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Abstract
We present in this thesis three distinct models in Financial Economics. In the
first chapter we present a pure exchange economy model with collateral constraints
in the spirit of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). As a first result in this chapter we prove
the existence of an equilibrium for this type of economies. We show that in this
type of models bubbles can exist and provide a bubble example in which the asset
containing the bubble pays positive dividends. We also show for the case of high
interest rates the equivalence between this type of models and the Arrow-Debreu
market structure.
In the second chapter we present a model with limited commitment and one-side
exclusion from financial markets in case of default. For this type of models we prove
a no-trade theorem in the spirit of Bulow and Rogoff (1989). This is done for an
economy with and without bounded investment in a productive activity.
The third chapter presents a 2 period economy with complete markets, and 250
states of the world and assets. For this economies we generate a sequence of observed
returns, and we show that a market proxy containing only 80% of the assets in the
economy provides similar results as the true market portfolio when estimating the
CAPM. We also show that for the examples we present a vast amount of observations
is required in order to reject the CAPM. This raises the question what the driving
force behind the bad empirical performance of the CAPM is.
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Introduction to the thesis
This thesis presents three essays in Financial Economics which build upon General
Equilibrium theory. In this work we address the topics of collateral constraints, bub-
bles, default with one-sided exclusion and the testability of the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM). All three works are essentially deviations from the workhorse model
in General Equilibrium theory; the Arrow-Debreu model. To highlight the connec-
tion between the models, we will proceed by outlining the major developments that
led to the Arrow-Debreu model and its most relevant extensions.
General Equilibrium theory seeks to address economic questions through rigorous
application of mathematics. Its main objective is to unite decision making of the
agents with the coordination of markets. As such it has become a powerful tool for
analysis in Financial Economics.
The field of General Equilibrium theory was pioneered by Le´on Walras, see for
example Walras (1926). The main idea of a General Equilibrium is that in an
economy prices influence agent choices and, given that resources are in scarce supply,
the aggregate of agent choices influences prices. Depending on the fundamentals of
the economy, e.g. consumer preferences, production technology, endowments, et
cetera, solving for the equilibrium allocation and the equilibrium price vector can
be very difficult and, if certain conditions are not fulfilled, it is not guaranteed
that a solution exists. In its modern form, General Equilibrium theory developed
around the works of Arrow and Debreu (1954) and McKenzie (1954). These works
provided equilibrium existence theorems based on Kakutani’s fixed point theorem
and distinguished themselves for leading the transition from Calculus based methods
to Topology based methods. A broad exposition of what came to be know as the
Arrow-Debreu, or Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model, can be found in Debreu (1959).
The Arrow-Debreu model is a model with a finite amount of time periods, a
finite amount of consumers or households and a finite amount of firms producing a
finite amount of goods. Households observe prices and state their demand for goods.
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They also own shares in firms such that profits are redistributed back to households.
Firms observe prices and state their demand for “intermediate” goods and supply
of “final” goods in order to maximise their profits. If markets clear, i.e. if for each
good the supply of goods is equal to the demand for goods, the price vector that
clears the markets together with the associated demand and supply for goods is
called an equilibrium. In this model labour is treated as a good. At a positive wage,
which is the price for the good labour, a household may have a negative demand for
labour. This means the household is supplying labour to firms. Goods are not in
general classified as intermediate and final goods, but depending on the technology
available to a firm a certain good is an intermediate good or a final good for the
firm. The model has essentially an implementation of a stock market, since agents
can trade the shares of firms among them.
In brief, an allocation with an associated price vector is a General Equilibrium
if at given prices the following conditions hold:
• For any household there does not exist a bundle of goods which is affordable
and preferred, i.e. agents are choosing the optimal consumption bundle among
the feasible choices.
• For any firm there does not exist a production plan which is technological
feasible and yields higher profits, i.e. firms are profit maximising.
• There does not exist a good for which the demand exceeds the supply or the
supply exceeds the demand, i.e. markets clear.
One of the most useful abstractions in Arrow and Debreu (1954) is that the same
physical good at a different location or at a different time is treated in the model
as a different good. This notion can be extended to probability spaces through the
definition of Arrow Securities. Arrow Securities have been introduced by Arrow
(1952). They consist in assets that pay one unit of the nume´raire good in exactly
one state of the world and zero in all other states. If for each state of the world one
of these Arrow Securities exists, the market is called complete and the equilibrium
existence proof in Arrow and Debreu (1954) can easily be extended to capture
uncertainty in this economy, as shown in Debreu (1959). For the case where markets
are incomplete, Radner (1972) proved that under certain conditions an equilibrium
can still exist. Radner’s work highlights also the difference between an Arrow-Debreu
market structure, where trade takes place only in the first period for all successive
periods, and sequential markets, where trade takes places from period to period in
a sequential fashion.
A second major extension of the standard model is due to Peleg and Yaari (1970),
and Bewley (1972). The paper of Peleg and Yaari extends the standard model for an
exchange economy to countable infinite many commodities or time periods. Bewley
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accomplishes the same task for an economy with production. Bewley’s paper is
especially relevant for chapter 1 of this thesis, where we use the same principle of
proving the existence of an equilibrium by truncating the economy and considering
the limit of equilibria for the truncated economies.
The first chapter presents an exchange economy with collateral requirements in
the spirit of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). When considering infinite lived agents,
who have the opportunity to save or borrow, a Transversality Condition has to be
imposed that forbids agents to choose trading sequence in which they continue rolling
over their debts and effectively never repay it. Given that it is not always possible
to give an economic meaningful interpretation of those Transversality Conditions,
borrowing constraints can be used to implement a Transversality Condition. For this
task, collateral constraints offer very intuitive borrowing limits that a very common
in contracts, as for example mortgages. We present in this chapter an equilibrium
existence result that extends the current literature on collateral constraints and
provides the foundations for models like Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Given that
borrowing constraints can give rise to bubbles, we show that bubbles in this model
can exist and provide a bubble example in the spirit of Kocherlakota (1992), and
Huang and Werner (2000). A particularity of this bubble example is that, the asset
containing the bubble is not fiat money but an asset paying positive dividends.
For this model we show also an equivalence between our framework and an Arrow-
Debreu market structure. This equivalence holds for the case of high interest as
defined by Alvarez and Jermann (2000). We provide a no bubble theorem that
rules out bubbles under high interest. This implies that our bubble example exist
in sequential markets but not in an Arrow-Debreu market structure.
The second chapter presents a model with limited commitment and one-sided
exclusion in case of default. In this chapter agents can invest in a productive activity
that yields a return in units of the consumption good. Agents have the same pro-
ductivity and we consider two version of the model. In the first version we assume
that agents’ investment is only limited by their budget constraint, in the second
version we assume that there exists an exogenous bound on investments, which we
normalise to unity. We allow agents to borrow from each other but we assume that
they cannot commit to their repayment promises and have the option to default on
their debts, i.e. we have limited commitment in the model. The punishment for de-
faulting consists in a one-sided exclusion from financial markets, i.e. after defaulting
an agent can save but not borrow. We assume that agents can observe the net debt
position of the other agents in the economy and that they will not lend to an other
agent if her/his next period endowment is not sufficient to cover all outstanding
debt. In this framework we show that agents have no incentive to repay their debts;
and thus the only equilibrium without default is a no-trade equilibrium in the spirit
of Bulow and Rogoff (1989). By constructing an appropriate example, we show that
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this result can have welfare implication in the economy with bounded investment
and the resulting outcome is not Pareto efficient. This result is consequential in the
study of financial markets and its welfare implications. We believe that this result
could also be an important reference point in development economics, especially
where market structures that regulate default are missing.
In the third chapter we use the notion of Arrow Securities to solve a two period
economy with 250 assets and 250 states of the world. We do this for two versions
of the economy, one in which agents have quadratic utility functions and the other
in which they have logarithmic utility functions. It is known that under quadratic
utility the CAPM holds. In contrast to, it does not hold in general under logarithmic
utility. For each economy we construct a random sequence of observed returns and
compare the performance of an OLS estimation of the CAPM based on the true
market portfolio against an estimation based on a market proxy containing only 80%
of the assets in the economy. We find that for both economies the estimations based
on the market proxy are close to the estimations based on the market portfolio. As
a consequence of this, it is very likely that using a market proxy does not distort the
CAPM tests. On the other hand, we find also that for the examples we present, the
deviations from the predictions of the CAPM are very small when we use logarithmic
utility. In this case we get only a significant rejection of the CAPM after increasing
the sequence of observed returns to an amount that is hardly feasible in tests based
on field data. This simulation is designed to test the implication of Roll’s critique
(see Roll, 1977) on the estimation of the CAPM. Our model is a completely artificial
economy in the sense that it contains no noise except for rounding errors in the
software package we are using. As such, our results raise the question whether a
test of the CAPM is truly feasible with real world data, given that it requires so
many observations in a well behaved data set as ours. Both of our findings are
connected to each other. On the one hand the errors produced by the market proxy
are negligible, on the other hand the true deviations from the CAPM are also small,
such that an extensive amount of observations is required to distinguish between an
economy where the CAPM holds and one where the CAPM does not hold.
We can show the connection of the three models presented by departing from the
Arrow-Debreu model. The model of the first chapter, is a pure exchange economy.
That is, compared to the Arrow-Debreu model we assume that the consumption
good is not produced by firms, but each household has its individual sequence of
endowments, which specifies how many units of the consumption good the agent
is endowed with at the beginning of each period. In the second chapter the future
endowment depends on the past investment. One can think of the endowments
being produced by trees. Depending on the economy we are considering, agents
can only plant a finite amount of these trees. Trees cannot be traded among the
agents, but as in the first chapter agents exchange promises on future delivery of
10
the consumption good.
The models presented in the first and second chapter are closely related to each
other. The key differences are the exogenous endowment stream, which the agents
face at the beginning of the first model, and the punishment in case of default.
The first model is an exchange economy in which agents smooth their consumption
depending on the endowment stream they face. It is possible to observe a high
amount of trade if the agents face very variable endowments streams, especially if
there exists a group of agents that faces a relative high endowment in periods where
another group faces a relative low endowment. The main role of the collateral
requirement in the first model is to discourage agents to default. So, in the first
model there will never exist an equilibrium in which an agent has an incentive to
default. In the Arrow-Debreu market structure this implies that all equilibria are
self-fulfilling.
In the second model, the only difference between agents is their initial wealth.
This implies that at the beginning of the period, there exist a group of agents which
is relative wealthy and one group which is relative poor. In principle, one would
expect that, given the decreasing marginal utility, the relative rich agent will lend
to the relative poor agent. This does not occur because the punishment considered
is too weak and the borrower is always better-off by defaulting at some period. In
an Arrow-Debreu market structure this implies that the only equilibria that are not
self-fulfilling are no-trade equilibria.
The main questions that arises from a comparison of the two models are; whether
we would observe trade by introducing collateral constraints with a punishment con-
sisting in a seizure of the collateral in the second model, and whether we could cat-
egorically exclude default in the first model, when considering a one-sided exclusion
as punishment instead of a seizure of the collateral.
Intuitively speaking, we can see from the proof of the no-trade equilibrium in
the second chapter, that trade can arise when considering the different punishment,
i.e. when agents loose their collateral in case of default. The intuition for the no-
trade result is that at some point in time the present value of the debt will start
to decrease, since the agent can not extend its debt further. Thus, the agent is
effectively starting to repay its debt. The collateral constraint would imply that the
present value of the collateral is equivalent to the present value of the outstanding
debt. From this would follow that in terms of present value the benefit of defaulting
is entirely cancelled out by the punishment which would go to the creditor.
In the case of the first model, one has to consider that when the collateral
constraint is imposed, there exists a long-lived asset that through a non-arbitrage
argument can be shown to be equivalent to the short-lived asset. By changing the
punishment, this equivalence would not hold any longer and the question would
arise, whether the short-lived asset will be traded at a premium because of the risk
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of default. Intuitively speaking, one can exclude that the two assets are equivalent
because if the return would be the same, then an agent might consider defaulting
on the promises involved in the short-lived asset and invest the amount on which
she/he defaulted in the long-lived asset. So, to answer this question, one would have
to look at the new choice sets of the agents, which in this case, might be non-convex.
This non-convexity can add further difficulties to the equilibrium existence proof. In
this sense the model sacrifices a realistic feature of economies for to achieve greater
simplicity.
In the third chapter we consider a two period economy in which agents are en-
dowed with an initial amount of the consumption good that can be used to purchase
shares in trees. The endowment of the consumption good in the second period is
again produced by trees. We also assume that there a different type of trees and
states of the world. The payoff of each tree depends on the state of the world that
occurs, such that each tree has its individual payoff vector. The payoff vectors of
the trees are all linearly independent and the market is complete. This model is
essentially the classical Arrow-Debreu model, with two difference. The first differ-
ence is that goods are not produced by firms, but by trees, whose output is random.
This implies that the firms profit maximisation problem is replaced by a distribu-
tion of aggregate output. The second is that there is no labour in the economy, so
households have simply to choose their investment strategies.
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CHAPTER 1
Financial markets with secured lending
1.1 Introduction
When considering infinite horizon models, a Transversality Condition needs to be
imposed to ensures the optimality of the consumers optimisation problem. This
condition is analogous to the terminal condition in finite horizon models. When
considering a finite horizon model, agents are usually required to save or borrow
nothing in the last period. This is because it cannot be optimal for an agent to
keep savings at the end of the last period, since she/he cannot consume them in
the successive periods. Similarly, an agent cannot accumulate debts at the end
of the last period, since there is no possibility to repay them. In such a case the
problem would be misspecified, given that the agent would essentially receive a
gift. In infinite horizon models there exists no terminal period, and one needs to
impose a condition that regulates the limit of the trading sequence. As in the finite
horizon model, it cannot be an optimal solution if the limit of the present value of
savings is positive, and it cannot be a valid solution if the limit of the present value
is negative, i.e. the agent effectively does not pay its debts. Especially the later
case is problematic in infinite horizon models, since the agent is running a Ponzi
scheme, which implies that the agent is repaying old debt obligations by issuing
new debt, such that effectively she/he is never repaying the debt. Thus, to rule
out Ponzi schemes and guarantee the optimality of the solution of the consumers’
optimisation problem, the Transversality Condition must hold; it is a necessary
condition. Strictly speaking, it would not be enough to impose a No Ponzi Game
Condition since this would not rule out that an agent saves too much, in the sense
that she/he could increase the utility by saving less. The problem of over-saving was
addressed, by Malinvaud (1953, 1962). In his paper the author extends the notion
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of Pareto efficiency, by demonstrating, that in an efficient allocation for a infinite
horizon problem with capital accumulation, the present value of future consumption
and future capital tend to zero as time tends to infinity (Malinvaud, 1953, p. 251).
As pointed out by Benveniste (1976), the proof presented by Malinvaud actually
shows that only the limit inferior is required to converge to zero for the program to
be efficient.
Usually, efficiency questions in General Equilibrium models are addressed by
considering an optimisation problem of a social planner. In our model we have
difficulties in addressing efficiency questions because the borrowing constraint is
endogenous and depends on prices, while the social planner does not consider prices.
This implies that we have difficulties in formulating the correct optimisation problem
for a social planner and cannot address efficiency questions in the classical way.
To rule out Ponzi schemes, borrowing constraints are frequently used in the
literature. Broadly speaking, the literature distinguishes between implicit borrowing
constraints and explicit borrowing constraints. Implicit borrowing constraints limit
the rate at which debt can grow. Essentially, they are a direct way of imposing a
no-Ponzi game condition by ruling out all borrowing sequences that are not conform
with this condition. Explicit borrowing constraints impose a direct bound on the
debt values for each period. This bounds will rule out Ponzi schemes, since they
impose an upper bound on debts, whose present value converges to zero. The
first approach has the advantage of being more general and allowing for a direct
comparison between the Arrow-Debreu market structure and sequential markets.
The second is more intuitive and easier to interpret economically.
There exists a vast literature which focuses on Transversaility Conditions in in-
finite horizon models. A recent exposition can be found in Martins-da-Rocha and
Vailakis (2012). A main issue highlighted in this literature is whether a common
evaluation for debt exists, as it is the case in complete markets. When a com-
mon evaluation exists, one can impose a solvency requirement that implies that the
present value of the debt can never exceed the present value of the future endowment
or income.
In this model there exists a common evaluation of debt, but because we allow
for the possibility of default we impose a more stringent borrowing constraint that
rules out default at equilibrium. We do this by imposing a collateral constraint in
the spirit of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). This offers an intuitive way of eliminating
strategic default and allows us to study the use of collateral as an instrument for risk
sharing. The provision of collateral is one of the most important means of securing
loans and, if one considers the mortgage market it is one of the most widespread.
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008 collateral backed loans have been in the
focus of the public attention and are perceived as one of the major causes of the
crises. In spite of this negative attention, it has to be mentioned that collateral as a
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mean of securing loan has two major benefits. First, the use of collateral decreases
incentives of strategic default. Second, it allows for more risk sharing among agents.
These benefits become obvious if one considers that especially for young individuals
it becomes easier to acquire a property by means of secured loans. The gap between
the public’s perception and the obvious benefits of collateral backed assets highlights
the need of research in this subject.
This chapter contributes to this field by studying a pure exchange, deterministic
economy with infinitely lived agents and a single consumption good. Loans are
protected by collateral constraints in the spirit of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). For
each loan, agents have to provide the equivalent value in units of a long-lived asset
as collateral. In case of default, the lender has the right to seize the collateral as
reparation. The implication of this is that there will be no default at equilibrium.
Our first contribution consist in proving the existence of an equilibrium for these
type of economies. To do this, we use a similar argument as Bewley (1972). We
truncate the economy and consider first a finite period economy. For this truncated
economy we use the fixed point theorem provided by Gale and Mas-Colell (1975,
1979) to prove the existence of an equilibrium. By moving the truncation period
towards infinity, we are able to show that the equilibrium in the truncated economy
converges to an equilibrium for the infinite period economy. This equilibrium exis-
tence proof serves as a reference point for works that study models with collateral
constraints and can be a point of departure to prove the existence of an equilibrium
in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
As shown by Kocherlakota (1992), it is possible that in sequential markets with
borrowing constraints bubbles can arise at equilibrium. Our second contribution
consists in showing that in the model we propose, the collateral constraint can give
rise to a bubble. We also present a bubble example in the spirit of Kocherlakota
(1992) and Huang and Werner (2000).
Bubbles are not a novelty in General Equilibrium models. Tirole (1985) shows
that in Overlapping Generations models bubbles occur when the resources in the
economy grow fast enough to enable agents to trade the bubble. This is also a crucial
condition in our model and, similarly to Huang and Werner (2000), we are able to
exclude bubbles when the limit of the present value of the aggregate endowment
is finite. A key assumption in Tirol’s model is that savings are nonproductive,
in the sense that savings do not increase a production factor like capital and as
a consequence, do not influence future aggregate output directly. In the model
we propose, future endowment is exogenously given and thus the saving decisions
have no effect on the amount of the consumption good available in each period.
The importance of this assumption is highlighted in Becker et al. (2012), where
the authors show that bubbles cannot occur in a Ramsey economy with borrowing
constraints similar to ours. Given that the model proposed by Becker et al. (2012)
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is a growth model, the amount that the economy saves on aggregate determines the
return on savings and the amount of available consumption in each period. The
proof of Theorem 7 in Becker et al. (2012) shows that this excludes bubbles.
The key difference between our findings and Tirol’s findings lies in the interpre-
tation of the bubble. Tirol shows that bubbles can help restore the Golden Rule
level of savings and avoid over accumulation of capital. The intuition for this result
is that in an Overlapping Generations model the young generations acquire the asset
containing the bubble, foreseeing that they can resell it to the next generation when
they are old. This provides a further opportunity to smooth consumption. In the
case where the asset containing the bubble pays no dividends, it can be called fiat
money. The money in this economy is then not needed for conducting transactions
but for storing value. This intuition does not hold in our model. In the example
that we provide, the bubble occurs because the borrowing constraints does not per-
mit the constrained agents to short-sell the asset containing the bubble. From this,
it follows that the driving force behind our bubble example is the borrowing con-
straint. It is difficult to establish whether this has particular welfare implications
as in Tirol’s paper, since in our model we would have to consider that a possible
relaxation of the borrowing constraint could lead to default.
As third contribution, we establish an equivalence results between a sequential
market equilibrium and an Arrow-Debreu market equilibrium for the case of high
interest rates.1 We can show that under high interest rates no bubble can exist.
Thus the bubble example we construct applies only to sequential market structures.
The structure of the paper is the following. In section 1.2 we will present the
model an relate our notation to similar models in the literature. Section 1.3 dis-
cusses properties of the equilibrium and the bubble example. Section 1.4 derives
the equivalence between the sequential market equilibrium and the Arrow-Debreu
market equilibrium. Section 1.5 presents the equilibrium existence proof. The final
section contains concluding remarks and suggestions for further research.
1.2 The model
1.2.1 Agents and commodities
There is a single non-durable consumption good available for trade at every period
t ∈ T = {0, 1, ...}. We let p = (pt)t∈T denote the sequence of spot prices where
pt ∈ R+ denotes the price of the consumption good at period t.
There is a finite set I of infinitely lived agents. Each agent i ∈ I is characterized
by an endowment sequence ωi = (ωit)t∈T where ω
i
t ∈ R+ denotes agent’s i endowment
available at period t. Each agent chooses a consumption sequence ci = (cit)t∈T where
1The terminology follows Alvarez and Jermann (2000).
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cit ∈ R+. The utility function U i : R∞+ −→ [0,+∞] is assumed to be time-additively
separable, i.e.,
U i(ci) =
∑
t∈T
βtiui(c
i
t), (1.2.1)
where ui : R+ −→ [0,∞) represents the instantaneous utility function at period t
and βi ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. Given a consumption sequence ci = (cit)t>0
the continuation utility U it (c) beginning at period t is defined as follows
U it (c
i) ≡
∑
s>t
βs−ti ui(c
i
s). (1.2.2)
1.2.2 Financial markets
There is a short-lived asset available for trade whose return amounts to pt units of
the consumption good at each period t. We let q = (qt)t∈T denote the asset price
sequence where qt ∈ R+ represents the asset price at period t. For every agent i, we
denote by zit ∈ R her/his net financial position on the short-lived asset at period t.
Each agent i starts with a zero position on the asset, i.e., zi−1 = 0.
There is in addition a long-lived asset that pays its owner a dividend ξt ∈ R+.
The physical asset is in positive net supply and its stock is normalized to unity.
For each agent i, we denote by xit ∈ R+ the amount of claims held by the agent
at period t. Initial endowments are positive and sum up to 1, i.e., xi−1 > 0 and
Σi∈Ixi−1 = 1. We let r = (rt)t∈T denote the long-lived asset price sequence where
rt ∈ R+ represents the price at period t.
The amount of the short-lived asset an agent can short-sell is observable and
subject to an upper bound. The bound is endogenous and follows from the institu-
tional environment in this economy. We assume that commitment is limited. Agents
cannot be forced to repay their debts. If agent i has being short on the short-lived
asset at period t, that is, if her/his net financial position is zit < 0, she/he should
deliver the promise −pt+1zit at period t+ 1. However, agent i may decide to default
and choose to deliver a quantity dit+1 in units of the consumption good which is
strictly less that her/his obligation −pt+1zit. In this case, an institution can seize
agent’s i long-lived asset holdings plus the dividend and transfer their ownership
to creditors. Lenders keep track of borrowers’ asset positions and the provision of
credit never exceeds the value [rt+1 +pt+1ξt+1]x
i
t. In other words, agents collateralize
their short-lived asset position and go short up to the value of their long-lived asset
holdings. In this setting, each agent i faces the following constraints
∀t ∈ T , [rt+1 + pt+1ξt+1]xit > −pt+1zit.
Given this constraint, no agent has an incentive to default at equilibrium. This is
in line with Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), where default occurs only after the shock.
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From this point of view our model misses on a major stylized fact, which is the
occurrence of default in real economies. The presence of uncertainty is fundamental
to generate default at equilibrium. Kubler and Schmedders (2003) use a similar
collateral constraint to test welfare implications of default. In their model there
exists an event tree such that default may occur at some nodes of the tree, i.e. after
a particular history. The existence of default in their model relies on the fact that at
any successive node there exists at least one event where the agent repays its debt.
Otherwise agents would anticipate that a particular agent would in any case default
and would not issue the loan. Our model can be understood as an event tree with
only one ramification, i.e. only one history can occur. This implies that if there
would exits a period in which an agent would default, then by individual rationality
no other agent would issue a loan to her/him. Thus, our decision to eliminate default
at equilibrium is dictated by the fact that we are using a non stochastic model.
1.2.3 Budget constraints
Let A be the space of sequences a = (at)t∈T with2
at = (ct, zt, xt) ∈ R+ × R× R+.
Agent i’s choice ai = (ci, zi, xi) ∈ A must satisfy the following constraints:
• budget constraints:
∀t ∈ T , ptcit + qtzit + rtxit 6 ptωit + [rt + ptξt]xit−1 + ptzit−1; (1.2.3)
• borrowing constraints:
∀t ∈ T , [rt+1 + pt+1ξt+1]xit > −pt+1zit. (1.2.4)
• no short-selling of the long-lived asset:
∀t ∈ T , xit > 0. (1.2.5)
1.2.4 The equilibrium concept
We denote by Π the set of sequences of prices (p, q, r) satisfying
∀t ∈ T , (pt, qt, rt) ∈ R+ × R+ × R+. (1.2.6)
Given a sequence of prices (p, q, r) ∈ Π we denote by Bi(p, q, r) the set of plans
a = (c, z, x) ∈ A satisfying constraints (1.2.3), (1.2.4) and (1.2.5).
2By convention we let a−1 = (c−1, z−1, x−1) with c−1 = 0 and z−1 = 0.
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Definition 1.2.1. A competitive equilibrium for the economy
E = (ui, βi, ωi, xi−1, zi−1)i∈I
is a family of prices (p, q, r) ∈ Π and an allocation a = (ai)i∈I with ai ∈ A such that
(a) for every agent i, the plan ai is optimal among the budget feasible plans, i.e.,
ai maximizes (1.2.1) and ai ∈ Bi(p, q, r).
(b) commodity markets clear at every period, i.e.,
∀t ∈ T ,
∑
i∈I
cit =
∑
i∈I
ωit + ξt; (1.2.7)
(c) the asset markets clear at every period, i.e.,
∀t ∈ T ,
∑
i∈I
zit = 0; (1.2.8)
and
∀t ∈ T ,
∑
i∈I
xit = 1. (1.2.9)
The set of allocations a = (ai)i∈I in A satisfying the market clearing conditions
(1.2.7), (1.2.8) and (1.2.9) is denoted by F. Each allocation in F is called physically
feasible. A plan ai ∈ A is called physically feasible if there exists a physically feasible
allocation (bi)i∈I ∈ F such that ai = bi.
1.2.5 Assumptions
It should be clear that these assumptions always hold throughout the paper.
(A.1) For each agent i ∈ I, the sequence of endowments ωi belongs to the interior
of `+∞.
(A.2) For every period t, the utility function ui is concave, continuous, C
1, strictly
increasing on R+ with ui(0) = 0 and satisfies
lim
c→0
u′i(c) = +∞.
(A.3) The dividend sequence (ξt)t∈T belongs to `+∞ and satisfies the following prop-
erty
∀t > 0, ∃τ > t such that ξτ > 0.
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1.2.6 Relation to the literature
The model is closely related to the one analysed by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
Kiyotaki and Moore abstract from the aforementioned general equilibrium structure.
Their baseline set up can be summarized as follows:
a. There are two consumers: the farmer and the gatherer.
b. There are two commodities: one durable (land) and one perishable (fruits).
The nume´raire good is the fruit and the price of land is denominated in units
of the fruit. Land does not depreciate and has a fixed total supply. To facilitate
the comparison between the two settings let xit denote the amount of land hold
by consumer i at period t and let cit denote the quantity of fruits consumed by
agent i at period t. Let pt denote the price of fruits and bt denote the amount of
fruits the farmer borrows at period t. The amount (in units of the fruit) the farmer
should pay at period t+ 1 per fruit borrowed is endogenous and is denoted by Rt+1.
Commitment is limited in this economy. By investing in land, the farmer can work
and produce fruits to repay back her/his debt. However, the farmer may decide not
to work. In that case, the lender (the gatherer) is not sure whether the farmer will
pay back her/his debt. The gatherer accepts to lend fruits only if the farmer gives
land as collateral.
To relate this setting with our set up one could consider that there is one short-
lived asset, paying in units of the fruit, that the farmer can short-sell. Assume that
there is a number Ct > 0 representing the units of land collateralized for one unit of
the asset sold at period t. Let us further consider that the asset pays one unit of the
fruit next period and denote by qt the unit price of the asset at period t in units of
the fruit. The price of the land in units of fruit is denoted by rt. If the farmer sells
short zt < 0 units of the asset she/he has to put as collateral −Ctzt units of land. At
time t, the farmer receives −qtzt units of the fruit and she/he should deliver −pt+1zt
units of the fruit at period t+ 1.
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) model the financial markets choosing the parametriza-
tion (bt, Rt+1) where Rt+1 is the gross interest rate. The correspondence between
the two settings is given by the equations
bt = −qtzt and Rt+1 = pt+1/qt. (1.2.10)
In the parametrization of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the farmer should put as a
collateral CtRt+1bt units of land when she/he asks for a loan bt. Therefore, the
farmer faces the following constraint
CtRt+1bt 6 xt. (1.2.11)
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If there is no other enforcement mechanism, the farmer will always deliver
min{Rt+1bt, rt+1CtRt+1bt} = Rt+1bt min{1, rt+1Ct}. (1.2.12)
A borrower defaults at period t + 1 if rt+1Ct < 1 but repays fully her/his debt if
rt+1Ct > 1.
In Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the gatherer allows the farmer to borrow bt units
of fruit only if
Rt+1bt 6 rt+1xt (1.2.13)
i.e., the amount the farmer should repay cannot be strictly larger than the mar-
ket value of the land she/he owns. That is, the collateral level is endogenously
determined as follows:
Ct =
1
rt+1
. (1.2.14)
In other words, the collateral is chosen such that no borrower has incentives to
default. In a sense the collateral level is chosen to be the less stringent (in terms of
borrowing restrictions it imposes) among those levels that ensure no default.
Using equation (1.2.10), (1.2.13) implies that
rt+1xt > −pt+1zt. (1.2.15)
Equation (1.2.15) is similar to equation (1.2.4). The difference rests on the fact that
in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) only the asset holdings (not the dividend) can be
seized.3
We can also relate our model to the one proposed by Kubler and Schmedders
(2003).4 The crucial difference with respect to our set up rests on the specification
of collateral levels. Using our notation, agents in Kubler and Schmedders (2003)
face the following constraints
∀t ∈ T , xt > −Ctzt. (1.2.16)
The collateral requirement Ct may depend on the current period endogenous vari-
ables i.e., Ct = ft(pt, rt, (c
i
t, x
i
t)i∈I) for some continuous function ft. Contrary to
our set up, the constraints in (1.2.16) do not exclude default at equilibrium. Given
t-period equilibrium prices and allocations, if the collateral level Ct is strictly less
than 1/rt+1 then there will be default at period t+ 1.
3To be more specific in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) agents use the land to produce fruits using
a production technology. It is assumed that the output of their production (the equivalent to our
dividend) cannot be seized.
4Kubler and Schmedders (2003) consider a variant of the model proposed by Araujo et al. (2002)
in which collateral takes the form of long-lived assets instead of durable and storable goods.
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1.3 Equilibrium asset pricing
Let (p, q, r) ∈ Π and an allocation a = (ai)i∈I with ai ∈ A be an equilibrium for the
economy E . For any agent i ∈ I there exists a sequence of multipliers (λit)t>0 and
(µit)t>0 associated with the constraints (1.2.3) and (1.2.4) such that the following
first order conditions hold:
(a) λitpt = β
t
iu
′
i(c
i
t);
(b) −λitrt + (λit+1 + µit)[rt+1 + pt+1ξt+1]+ς it = 0;
(c) −λitqt + pt+1(λit+1 + µit) = 0;
(d) λit[ptc
i
t + qtz
i
t + rtx
i
t − ptωit − [rt + ptξt]xit−1 − ptzit−1] = 0;
(e) µit[(rt+1 + pt+1ξt+1)x
i
t + pt+1z
i
t] = 0;
(f) ς itx
i
t = 0.
Proposition 1.3.1. For any period t ∈ T we have pt > 0, qt > 0 and rt > 0.
Moreover, the equilibrium price sequences (p, q, r) satisfy the following non-arbitrage
relation
rt
qt
=
[
rt+1
pt+1
+ ξt+1
]
(1.3.1)
and ∀i ∈ I we have ς it = 0.
Proof. The fact that pt > 0 and qt > 0 are strictly positive follows from the strict
increasingness of ui and the first order conditions (a) and (c). Combining (b) and
(c) gives
rt
qt
=
[
rt+1
pt+1
+ ξt+1
]
+
ς it
λit
.
Market clearing implies that xjt > 0 for some agent j ∈ I. Therefore, we have ςjt = 0
and condition (1.3.1) holds for this agent j. Given that each agent faces the same
prices and dividend stream, (1.3.1) must hold for every agent. From this follows
that ς it = 0, ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T .
Assumption (A.3) implies that there exists a subsequence (ξtk)k>1 such that
ξtk > 0 for all k > 1. Fix a date τ ∈ T such that ξτ+1 > 0. Summing up over i
the constraints (1.2.4) and use market clearing in security and asset markets (i.e.,
equations (1.2.8) and (1.2.9)) we get that
rτ+1 + pτ+1ξτ+1 > 0.
If rτ 6 0, then from the first order condition (b) we must have λiτ+1 + µiτ 6 0. This
is a contradiction since λiτ+1 > 0 (due to the Inada condition on ui) and µ
i
τ > 0.
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Therefore, rτ > 0 and using (1.3.1) we conclude that rt > 0 for any t < τ . Following
a recursive procedure we can show that rt > 0 for all t ∈ T .
We can normalise the price sequence of the consumption good by setting pt = 1,
∀t ∈ T . Since the equilibrium prices are strictly positive, market clearing in asset
markets implies that at every period t there is at least some agent i for which the
constraint (1.2.4) is not binding. The following proposition shows that non-binding
agents have the highest marginal rate of substitution. That is, at any period t, those
agents equalise their marginal rates of substitution.
Proposition 1.3.2. If for some j ∈ I
[rt+1 + ξt+1]x
j
t > −zjt
then
βj
u′j(c
j
t+1)
u′j(c
j
t)
= max
i∈I
βi
u′i(c
i
t+1)
u′i(c
i
t)
.
Proof. It follows from a variational argument that is based on the first order condi-
tions.
Propositions (1.3.1) and (1.3.2) have implications for asset pricing. In particular,
we get that for any period t ∈ T
qt = max
i∈I
λit+1
λit
= max
i∈I
βi
u′i(c
i
t+1)
u′i(c
i
t)
(1.3.2)
and
rt = max
i∈I
βi
u′i(c
i
t+1)
u′i(c
i
t)
[rt+1 + ξt+1] . (1.3.3)
Equations (1.3.2) and (1.3.3) imply that it is possible to find a common evaluation
for calculating the present value of debt. Nevertheless, the market is not complete
since the constrained agents cannot trade in such a manner to equate their marginal
rate of substitution of current and future consumption to the price vector. Thus, in
this case the market is sequentially incomplete.
A recursive argument shows that
r0 =
T∑
t=1
Qt0ξt +Q
T
0 rT (1.3.4)
where
Q00 = 1 and ∀t > 1, Qt0 =
t−1∏
σ=0
qσ (1.3.5)
denotes the Arrow-Debreu price that is equal to the present value (as of period 0)
of one unit of consumption at date t. By construction, we have that qt = Q
t+1
0 /Q
t
0.
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Since (1.3.1) holds, we get the following recursive equation
∀t ∈ T , Qt+10 =
rt
rt+1 + ξt+1
Qt0. (1.3.6)
Moreover, observe that for any t we have
λitrt
λi0
6 Qt0rt 6 r0. (1.3.7)
The fundamental value of the long-lived asset at period 0, denoted FV0, is defined
as the present value of the dividend using as a discount factor the sequence of Arrow-
Debreu prices (Qt0)t>1 i.e.,
FV0 =
∞∑
t=1
Qt0ξt. (1.3.8)
If at equilibrium the price of the asset at period 0, r0, equals its fundamental value
FV0, then we say that there is no sequential price bubble. Otherwise, there is a
price bubble equal to the difference between r0 and FV0. A necessary and sufficient
condition for no sequential price bubbles is that
lim
T→∞
QT0 rT = 0. (1.3.9)
Proposition 1.3.3. For any agent i ∈ I, the sequence of Lagrange multipliers
(λit)t∈T is summable (i.e., it belongs to `
+
1 ).
Proof. Fix a period T . Multiplying both sides of (1.2.3) by the multiplier λit, sum-
ming over all t from 0 to T and using the first order conditions (b), (c) and (e)
produces
T∑
t=0
λitc
i
t + λ
i
T [qT z
i
T + rTx
i
T ] =
T∑
t=0
λitω
i
t + λ
i
0[r0 + ξ0]x
i
−1. (1.3.10)
From (1.3.7) we have
λiT rT
λi0
6 QT0 rT 6 r0.
Let ait defined by
ait ≡ xit +
qt
rt
zit.
Observe that ait > 0 (this is because of the collateral constraint (1.2.4)) and
∑
i∈I a
i
t =
1 (because of market clearing). One has
λiT qT z
i
T + λ
i
T rTx
i
T = λ
i
T rTa
i
T 6 λi0r0. (1.3.11)
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Equations (1.3.10) and (1.3.11) together with the concavity of ui imply that
T∑
t=0
λitω
i
t 6 λi0r0 +
T∑
t=0
λitc
i
t = λ
i
0r0 +
T∑
t=0
βtiu
′
i(c
i
t)c
i
t
6 λi0r0 +
T∑
t=0
βti(ui(c
i
t)− ui(0))
6 λi0r0 +
T∑
t=0
βtiui(W )
where W = maxi∈I ||ωi||+ ||ξ||. Since ωi belongs to the interior of `+∞ (Assumption
A1), it follows that (λit)t∈T belongs to `
+
1 .
Proposition 1.3.4. For any agent i ∈ I, the sequence (λitrtait)t∈T converges to 0,
i.e., limt→∞ λitrta
i
t = 0.
Proof. Observe that (λitrt)t∈T is a non-increasing sequence (this follows from the
first order condition (b)), so it has a limit denoted η > 0. Observe also that the
last part of the proof of Proposition (1.3.3) (see the last inequalities) shows that∑∞
t=0 λ
i
tω
i
t and
∑∞
t=0 λ
i
tc
i
t are both finite.
Assume by contradiction that limt→∞ λitrt = η > 0. Since λ
i
t → 0, then rt → +∞
and qt
rt
→ 0 (because of the non-arbitrage condition (1.3.1)). Recall that
ait = x
i
t +
qt
rt
zit.
It follows from (1.3.10) that limt→∞ ait exists and it is finite. We claim that in this
case limt→∞ ait = 0.
Indeed, if limt→∞ ait > 0, there exists T and ε > 0 strictly smaller than η such
that
∀t > T, xit +
qt
rt
zit >
ηε
η − ελ
i
0.
Consider the following asset plan (ẑit)t∈T defined as follows
ẑit =
{
zit if t < T
zit − ηεQt0qt if t > T.
The non-arbitrage condition (1.3.1) and the definition of qt imply that
∀t > T, qt+1 ηε
Qt+10 qt+1
=
ηε
Qt0qt
.
Moreover,
∀t > T, [rt+1 + ξt+1]xit > −ẑit.5
5This is because qt = Q
t+1
0 /Q
t
0 and (1.3.6) imply that the constraint is equivalent to x
i
t+
qt
rt
ẑit >
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It follows that the plan (ẑit)t∈T allows us to finance a consumption sequence ĉ
i that
differs from ci after the period T − 1 and enjoy higher utility, i.e., U i(ĉi) > U i(ĉi).
Obviously this contradicts the optimality of (ci, zi, xi). Therefore, limt→∞ ait = 0.
Assume that limt→∞ λitrt = 0 and observe that from equation (1.2.4) and the
market clearing conditions follows ait ∈ [0, 1],∀i ∈ I. In this case it follows immedi-
ately that
lim
t→∞
λitrta
i
t = 0, ∀i ∈ I.
Theorem 1.3.1. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) There is no sequential price bubble
(ii) limT→∞QT0 rT = 0
(iii) ∀i ∈ I, limT→∞
∑T
t=0 Q
t
0(c
i
t − ωit) exists.
Proof. (i)⇔ (ii): This is because (ii) is a necessary and sufficient condition for no
sequential price bubbles.
(ii)⇒ (iii): Recall that
ait = x
i
t +
qt
rt
zit
and ait > 0,
∑
i∈I a
i
t = 1. Multiplying both sides of (1.2.3) by Q
t
0, summing over all
t from 0 to T and using the recursive relation (1.3.6) we get
T∑
t=0
Qt0(ω
i
t − cit) + (r0 + ξ0)xi−1 = QT0 rTaiT . (1.3.12)
Hence
lim inf
T
T∑
t=0
Qt0(ω
i
t − cit) + (r0 + ξ0)xi−1 > 0
and
lim sup
T
T∑
t=0
Qt0(ω
i
t − cit) + (r0 + ξ0)xi−1 6 lim
T
QT0 rT .
If (ii) holds, then
lim sup
T
T∑
t=0
Qt0(ω
i
t − cit) = lim inf
T
T∑
t=0
Qt0(ω
i
t − cit).
0. Moreover, using (1.3.7) and the fact that limt→∞ λitrt = η gives
xit +
qt
rt
ẑit = x
i
t +
qt
rt
zit −
qt
rt
ηε
Qt0qt
> xit +
qt
rt
zit −
ηελi0
λitrt
> xit +
qt
rt
zit −
ηε
η − ελ
i
0 > 0.
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(iii)⇒ (i): Assume that limT→∞
∑T
t=0 Q
t
0(c
i
t − ωit) exists and that (i) is not true.
It follows from (ii) that QT0 rT → η > 0. In this case, using (1.3.12), we get that
limt→∞ ait exists. From Proposition (1.3.4), follows then that limt→∞ a
i
t = 0 and we
have the following contradiction
1 = lim
t→∞
∑
i∈I
ait =
∑
i∈I
lim
t→∞
ait = 0.
The following corollary is in the spirit of Theorem 6.1 in Huang and Werner
(2000). Roughly speaking it states that bubbles are excluded if interest rates (the
inverse of Arrow-Debreu prices) are greater than the growth rate of economy’s ag-
gregate endowment.
Corollary 1.3.1 (Huang-Werner, 2000). Assume that
∑∞
t=0 Q
t
0ωt < +∞, where
ωt =
∑
i∈I ω
i
t. Then, there is no sequential price bubble.
Proof. Fix some agent i ∈ I. From equation (1.3.12) we have that∑∞t=0 Qt0cit < +∞.
Therefore, limT→∞
∑T
t=0Q
t
0(c
i
t − ωit) exists in which case we can use Theorem 1.3.1
to prove the result.
The sufficient condition in Corollary 1.3.1 involves endogenous variables (Arrow-
Debreu prices) and as result is difficult to verify in workable examples. We next
provide a sufficient condition for ruling out bubbles that expressed only in funda-
mentals.
Corollary 1.3.2. Let k > 0. If ξt > kmaxi∈I ωit for any period t ∈ T , then there is
no sequential price bubble.
Proof. From equation (1.3.4) we have
∑∞
t=1 Q
t
0ξt 6 r0. Under our assumption this
implies that k
∑∞
t=1Q
t
0ω
i
t 6
∑∞
t=1Q
t
0ξt 6 r0 for any i ∈ I. We apply next Corollary
1.3.1.
The next result is in the spirit of Proposition 4 in Kocherlakota (1992). It states
that a sequential price bubble can occur only if there exists an agent who is infinitely
rich.
Corollary 1.3.3 (Kocherlakota, 1992). Assume that there exists a sequential price
bubble. Then, there exists an agent j such that (ajt)t∈T has no limit. For any such
agent, we have that
∑∞
t=0Q
t
0ω
j
t = +∞.
Proof. Assume that for any i ∈ I, (ait)t∈T has a limit. It follows from (1.3.12) that
limT
∑T
t=0Q
t
0(ω
i
t−cit) exists, in which case we have no price bubble: a contradiction.
Let j be such that (ajt)t∈T has no limit and assume that limT
∑T
t=0 Q
t
0ω
j
t < +∞.
In this case,
∑∞
t=0 Q
t
0c
j
t < +∞ and limT
∑T
t=0 Q
t
0(c
j
t − ωjt ) exists. From (1.3.12),
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limT Q
T
0 rTa
j
T exists, and since Q
T
0 rT → η > 0 (by the assumption of a sequential
price bubble), limT a
j
T exists too: a contradiction.
Remark 1.3.1. Kocherlakota (1992) (see Proposition 4) provides an alternative proof
of Corollary 1.3.3. However, to prove the result, he claims that if a sequence (at)t∈T
is bounded and has no limit, then there must exists a subsequence (tn)
∞
n=1 and a pos-
itive constant b such that (atn−atn−1) > b for all n. As the following counterexample
illustrates, this claim is not correct.6
We construct a sequence as follows: a1 = 1 and at = at−1 + 1/t for 2 6 t 6 τ1,
where τ1 is the first period such that aτ1 > 2 (such a period always exists). Define
next at = at−1−1/t for τ1 + 1 6 t 6 τ2, where τ2 is the first date such that aτ2 < −2
(such a period always exists). Then, you define at = at−1 + 1/t until the first date
you reach the value 2 and so on so forth.
The sequence (at)t∈T constructed in this way is bounded, does not converge, and
for any subsequence (tn)
∞
n=1 we have limn(atn − atn−1) = 0.
We present next an example of a sequential equilibrium with price bubble. An
interesting feature of our example, as opposed to the example of Kocherlakota (1992)
and Huang and Werner (2000), is that the asset is not fiat money and there is no
growth.
Example 1.3.1. We consider an economy with two infinitely-lived agents (i = 1, 2)
characterised by the same CRRA instantaneous utility function
u(c) =
c1−θ
1− θ , θ > 0,
having common discount factor β ∈ (0, 1) and initial asset holdings xi−1 = 1/2 for
i = 1, 2. The asset’s dividend process (ξt)t∈T satisfies: ξ0 > 1 and
∑∞
t=1 ξt 6 1.
Denote by γ the following constant
γ =
1
β1/θ
and consider the sequence (bt)t∈T defined as follows: b0 = 1, b1 = 1 − ξ1,. . . , bt =
1−∑ts=1 ξt, . . . .
The endowments are specified as follows:
Observe that for both agents we have (ωit)t∈T ∈ int`+∞. We chose the price
sequence r to be equal to the process b, i.e., rt = bt for all t. There is trade only
on the long lived asset, i.e, for i = 1, 2, zit = 0 for all t ∈ T . The price sequence
q is given by qt = 1 for all t. The equilibrium values of the Lagrange multipliers
(µit)t∈T are specified in table 1.2. The consumption and long-lived asset allocations
are specified in table 1.3.
6We are grateful to Paulo Klinger Monteiro for the idea underlying the construction of this
counterexample.
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Endowments for agent 1 (τ > 1) Endowments for agent 2 (τ > 2)
ω10 = 1 ω
2
0 > 0
ω11 + b0 = β
1/θ(ω10 + ξ0)× 1/2 ω21 − b1 = β1/θ(ω20 + (b0 + ξ0)× 1/2) + γ
ω12 − b2 = β2/θ(ω10 + ξ0)× 1/2 + γ ω22 + b1 = β2/θ(ω20 + (b0 + ξ0)× 1/2) + 1
ω12τ+1 + b2τ = β
1/θ(ω12τ − b2τ ) ω22τ−1 − b2τ−1 = β2/θ(ω22τ−3 − b2τ−3) + γ
ω12τ+2 − b2τ+2 = β1/θ(ω12τ+1 + b2τ ) + γ ω22τ + b2τ−1 = β2/θ(ω22τ−2 + b2τ−3) + 1
Table 1.1: Endowments
Multipliers for agent 1 Multipliers for agent 2
µ10 = 0 µ
2
0 = λ
2
0 − λ21
µ11 = λ
1
1 − λ12 µ21 = 0
µ12t = 0 µ
2
2t = λ
2
2t − λ22t+1
µ12t+1 = λ
1
2t+1 − λ12t+2 µ22t+1 = 0
Table 1.2: Lagrange multipliers (µit)t∈T
Allocations for agent 1 Allocations for agent 2
x12t = 1, x
1
2t+1 = 0 x
2
2t = 0, x
2
2t+1 = 1
c10 = (ω
1
0 + ξ0)× 1/2 c20 = ω20 + (ξ0 + r0)× 1/2
c11 = ω
1
1 + r0 c
2
1 = ω
2
1 − r1
c12t = ω
1
2t − r2t c22t = ω22t + r2t−1
c12t+1 = ω
1
2t+1 + r2t c
2
2t+1 = ω
2
2t+1 − r2t+1
Table 1.3: Equilibrium allocations
To see that these prices and allocations are an equilibrium, we first note that
markets clear at every date, the budget and short-sales constraints are all satis-
fied. Moreover, the first order conditions as well as the Transversality Condition
limt→∞ βtu′(ct)xit = 0 are also satisfied.
Observe that
∀t ∈ T , Qt+10 =
rt
rt+1 + ξt+1
Qt0 = Q
t
0.
and Qt0rt → r = 1−
∑∞
t=1 ξt. If
∑∞
t=1 ξt < 1 then r > 0 and then there is a sequential
price bubble. If
∑∞
t=1 ξt = 1 then r = 0 and bubbles are excluded.
The intuition of the above example is similar as in Example 1 by Kocherlakota
(1992). The borrowing constraint does not permit agents to permanently reduce
their asset holdings, because it will bind in every other period. At the same time
the endowments grow fast enough to permit agents to purchase the asset when they
are unconstrained.
We close this section by introducing an equivalent competitive equilibrium con-
cept that involves wealth constraints. This concept will appear useful when we prove
existence of a competitive equilibrium.
Assume that there exists an equilibrium for the economy E . The absence of
arbitrage opportunities requires that at any period t ∈ T the equilibrium price
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sequences (p, q, r) satisfy (1.3.1), i.e.,
∀t ∈ T , rt
qt
=
[
rt+1
pt+1
+ ξt+1
]
.
Denote
∀t ∈ T , θit−1 =
[
rt
pt
+ ξt
]
xit−1 + z
i
t−1.
Using this new variable, constraints (1.2.3) and (1.2.4) can be written as follows:
(a) budget constraints:
∀t ∈ T , ptcit + qtθit 6 ptωit + ptθit−1. (1.3.13)
(b) wealth constraints:
∀t ∈ T , θit > 0. (1.3.14)
We define next a competitive equilibrium with wealth constraints.
Definition 1.3.1. An equilibrium with wealth constraints consists of prices (p, q, r) ∈
Π together with consumption and wealth profiles (ci, θi)i∈I such that:
(a) for each agent i, (ci, θi) is optimal among all plans satisfying constraints (1.3.13),
(1.3.14);
(b) commodity markets clear, i.e.,
∀t ∈ T ,
∑
i∈I
cit =
∑
i∈I
ωit + ξt; (1.3.15)
(c) asset market clears, i.e.,
∀t ∈ T ,
∑
i∈I
θit =
rt+1
pt+1
+ ξt+1; (1.3.16)
(d) non-arbitrage relation, i.e.,
∀t ∈ T , rt
qt
=
[
rt+1
pt+1
+ ξt+1
]
. (1.3.17)
Proposition 1.3.5. A sequence of prices (p, q, r) ∈ Π together with an allocation
(ci, θi)i∈I is a competitive equilibrium with wealth constraints if and only if (p, q, r) ∈
Π and (ci, zi, xi)i∈I is a competitive equilibrium for the economy E .
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1.4 Arrow-Debreu markets
In this section we state and prove two equivalence results. We show that con-
sumption allocations in a sequential equilibrium with limited commitment can be
implemented in a Arrow-Debreu trading environment with limited commitment in
which agents trade only once facing a single budget constraint and a sequence of self-
enforcing constraints. Equivalently, Arrow-Debreu equilibria with limited commit-
ment can be implemented in a sequential trading environment having the described
collateralised institutional structure.
1.4.1 Limited commitment
Markets open only at period 0 and agents make arrangements on future consumption
claims. A possible outcome (ci)i∈I is resource feasible provided that
∀t ∈ T ,
∑
i∈I
cit =
∑
i∈I
ωit + ξt.
The allocation (ci)i∈I may involve promises (this is the case if (ci)i∈I 6= (ωi?)i∈I where
ωi?t = ω
i
t + x
i
−1ξt). We assume that there is no commitment: agent i fulfils her/his
promises only if it is optimal for her/him. In other words, agent i may default.
Her/His decision (defaulting or not) depends on the consequences of default (i.e.,
the punishment). We assume that the punishment for defaulting at some period t
is the confiscation of agent’s asset holdings as well as the agent looses the ability
to finance current consumption based on her/his future wealth. More precisely, if
agent i defaults at period t, she/he faces the following maximization problem:
V it (Q0) = max U
i
t (c
i)
s.t. ci ∈ Bi,outt (Q0)
where U it (c
i) is the continuation utility as defined in (1.2.2) and
Bi,outt (Q0) ≡
{
ci :
∞∑
s=t
Qs0(c
i
s − ωis) 6 0 and ∀τ > t,
τ∑
s=t
Qs0(c
i
s − ωis) 6 0
}
.
Remark 1.4.1. We recall that Qt0 is the price at period 0 of the contract delivering
one unit of the good at period t > 0 (with Q00 = 1). We restrict our attention to
Arrow–Debreu price processes Q0 = (Q
t
0)t∈T such that initial endowment processes
have finite values, i.e.,
∀i ∈ I,
∞∑
t=0
Qt0ω
i
t <∞.
An Arrow–Debreu price sequence Q0 satisfying the above property is said to have
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high interest rates. We also say that a price sequence q defined by qt = Q
t+1
0 /Q
t
0
has high interest rates if the associated Arrow-Debreu price sequence Q0 has high
interest rates.
Remark 1.4.2. Let di,outt (Q0) denote the demand set associated with the budget set
Bi,outt (Q0), i.e.,
di,outt (Q0) ≡ argmax {U it (c) : c ∈ Bi,outt (Q0)}.
We get that
∞∑
s=t
Qs0(c
i
s − ωis) = 0 and ∀τ > t,
∞∑
s=τ
Qs0(c
i
s − ωis) > 0.
Indeed, assume the contrary, i.e.,
∑∞
s=tQ
s
0(c
i
s − ωis) = k < 0, and let ε > 0 satisfy
k < −3ε. There exists T > t such that for all τ > T,∑τs=tQs0(cis − ωis) − k 6 ε.
Consider next the sequence di defined as follows:
dis = c
i
s, s 6= T,
diT = c
i
T +
ε
QT0
.
We get that
∞∑
s=t
Qs0(d
i
s − ωis) = k + ε < −2ε < 0.
Observe that:
for t 6 τ < T,
τ∑
s=t
Qs0(d
i
s − ωis) =
τ∑
s=t
Qs0(c
i
s − ωis) 6 0,
for τ > T,
τ∑
s=t
Qs0(d
i
s − ωis) =
τ∑
s=t
Qs0(c
i
s − ωis) + ε
6 k + 2ε < −ε < 0.
Thus, di ∈ Bi,outt (Q0). However, U it (di) > U it (ci): a contradiction. Hence,
∑∞
s=tQ
s
0(c
i
s−
ωis) = 0. Since
∑τ
s=tQ
s
0(c
i
s−ωis) 6 0 for all τ > t, we obtain that
∑∞
s=τ Q
s
0(c
i
s−ωis) >
0 for all τ > t.
A self-enforcing consumption process is defined as follows.
Definition 1.4.1. A consumption sequence ci for agent i is self-enforcing if at every
period t > 0 agent i has no incentive to default, i.e., U it (c
i) > V it (Q0).
Given a period τ > 0, the condition U iτ (c
i) > V iτ (Q0) is called the self-enforcing
constraint at period τ . We denote by SCit the set of all consumption sequences
ci satisfying the self-enforcing constraints at every period τ > t. Observe that a
consumption process is self-enforcing if it belongs to SCi0.
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The self-enforcing constraints correspond to a requirement of interim individual
rationality, which implies that no borrower has an incentive to default. At the
initial period there is no promise involved in the allocation of resources. However,
an agent j may decide to reject or block the allocation (ci)i∈I if U
j
0 (c
j) < U j0 (ω
i?).
Naturally, we should avoid such a situation, therefore we will say that an allocation
(ci)i∈I is individually rational if at the initial period 0, U i0(c
i) > U i0(ωi?) for each i ∈
I.
1.4.2 Arrow–Debreu equilibrium with limited commitment
We next adapt the Arrow–Debreu competitive equilibrium concept to the framework
of limited commitment.
Definition 1.4.2. An Arrow–Debreu competitive equilibrium with initial asset
holdings (xi−1)i∈I is a family (Q0, (c
i)i∈I) of an Arrow–Debreu price process Q0 with
high interest rates and a resource feasible and self-enforcing allocation (ci)i∈I such
that ci is optimal among all self-enforcing consumption processes di satisfying the
budget restriction
∞∑
t=0
Qt0(d
i
t − ωit) 6 xi−1PV0(Q0, ξ)
where PV0(Q0, ξ) =
∑∞
t=0 Q
t
0ξt is the present value of the dividend stream (ξt)t∈T .
Given a period t ∈ T , a price process Q0 with high interest rates and a real
number bt > 0, we denote by Bi,adt (Q0, bt) the set of consumption processes ci
satisfying
• the truncated budget restriction
∞∑
s=t
Qs0(c
i
s − ωis) 6 Qt0bt
• the self-enforcing constraints, i.e., ci ∈ SCit or equivalently
∀τ > t, U iτ (ci) > V iτ (Q0).
It is important to notice that we do not restrict the consumption process ci to satisfy
the participation constraint at the initial period t.
We denote by di,adt (Q0, bt) the demand set associated with the budget setB
i,ad
t (Q0, bt)
defined by
di,adt (Q0, bt) ≡ argmax{Ut(c) : c ∈ Bi,adt (Q0, bt)}.
Observe that if ci belongs to the demand set di,ad0 (Q0, x
i
−1PV0(Q0, ξ)) then the con-
sumption process ci is self-enforcing and individually rational. Indeed, since ci be-
longs to Bi,ad0 (Q0, x
i
−1PV0(Q0, ξ)) it satisfies the participation constraint at every
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period t > 0. Since the endowment process ωi? belongs to Bi,ad0 (Q0, x
i
−1PV0(Q0, ξ)),
we must have U i0(c
i) > U i0(ωi?), implying that ci is individually rational. This prop-
erty implies that if Q0 is an Arrow–Debreu price process with high interest rates
and (ci)i∈I is resource feasible, then (Q0, (ci)i∈I) is an Arrow–Debreu equilibrium if
and only if we have
∀i ∈ I, ci ∈ di,ad0 (Q0, xi−1PV0(Q0, ξ)).
1.4.3 Equivalence results
We are now ready to state our equivalence results.
Theorem 1.4.1. Let (q, r, (ci, xi, zi)i∈I) be a competitive equilibrium of the economy
E such that q has high interest rates. Then, (Q0, (ci)i∈I) is an Arrow–Debreu equilib-
rium with initial asset holdings (xi−1)i∈I and Q0 is the Arrow–Debreu price sequence
associated to q.
We also have the converse implication.
Theorem 1.4.2. If (Q0, (c
i)i∈I) is an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium with initial asset
holdings (xi−1)i∈I and high interest rates, then (q, r, (c
i, xi, zi)i∈I) is a competitive
equilibrium of the economy E where:
• q is the price sequence associated to Q0, i.e.,
∀t ∈ T , qt = Q
t+1
0
Qt0
;
• r is an asset price sequence with no bubbles, i.e.,
∀t ∈ T , rt = 1
Qt0
∞∑
s=t+1
Qs0ξs;
• ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T , (xit, zit) are chosen such that ait = xit + qtrt zit where
rta
i
t =
1
Qt0
∞∑
s=t+1
Qs0(c
i
s − ωis).
In order to prove Theorems 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 we first prove some intermediate
properties.
Claim 1.4.1. Let Q0 be an Arrow–Debreu price sequence with high interest rates.
Fix a period t. We have:
ci ∈ SCit =⇒ ∀τ > t,
∞∑
s=τ
Qs0(c
i
s − ωis) > 0.
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Proof. Let ci ∈ SCit and assume that there exists some τ > t such that
∞∑
s=τ
Qs0(c
i
s − ωis) < 0.
Since U iτ (c
i) > V iτ (Q0), there exists τ1 > τ such that
τ1∑
s=τ
Qs0(c
i
s − ωis) > 0.
Indeed, if this is not the case, then ci ∈ di,outτ (Q0). By Remark 1.4.2 it should be
the case that ∞∑
s=τ
Qs0(c
i
s − ωis) = 0,
which is a contradiction.
Similarly, since U iτ1+1(c
i) > V iτ1+1(Q0), there exists τ2 > τ1 + 1 such that
τ2∑
s=τ1+1
Qs0(c
i
s − ωis) > 0.
We can therefore find a sequence (τn)n>1 such that
∀n > 1,
τn∑
s=τ
Qs0(c
i
s − ωis) > 0.
Taking the limit an n goes to infinite proves the claim.
Given a price sequence r and a real number bt > 0, we denote by Bit(r, bt) the
set of all pairs (ci, ai) ∈ R∞+ × R∞+ satisfying
• the budget restrictions
cit + rta
i
t 6 ωit + bt,
∀τ > t, ciτ + rτaiτ 6 ωiτ + [rτ + ξτ ]aiτ−1; (1.4.1)
• the borrowing constraints aiτ > 0 for every period τ > t.
We also denote by dit(r, bt) the demand set associated with the budget set B
i
t(r, bt)
and defined by
dit(r, bt) ≡ argmax{U it (c) : c ∈ Bit(r, bt)}.
Claim 1.4.2. Let Q0 be an Arrow–Debreu price sequence with high interest rates
and r be a price sequence that satisfies the recursive equation (1.3.6). Fix a period
t and some bit > 0. We have:
ci ∈ Bi,adt (Q0, bit) =⇒ (ci, ai) ∈ Bit(r, bit)
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where the portfolio sequence ai is given by
∀τ > t, rτQτ0aiτ =
∞∑
s=τ+1
Qs0(c
i
s − ωis).
Proof. Let ci ∈ Bi,adt (Q0, bit) and define the sequence ai as specified in the claim.
Because of Claim 1.4.1 we have that aiτ > 0. Recall that ci satisfies
Qt0(c
i
t − ωit) +
∞∑
s=t+1
Qs0(c
i
s − ωis) 6 Qt0bit
implying that
cit − ωit + rtait 6 bit.
Now fix a period τ > t. Observe that by the definition of the process ai we have
rτQ
τ
0a
i
τ =
∞∑
s=τ+1
Qs0(c
i
s − ωis)
=
∞∑
s=τ
Qs0(c
i
s − ωis)−Qτ0(ciτ − ωiτ )
= rτ−1Qτ−10 a
i
τ−1 −Qτ0(ciτ − ωiτ ).
Since r satisfies the recursive equation (1.3.6) we get that
ciτ − ωiτ + rτaiτ = [rτ + ξτ ]aiτ−1.
We have thus proved that the sequential budget restrictions are satisfied for every
period τ > t.
Claim 1.4.3. Let Q0 be an Arrow-Debreu price sequence with high interest rates.
Fix a period t and some bit > 0. We have:
ci ∈ di,outt (Q0) =⇒ ci ∈ Bi,adt (Q0, bit)
Proof. Let ci ∈ di,outt (Q0). Since bit > 0 we get (this is because of Remark 1.4.2) that
∞∑
s=t
Qt0(c
i
s − ωis) 6 Qt0bit.
We next show that ci is self-enforcing, i.e., ci ∈ SCit. Assume the contrary. That is,
assume there exists a period τ > t such that
U iτ (c
i) < V iτ (Q0) = U
i
τ (d
i)
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where di satisfies
∞∑
s=τ
Qs0(d
i
s − ωis) 6 0, and ∀σ > τ,
σ∑
s=σ
Qs0(d
i
s − ωis) 6 0
Let
c˜is = c
i
s, for s = 0, .., τ − 1,
c˜is = d
i
s, for s > τ.
Observe that:
for t 6 σ < τ,
σ∑
s=t
Qs0(c˜
i
s − ωis) =
τ∑
s=t
Qs0(c
i
s − ωis) 6 0,
for σ > τ,
σ∑
s=t
Qs0(c˜
i
s − ωis) =
τ−1∑
s=t
Qs0(c
i
s − ωis) +
σ∑
s=τ
Qs0(d
i
s − ωis) 6 0.
This implies that c˜i ∈ Bi,adt (Q0, bit). Sine U it (c˜i) > U it (ci), this contradicts the fact
that ci ∈ di,outt (Q0).
Claim 1.4.4. Let Q0 be an Arrow–Debreu price sequence with high interest rates
and r be a price sequence that satisfies the recursive equation (1.3.6). Fix a period
t and some bit > 0. We have:
(ci, ai) ∈ dit(r, bit) =⇒ ci ∈ di,adt (Q0, bit).
Proof. Let (ci, ai) ∈ dit(r, bit). We first show that ci belongs to Bi,adt (Q0, bit). Multi-
plying the budget constraints (1.4.1) by Qt0 and then sum up to a period T > t we
get
T∑
s=t
Qs0(c
i
s − ωis) + rTQT0 aiT 6 Qt0bit.
Since ait > 0, passing to the limit when T goes to infinite we get
∞∑
s=t
Qs0(c
i
s − ωis) 6 Qt0bit.
In order to prove that ci belongs to Bi,adt (Q0, b
i
t) we still have to show that U
i
τ (c
i) >
V iτ (Q0) for every τ > t.
Fix τ > t and let ĉi be such that
ĉi ∈ di,outτ (Q0).
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Using Claim 1.4.2 and Claim 1.4.3 we can conclude that
(ĉi, âi) ∈ Biτ (r, biτ )
where âi is a portfolio sequence given by
∀σ > τ, rσQσ0 âiσ =
∞∑
s=σ+1
Qs0(ĉ
i
s − ωis).
Since (ci, ai) is assumed to belong to the sequential demand set dit(r, bt), it follows
from Bellman’s Principle of Optimality7 that (ci, ai) also belongs to diτ (r, b
i
τ ). In
particular, we must have
U iτ (c
i) > U iτ (ĉi) = V iτ (Q0).
We have thus proved that ci belongs to Bi,adt (Q0, b
i
t).
Now let c˜i be a consumption process in di,adt (Q0, bt). Applying Claim 1.4.2 we
have (c˜i, a˜i) ∈ Biτ (r, bt) where the process a˜i is defined according to Claim 1.4.2.
Since (ci, ai) belongs to the demand set dit(r, bt) we must have U
i
t (c
i) = U it (c˜
i). This
proves the claim.
Proof of Theorem 1.4.1. Let (q, r, (ci, xi, zi)i∈I) be a competitive equilibrium of the
economy E . Let bi0 = [r0 + ξ0]xi−1 and ait = xit + qtrt zit for all t ∈ T . Observe that the
budget restriction (1.2.3) reduce to the budget restrictions (1.4.1) and the collateral
constraints (1.2.4) imply that ait > 0 for all t ∈ T . Therefore,
∀i ∈ I, (ci, ai) ∈ di0(r, bi0)
Claim 1.4.4 implies that ci ∈ di,ad0 (Q0, bi0). Since q has high interest rates, there are
no bubbles, i.e.,
r0 + ξ0 = PV0(Q0, ξ).
Therefore, ci ∈ di,ad0 (Q0, xi−1PV0(Q0, ξ)) establishing optimality of the consumption
allocation. Market clearing is obvious.
Proof of Theorem 1.4.2. Let (Q0, (c
i)i∈I) be an Arrow–Debreu equilibrium with high
interest rates and let q, r and ai be as specified in the statement of the theorem.
We show that
∀i ∈ I, (ci, ai) ∈ di0(r, bi0)
with bi0 = [r0 +ξ0]x
i
−1. Since Q0 has high interest rates we have PV0(Q0, ξ) = r0 +ξ0.
It follows that ci ∈ di,ad0 (Q0, xi−1PV0(Q0, ξ)) , so we can apply Claim 1.4.2 to conclude
7Principle of Optimality: An optimal policy has the property that whatever the initial state
and initial decision are, the remaining decisions must constitute an optimal policy with regard to
the state resulting from the first decision (see Bellman, 1972, p.83).
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that (ci, ai) belongs to Bi0(r, b
i
0). Now let (c˜
i, a˜i) be in the demand set di0(r, b
i
0).
Applying Claim 1.4.4, we get that c˜i belongs to di,ad0 (Q0, b
i
0). Since c
i also belongs
to the same set, we must have U i0(c
i) = U i0(c˜
i), proving the claim.
Let the allocations (xit, z
i
t)t∈T be such that a
i
t = x
i
t +
qt
rt
zit. We next show that
markets clear. Using the budget restrictions of period t = 0 and the fact that ci is
resource feasible gives
∑
i∈I
ai0 =
r0 + ξ0 −
∑
i∈I(c
i
0 − ωi0)
r0
= 1.
It then follows that
∑
i∈I x
i
0 = 1 and
∑
i∈I z
i
0 = 0. Following a similar argument
shows that for all t > 1 we have
∑
i∈I
ait =
rt + ξt −
∑
i∈I(c
i
t − ωit)
rt
= 1,
implying that
∑
i∈I x
i
t = 1 and
∑
i∈I z
i
t = 0
1.5 Existence of a competitive equilibrium
1.5.1 Existence in the finite horizon case
Given the family of fundamentals (U i, βi, ω
i, xi−1, z
i
−1)i∈I , our first objective is to
prove that an equilibrium exists in the finite horizon case. The proof is rather
involved, so that we decompose it in several steps.
Step 1: Introducing an auxiliary economy ÊT .
Fix a period T and denote by ΠT the set of price sequences (p, κ) such that
ΠT =
{
(p, κ) ∈ R∞ × R∞+ : ∀t > T, pt = 0 and κt = 0
}
.
We subsequently define the sets
Ci,T =
{
ci ∈ R∞+ : ∀t > T, cit = 0
}
and
Φi,T =
{
ϕi ∈ R∞+ : ∀t > T, ϕit = 0
}
.
Given prices (p, κ) ∈ ΠT we denote by Bi,T (p, κ) the set of plans (ci, ϕi) ∈ Ci,T×Φi,T
satisfying the following solvency constraints
∀t ∈ {0, ..., T}, ptcit + ptϕit 6 ptωit + κtϕit−1. (1.5.1)
where ϕi−1 > 0 is given.
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Given the profile of utilities, discount factors, endowments and the distribution
(ϕi−1)i∈I , we can consider the T -period economy
ÊT = (Ci,T ,Φi,T , ui, βi, ωi, ϕi−1)i∈I
where ∀i ∈ I, ωi ∈ Ci,T and U i : Ci,T → [0,∞].
Definition 1.5.1. An equilibrium for the economy ÊT consists of prices (p, κ) ∈ ΠT
together with allocations (ci, ϕi)i∈I ∈
∏
i∈I(C
i,T × Φi,T ) such that
(a) for each agent i, (ci, ϕi) is optimal among all plans satisfying the constraints
(1.5.1);
(b) commodity markets clear, i.e.,
∀t ∈ {0, ..., T},
∑
i∈I
cit =
∑
i∈I
ωit + ξt; (1.5.2)
(c) For every period t ∈ {0, ..., T},[
pt
(∑
i∈I
ϕit + ξt
)
− κt
∑
i∈I
ϕit−1
]
= 0. (1.5.3)
Given a real number ρ > M where M ≡ (T + 1)× [maxi∈I ||ωi||+ ||ξ||] let
BT (0, ρ) = {x ∈ R∞+ : xt 6 ρ for t ∈ {0, ..., T} and xt = 0 for t > T}.
Consider subsequently the following sets
C˜i,T = Ci,T ∩ BT (0, ρ), Φ˜i,T = Φi,T ∩ BT (0, ρ).
Given ci ∈ C˜i,T we denote by P i(ci) the set of bundles strictly preferred to ci by
agent i, i.e.,
P i(ci) = {ci ∈ C˜i,T : ci  ci},
where  is the preference relation on C˜i,T represented by the utility function U i :
C˜i,T → [0,∞].
We next prove existence of an equilibrium for the bounded economy
E˜T (ρ) = (C˜i,T , Φ˜i,T , U i, βi, ωi, ϕi−1)i∈I .
Step 2: Existence of equilibrium in the bounded economy E˜T .
Proposition 1.5.1. For any ρ > M the economy E˜T (ρ) has an equilibrium (p, κ, (ci, ϕi)i∈I)
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such that pt > 0, κt > 0, c
i
t > 0,
∑
i∈I ϕ
i
t−1 > 0 for t = 0, ..., T and ϕ
i
T = 0.
8
Proof. Let
Π˜T = {(p, κ) ∈ ΠT : ∀t ∈ [0, ..., T ], |pt| 6 1, κt ∈ [0, 1]}.
For every i, we introduce the “modified” budget correspondences defined on Π˜T as
follows
Bi,Tγ (p, κ) = {(ci, ϕi) ∈ C˜i,T×Φ˜i,T : ∀t ∈ [0, ..., T ], ptcit+ptϕit 6 ptωit+κtϕit−1+γt(p, κ)}
B
′i,T
γ (p, κ) = {(ci, ϕi) ∈ C˜i,T×Φ˜i,T : ∀t ∈ [0, ..., T ], ptcit+ptϕit < ptωit+κtϕit−1+γt(p, κ)},
where γt(p, κ) = 1−min{1, |pt|+ κt}.
The proof follows from a series of claims.
Claim 1.5.1. For every i ∈ I, for every (p, κ) ∈ Π˜T , B′i,Tγ (p, κ) is nonempty and
convex. Its closure is Bi,Tγ (p, κ).
Proof. It is straightforward.
We subsequently introduce an additional agent by setting the following reaction
correspondences defined on Π˜T ×∏i∈I(C˜i,T × Φ˜i,T )
ψi(p, κ, c, ϕ) =
{
B
′i,T
γ (p, κ) if (c
i, ϕi) /∈ Bi,Tγ (p, κ)
B
′i,T
γ (p, κ) ∩ (P i(ci)× Φ˜i,T ) if (ci, ϕi) ∈ Bi,Tγ (p, κ)
ψ0(p, κ, c, ϕ) =
{
(p′, κ′) ∈ ΠT :
∑
t
(p′t − pt)
[∑
i∈I
(cit − ωit)− ξt
]
+
∑
t
(κ′t − κt)
[
pt
(∑
i∈I
ϕit + ξt
)
− κt
∑
i∈I
ϕit−1
]
> 0
}
.
Claim 1.5.2. For every i ∈ I ∪ {0}, ψi is a convex mapping that has an open graph
in Π˜T ×∏i∈I(C˜i,T × Φ˜i,T ).
Proof. It is straightforward.
From Gale and Mas-Colell (1975, 1979) fixed point theorem there exists (p¯, κ¯, (c¯i, ϕ¯i)i∈I)
such that
∀i ∈ I, (c¯i, ϕ¯i) ∈ Bi,Tγ (p¯, κ¯); (1.5.4)
∀i ∈ I, (ci, ϕi) ∈ B′i,Tγ (p¯, q¯)⇒
∑
t
βtiui(c
i
t) 6
∑
t
βtiui(c¯
i
t); (1.5.5)
8Equilibrium prices (p, κ) as well as equilibrium allocations (c, ϕ) depend on the choice of ρ.
For notational convenience we do not make at this point this dependence explicit.
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∀(p, κ) ∈ Π˜T ,
∑
t
(pt − p¯t)
[∑
i∈I
(c¯it − ωit)− ξt
]
+
∑
t
(κt − κ¯t)
[
p¯t
(∑
i∈I
ϕ¯it + ξt
)
− κ¯t
∑
i∈I
ϕ¯it−1
]
6 0. (1.5.6)
(1.5.4) and (1.5.5) imply that at equilibrium every agent i chooses an allocation
inside her/his budget set and that there does not exist any other allocation inside
the budget set that yields a higher utility. (1.5.6) implies that at equilibrium the
reaction correspondence of the additional agent is empty, i.e. ψ0(p¯, κ¯, c¯, ϕ¯) = ∅.
Claim 1.5.3. Each (c¯i, ϕ¯i) is optimal in Bi,Tγ (p¯, q¯), i.e.,
∀i ∈ I, (ci, ϕi) ∈ Biγ(p¯, κ¯)⇒
∑
t
βtiui(c
i
t) 6
∑
t
βtiui(c¯
i
t).
Proof. It is straightforward
Claim 1.5.4. For all t ∈ {0, ...T}
• ∑i∈I(c¯it − ωit)− ξt = 0;
• [p¯t(
∑
i∈I ϕ¯
i
t + ξt)− κ¯t
∑
i∈I ϕ¯
i
t−1] = 0;
• p¯t > 0, κ¯t > 0, γ(p¯t, κ¯t) = 0 and
∑
i∈I ϕ¯
i
t−1 > 0.
Proof. It follows from (1.5.6) that ∀(p, κ) ∈ Π˜T , ∀t ∈ {0, ...T}
pt
[∑
i∈I
(c¯it − ωit)− ξt
]
6 p¯t
[∑
i∈I
(c¯it − ωit)− ξt
]
(1.5.7)
and
κt
[
p¯t
(∑
i∈I
ϕ¯it + ξt
)
− κ¯t
∑
i∈I
ϕ¯it−1
]
6 κ¯t
[
p¯t
(∑
i∈I
ϕ¯it + ξt
)
− κ¯t
∑
i∈I
ϕ¯it−1
]
. (1.5.8)
If
∑
i∈I(c¯
i
t − ωit)− ξt 6= 0, from (1.5.7), |p¯t| = 1, γ(p¯t, κ¯t) = 0 and
p¯t
[∑
i∈I
(c¯it − ωit)− ξt
]
> 0. (1.5.9)
If p¯t = −1, from Claim 3.3, ∀i ∈ I, c¯it = ρ and∑
i∈I
(c¯it − ωit)− ξt = Iρ−
∑
i∈I
ωit − ξt > 0,
which gives a contradiction to (1.5.9). Hence, it must be that p¯t = 1.
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If p¯t(
∑
i∈I ϕ¯
i
t + ξt)− κ¯t
∑
i∈I ϕ¯
i
t−1 < 0, from (1.5.8), κ¯t = 0 and
p¯t
(∑
i∈I
ϕ¯it + ξt
)
< 0
which is a contradiction. If p¯t(
∑
i∈I ϕ¯
i
t+ ξt)− κ¯t
∑
i∈I ϕ¯
i
t−1 > 0, from the “modified”
budget constraints and (1.5.9) we have
0 < p¯t
[∑
i∈I
(c¯it − ωit)− ξt
]
+
[
p¯t(
∑
i∈I
ϕ¯it + ξt)− κ¯t
∑
i∈I
ϕ¯it−1
]
6 Iγ(p¯t, κ¯t) = 0
which is also a contradiction. Hence, we get that
∀t ∈ 0, ..., T ,
∑
i∈I
(c¯it − ωit)− ξt = 0. (1.5.10)
If
p¯t
(∑
i∈I
ϕ¯it + ξt
)
− κ¯t
∑
i∈I
ϕ¯it−1 < 0,
from (1.5.8), κ¯t = 0 and p¯t < 0. But in this case, from Claim 1.5.3, ∀i ∈ I, c¯it = ρ
and (1.5.10) is violated. If it was the case that
p¯t
(∑
i∈I
ϕ¯it + ξt
)
− κ¯t
∑
i∈I
ϕ¯it−1 > 0,
from (1.5.8), κ¯t = 1 and γ(p¯t, κ¯t) = 0. From the“modified” budget constraints and
(1.5.10) we have
0 < p¯t
[∑
i∈I
(c¯it − ωit)− ξt
]
+
[
p¯t(
∑
i∈I
ϕ¯it + ξt)− κ¯t
∑
i∈I
ϕ¯it−1
]
6 Iγ(p¯t, κ¯t) = 0,
which is a contradiction. Therefore,
p¯t
(∑
i∈I
ϕ¯it + ξt
)
− κ¯t
∑
i∈I
ϕ¯it−1 = 0. (1.5.11)
This implies p¯t > 0,∀t ∈ {0, ..., T}. If p¯t = 0, then ∀i ∈ I, c¯it = ρ: a contradiction
with (1.5.10). Thus p¯t > 0,∀t ∈ {0, ..., T}. The “modified” budget constraints
should hold with equality and summing over i we get that γ(p¯t, κ¯t) = 0.
Observe that we have
p¯0
(∑
i∈I
ϕ¯i0 + ξt
)
= κ¯0
∑
i∈I
ϕ¯i−1.
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This implies κ¯0 > 0. Similarly for t ∈ {1, ..., T} we have
p¯tξt 6 p¯t
(∑
i∈I
ϕ¯it + ξt
)
= κ¯t
∑
i∈I
ϕ¯it−1
which implies κ¯t > 0,
∑
i∈I ϕ¯
i
t−1 > 0.
Under the imposed assumptions on the instantaneous utility functions ui, it is
straightforward to show that ∀t ∈ {0, ..., T}, cit > 0 and ϕiT = 0.
The proof is complete.
Remark 1.5.1. We can normalize prices such that pt + κt = 1 for all t ∈ {0, ..., T}.
Step 3: Existence of equilibrium in the auxiliary economy ÊT .
Proposition 1.5.2. The unbounded economy ÊT has an equilibrium denoted (p̂, κ̂, (ĉi, ϕ̂i)i∈I).9
Proof. We know that for any ρ > M , the bounded economy E˜T (ρ) attains an
equilibrium (p(ρ), κ(ρ), (ci(ρ), ϕi(ρ))i∈I). We know that ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ {0, ..., T},
cit(ρ) 6 M < ρ. If there exists a ρ > M such that at equilibrium we have
ϕit(ρ) < ρ for all i, all t ∈ {0, . . . , T}, then it is straightforward to show that
(p(ρ), κ(ρ), (ci(ρ), ϕi(ρ))i∈I) is an equilibrium for the economy ÊT .
Let (ρn)n∈N be an sequence converging to +∞ with n. We claim that there exists
ν and an equilibrium (p(ρν), κ(ρν), (c
i(ρν), ϕ
i(ρν)i∈I)) such that ϕit(ρν) < ρν for all
i ∈ I, for all t ∈ {0, . . . , T}.
Assume that it is not true. Then, for any n there exist i ∈ I and a period
t ∈ {0, . . . , T} such that ϕit(ρn) > ρn. This implies that
∑T
t=0
∑
i ϕ
i
t(ρn) → +∞
when n → +∞. Without loss of generality we can assume that the corresponding
sequences of equilibrium allocations and prices (p(ρn), κ(ρn), (c
i(ρn), ϕ(ρn))i∈I)n∈N
converge to some (p̂, κ̂, (ĉi, ϕ̂i)i∈I).10
Given any n ∈ N, we have the following first order conditions in the corresponding
bounded economy: ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ {0, ..., T},
βtiu
′
i(c
i
t(ρn)) = λ
i
t(ρn)pt(ρn); (1.5.12)
−λit(ρn)pt(ρn) + λit+1(ρn)κt+1(ρn) + ζ it(ρn)− ηit(ρn) = 0; (1.5.13)
λit(ρn) > 0, λit(ρn)[pt(ρn)cit(ρn) + pt(ρn)ϕit(ρn)− pt(ρn)ωit − κt(ρn)ϕit−1(ρn)] = 0;
(1.5.14)
ζ it(ρn) > 0, ηit(ρn) > 0, ζ it(ρn)ϕit(ρn) = 0, ηit(ρn)(ϕit(ρn)− ρn) = 0. (1.5.15)
For every period t, λit(ρn) is the multiplier associated to the budget constraint, ζ
i
t(ρn)
is the multiplier associated to the constraint ϕit(ρn) > 0 while ηit(ρn) is the multiplier
associated to the constraint ϕit(ρn) 6 ρn.
9Equilibrium prices (p̂, κ̂) as well as equilibrium allocations (ĉ, ϕ̂) depend on the choice of the
terminal date T . At this stage it is not necessary to make this dependence explicit.
10Observe that we cannot exclude that ϕit(ρn)→ ϕ̂it = +∞ for some i ∈ I and some t ∈ {0, ..., T}.
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The proof follows from a series of claims and is a bit more complicated than
the proof of Theorem 4 in Becker et al. (2012), which deals with the transition to
the unbounded economy for the finite horizon case in their model. The reason for
this is that in their model they can choose bounds that are large enough, such that
the equilibrium lies in the interior of the feasible set. Given this, the authors can
construct the following contradiction. They assume that there exists an equilibrium
outside the feasible set. By taking a convex combination of the two equilibria,
there must exist a second equilibrium inside the feasible set that dominates the
original equilibrium inside the feasible set and thus contradicts the fact that it is an
equilibrium. In our model, we cannot guarantee that the equilibrium does not lie on
the boundary and thus we cannot apply their strategy. Instead, we have to show that
by increasing the bounds and essentially going over into an unbounded economy, the
equilibrium will converge to a particular point in space which ultimately is inside
the feasible set once the bounds are large enough. This equilibrium than clearly
constitutes an equilibrium for the unbounded economy as mentioned earlier.
Claim 1.5.5. We cannot have ∀t ∈ {0, ..., T}, p̂t = 0.
Proof. The budget constraints (1.5.1) in any bounded economy hold with equality.
Therefore,
∀t ∈ {0, ..., T − 1}, pt(ρn)cit(ρn) + pt(ρn)ϕit(ρn) = pt(ρn)ωit + κt(ρn)ϕit−1(ρn),
(1.5.16)
and
pT (ρn)c
i
T (ρn) = pT (ρn)ω
i
T + κT (ρn)ϕ
i
T−1(ρn)
If p̂T = 0, then κ̂T = 1 and ϕ̂T−1 = 0. If ∀t ∈ {0, ..., T}, p̂t = 0, it follows by
backward induction that ∀i ∈ I, ϕi−1 = 0: a contradiction.
Claim 1.5.6. We have p̂T > 0, κ̂T > 0 and ∀i ∈ I, ĉiT > ωiT ,
∑
i∈I ϕ̂
i
T−1 ∈ (0,+∞).
Proof. From Claim (1.5.5) there exists τ ∈ {0, ..., T} such that p̂τ > 0. Let τ
coincide with the larger period t such that p̂t > 0. Using the same argument as
for the proof of the previous claim, it follows that p̂t = 0, κ̂t = 1 and ∀i ∈ I,
ϕ̂it−1 = 0 for t ∈ {τ + 1, ..., T}. From equation (1.5.16) we conclude that ∀i ∈ I,
ĉiτ > ωiτ > ωiτ −  > 0. Using (1.5.12)-(1.5.15), there exists N large enough, such
that ∀i ∈ I, ∀n > N , ηiτ (ρn) = 0 and
βτi u
′
i(ω
i
τ − ) > βτi u′i(ciτ (ρn)) = λiτ (ρn)pτ (ρn) > λiτ+1(ρn)κτ+1(ρn). (1.5.17)
We also know that for any period t ∈ {0, ..., T}, the sequence of equilibrium con-
sumption profiles (cit(ρn))i∈I are uniformly bounded from above by M . It follows
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that ∀i ∈ I, ∀n > N ,
βτ+1i u
′
i(M) < β
τ+1
i u
′
i(c
i
τ+1(ρn)) = λ
i
τ+1(ρn)pτ+1(ρn). (1.5.18)
If p̂τ+1 = 0, from (1.5.18), λ
i
τ+1(ρn) → +∞: But since κτ+1(ρn) → 1 we get a
contradiction to (1.5.17). Therefore, we must have τ = T . Hence, p̂T > 0 and
∀i ∈ I, ĉiT > ωiT . It follows from (1.5.12) that ∀i ∈ I, λ̂iT < +∞.
We know that
pT (ρn)ξT = κT (ρn)
∑
i∈I
ϕiT−1(ρn).
If κ̂T = 0, then
∑
i∈I ϕ
i
T−1(ρn) → +∞. Therefore, there exists i ∈ I such that
ϕiT−1(ρn) → +∞. For this agent, there exists N large enough such that ∀n > N ,
ζ iT−1(ρn) = 0 and
βT−1i u
′
i(M) 6 βT−1i u′i(ciT−1(ρn)) = λiT−1(ρn)pT−1(ρn) 6 λiT (ρn)κT (ρn).
But this implies that λiT (ρn)→ +∞: a contradiction. Hence, κ̂T > 0 and
∑
i∈I ϕ̂
i
T−1 ∈
(0,+∞).
Claim 1.5.7. For all t ∈ {0, ..., T −1}, p̂t > 0, κ̂t > 0 and ∀i ∈ I, ĉit > 0,
∑
i∈I ϕ̂
i
t−1 ∈
(0,+∞).
Proof. We prove the claim for t = T − 1. If p̂T−1 = 0, then κ̂T−1 = 1. Using
the budget constraints (for the sequence of bounded economies) we conclude that
∀i ∈ I, ϕiT−2(ρn) → 0. That is, for any ε > 0, there exists N large enough, such
that, ∀n > N , ϕiT−2(ρn) < ε. Since for any n > N , pT−2(ρn) > 0 (see Claim 1.5.4),
we get that, ciT−2(ρn) > ω
i
T−2 − ε. It follows that ∀i ∈ I, there exists α > 0 such
that inf{n:n>N} ciT−2(ρn) > α. It follows that ∀i ∈ I, ∀n > N , ηiT−2(ρn) = 0 and
βT−2i u
′
i(α) > λiT−2(ρn)pT−2(ρn) > λiT−1(ρn)κT−1(ρn). (1.5.19)
We also have that ∀i ∈ I, ∀n > N
βT−1i u
′
i(M) < β
T−1
i u
′
i(c
i
T−1(ρn)) = λ
i
T−1(ρn)pT−1(ρn). (1.5.20)
If p̂T−1 = 0, from (1.5.20), λiT−1(ρn) → +∞. But since κT−1(ρn) → 1 we get a
contradiction to (1.5.19). Therefore, we must have p̂T−1 > 0. If there exists i ∈ I
such that ϕ̂iT−1 > 0, then
λ̂iT−1p̂T−1 6 λ̂iT κ̂T 6 λ̂iT < +∞.
where the last inequality follows from the proof of Claim 1.5.6. From (1.5.12) we get
that ĉiT−1 > 0. If ϕ̂
i
T−1 = 0, then ĉ
i
T−1 > ωiT−1 > 0 (since p̂T−1 > 0). From (1.5.12)
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we also have λ̂iT−1 < +∞.
The proof of κ̂T−1 > 0 and
∑
i∈I ϕ̂
i
T−2 ∈ (0,+∞) is similar to the one used to
show that κ̂T > 0 and
∑
i∈I ϕ̂
i
T−1 ∈ (0,+∞).
Working by induction, we can prove the claim for t ∈ {0, ..., T − 2}.
Summing up, we have proved that limn→+∞
∑T
t=0
∑
i∈I ϕ
i
t(ρn) < +∞. We
conclude there exists ν and an equilibrium (p(ρν), κ(ρν), (c
i(ρν), ϕ
i(ρν))i∈I) with
ϕit(ρν) < ρν for all i, all t ∈ {0, . . . , T}. This equilibrium is an equilibrium of
the economy ÊT .
Step 4: From equilibrium in economy ÊT to equilibrium with zero wealth con-
straints.
Let (p̂, κ̂, (ĉi, ϕ̂i)i∈I) denote the equilibrium in the auxiliary economy ÊT in which
for every i ∈ I, ϕi−1 = xi−1. Let (p, q) ∈ ΠT be a sequence of prices and (c, θ)i∈I ∈∏
i∈I(C
i,T ×Θi,T ) where
∀i ∈ I, Θi,T = {θi ∈ R∞+ : ∀t > T, θit = 0} ,
be a consumption-wealth profile such that ∀t ∈ {0, ..., T},
pt = p̂t, qt = p̂t
p̂t+1
κ̂t+1
, cit = ĉ
i
t, θ
i
t = ϕ̂
i
t
p̂t
qt
. (1.5.21)
Fix r0 = κ̂0 − p0ξ0 and denote
∀i ∈ I, θi−1 =
[
r0
p0
+ ξ0
]
xi−1.
Consider next the sequence of prices (rt)t>1 defined (implicitly) as follows
∀t ∈ {1, ..., T},
∑
i∈I
θit−1 =
rt
pt
+ ξt (1.5.22)
and rt = 0 for t > T .
For any period t ∈ {0, ..., T}
p̂tĉ
i
t + p̂tϕ̂
i
t = p̂tω
i
t + κ̂tϕ̂
i
t−1,
therefore summing over i gives that rt > 0 for all t ∈ {0, ..., T}. Observe that ∀i ∈ I,
p0θ
i
−1 = κ̂0ϕ
i
−1 and
∀t ∈ {0, ..., T}, ptcit + qtθit = ptωit + ptθit−1. (1.5.23)
By construction, given the prices (p, q, r), the consumption-wealth profile (ci, θi)
gives the highest utility among the budgetary feasible consumption-wealth profiles.
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Moreover, summing (1.5.23) over i gives
∀t ∈ {0, ..., T},
∑
i∈I
θit−1 =
qt
pt
∑
i∈I
θt + ξt.
From (1.5.22) we conclude that
∀t ∈ {0, ..., T}, rt
pt
=
qt
pt
[
rt+1
pt+1
+ ξt+1
]
.
It follows that the price sequences (p, q, r) together with the consumption-wealth
profiles (ci, θi)i∈I satisfy conditions (a)-(d) of Definition 1.3.1 (for any period t ∈
{0, ..., T}) and therefore constitute a T -period equilibrium with zero wealth con-
straints.
1.5.2 Existence in the infinite horizon case
Given any T > 0, let
(
p̂T , κ̂T , (ĉi,T , ϕ̂i,T )i∈I
)
be an equilibrium of the truncated aux-
iliary economy ÊT . The sequence (p̂T , κ̂T , (ĉi,T )i∈I)T belongs to a compact set for
the product topology, so it has a convergent subsequence. Assume that such a sub-
sequence converges to some (p, κ, (ci)i∈I). We will show that (ϕ̂i,T )T also converges
to some ϕi with ϕit < +∞. Moreover, (p, κ, (ci, ϕi)i∈I) constitutes an equilibrium
for the infinite horizon auxiliary economy Ê∞.
Theorem 1.5.1. (p, κ, (ci, ϕi)i∈I) is an equilibrium for the economy Ê∞
Proof. Recall that for any T > 0
(i) ∀t ∈ {0, ..., T}, p̂Tt > 0, κ̂Tt > 0 with p̂Tt + κ̂Tt = 1 and ĉi,Tt > 0, ∀i ∈ I;
(ii) ∀t ∈ {0, ..., T − 1}, ∑i∈I ϕ̂i,Tt > 0 and ∑i∈I ϕ̂i,TT = 0;
(iii) ∀t ∈ {0, ..., T}, ∑i∈I ĉi,Tt = ∑i∈I ωit + ξt 6M , where M = ∑i∈I supt(ωit + ξt);
(iv) ∀t ∈ {0, ..., T}, p̂Tt
(∑
i∈I ϕ̂
i,T
t + ξt
)
= κ̂Tt
∑
i∈I ϕ̂
i,T
t−1;
(v) ∀t ∈ {0, ..., T}, ∀i ∈ I, βtiu′i(ĉi,Tt ) = λ̂i,Tt p̂Tt and λ̂i,Tt−1p̂Tt−1 > λ̂i,Tt κ̂Tt ;
(vi) ∀t ∈ {0, ..., T}, ∀i ∈ I, λ̂i,Tt−1p̂Tt−1ϕ̂i,Tt−1 = λ̂i,Tt κ̂Tt ϕ̂i,Tt−1.
The proof follows from a series of claims.
Claim 1.5.8. For any t ∈ T , cit > 0 and
∑
i∈I c
i
t =
∑
i∈I ω
i
t + ξt.
Proof. Indeed, let α = infi,t ω
i
t. We have for any τ > 0, for any T > τ
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T∑
t=τ
λ̂i,Tt p̂
T
t ĉ
i,T
t =
T∑
t=τ
λ̂i,Tt p̂
T
t ω
i
t + λ̂
i,T
τ κ̂
T
τ ϕ
i
τ−1
>
T∑
t=τ
λ̂i,Tt p̂
T
t ω
i
t > α
T∑
t=τ
λ̂i,Tt p̂
T
t .
Using the concavity of ui we get
βτi
1− βiui(M) >
T∑
t=τ
βti(ui(ĉ
i,T
t )− ui(0))
>
T∑
t=τ
βtiu
′
i(ĉ
i,T
t )ĉ
i,T
t
=
T∑
t=τ
λ̂i,Tt p̂
T
t ĉ
i,T
t > α
T∑
t=τ
λ̂i,Tt p̂
T
t .
Given a T > 0 we define the sequence pii,T as follows
pii,Tt =
{
λ̂i,Tt p̂
T
t if t 6 T
0 otherwise .
It follows that for any T > 0
∞∑
t=0
pii,Tt 6
ui(M)
1− βi α
and that for any ε > 0 there exists τ such that for any s > τ , any T
∞∑
t=s
pii,Tt 6 ε.
The sequence (pii,T )T is in a σ(`1, `∞)-compact set of `111, where σ(`1, `∞) is the weak
topology on `1 and its dual `∞. The weak topology is a polar topology containing
the finest open sets. Given the definition of a dual space, `∞ is the collection of
all linear functionals of the type ϕ : `1 → R. The weak topology is then the finest
topology, i.e. the topology containing the least open sets, that makes all these linear
functionals continuous. This implies that a sequence that converges in `1, will also
converge in `∞ with respect the weak topology σ(`1, `∞). We can therefore suppose
that for any i ∈ I, pii,T → pii ∈ `1 for σ(`1, `∞) and therefore that for any i ∈ I,
pii,T → pii ∈ `∞. In particular, using (v), for any i ∈ I, for any t ∈ T we have
βtiu
′
i(ĉ
i,T
t )→ βtiu′i(cit) < +∞.
11This follows from Dunford-Pettis Property, see Chapter 8 in Aliprantis and Border (1999).
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This implies cit > 0. Given any T > 0 we have
∀t ∈ {0, ..., T},
∑
i∈I
ĉi,Tt =
∑
i∈I
ωit + ξt,
in which case we get
∀t ∈ T ,
∑
i∈I
cit =
∑
i∈I
ωit + ξt.
Claim 1.5.9. For any t ∈ T , pt > 0, κt > 0, ϕit < +∞ and
∑
i∈I ϕ
i
t > 0.
Proof. We prove the claim by induction. Consider the period t = 0. If p̂T0 → 0 as
T → +∞, then ϕ̂i,T0 → +∞.12 Recall that W = maxi∈I ||ωi||+ ||ξ|| and
T∑
t=1
βtiui(W ) >
T∑
t=1
βt(ui(ĉ
i,T
t )− ui(0))
>
T∑
t=1
λ̂i,Tt p̂
T
t ĉ
i,T
t
=
T∑
t=1
λ̂i,Tt p̂
T
t ω
i
t + λ̂
i,T
1 κ̂
T
1 ϕ̂
i,T
0
> λ̂i,T1 κ̂T1 ϕ̂i,T0 = λ̂i,T0 p̂T0 ϕ̂i,T0 .
Since λ̂i,T0 p̂
T
0 = u
i′
0 (ĉ
i,T
0 )→ u′i(ci,T0 ) ∈ (0,+∞), ϕ̂i,T0 is uniformly bounded from above
yielding a contradiction. Hence, p0 > 0. This implies ϕ̂
i,T
0 → ϕi0 < +∞. From (iv)
we have
p̂T0 ξt 6 κ̂T0
∑
i∈I
ϕi−1
in which case we obtain κ0 > 0.
Now consider the period t = 1. If p1 = 0, from (i) and (v), κ̂
T
1 → 1 and
λ̂i,T1 → +∞. This gives a contradiction since from (v) we have
+∞ > u′i(ci0) > lim
T
λ̂i,T1 κ̂
T
1 = +∞.
Hence p1 > 0.
If κ1 = 0, from (iv),
∑
i∈I ϕ̂
i,T
0 → +∞. This gives a contradiction since for any
i ∈ I, ϕ̂i,T0 → ϕi0 < +∞. Hence, κ1 > 0. Since p1 > 0, we have ϕ̂i,T1 → ϕi1 < +∞.
Moreover, from (iv)
p̂T1 ξt 6 κ̂T1
∑
i∈I
ϕ̂i,T0 .
12This is because
p0c
i
0 + p0ϕ
i
0 = p0ω
i
0 + κ0ϕ
i
−1.
with κ0 = 1 and ϕ
i
−1 > 0.
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Taking the limit as T → +∞ implies that ∑i∈I ϕi0 > 0.
By induction, it follows that for any t ∈ T , pt > 0, κt > 0, ϕit < +∞, ∀i ∈ I
and
∑
i∈I ϕ
i
t > 0.
Claim 1.5.10. For any i ∈ I, (ci, ϕi) is agent i’s optimal choice given the prices
(p, κ).
Proof. First, observe that for any i ∈ I, for any t ∈ T we have
λ̂i,Tt → λit =
βtiu
′
i(c
i
t)
pt
.
Moreover, from (v) and (vi)
λ
i
tpt > λ
i
t+1κ
i
t+1
λ
i
tptϕ
i
t = λ
i
t+1κ
i
t+1ϕ
i
t.
Observe also that for any ε > 0 there exists a period τ such that for any t > τ
we have
∀T > t,
T∑
s=t
βsi ui(W ) 6 ε.
Since
T∑
s=t
βsi ui(W ) >
T∑
s=t
βs[ui(ĉ
i,T
s ]− ui(0))
>
T∑
s=t
λ̂i,Ts p̂
T
s ĉ
i,T
s
=
T∑
s=t
λ̂i,Ts p̂
T
s ω
i
s + λ̂
i,T
t κ̂
T
t ϕ̂
i,T
t−1
> λ̂i,Tt κ̂Tt ϕ̂i,Tt−1 = λ̂i,Tt−1p̂Tt−1ϕ̂i,Tt−1.
we can conclude that there exists a period τ such that for any t > τ we have
∀T > t, λ̂i,Tt−1p̂Tt−1ϕ̂i,Tt−1 6 ε.
Therefore, given any ε > 0, for t large enough we have
λ
i
t−1pt−1ϕ
i
t−1 6 ε.
Let (ci, ϕi) ∈ R∞+ × R∞+ satisfy
∀t ∈ T , ptcit + ptϕit 6 ptωit + κtϕit−1.
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These constraints are equivalent to
∀t ∈ T , λitptcit + λ
i
tptϕ
i
t 6 λ
i
tptω
i
t + λ
i
tκtϕ
i
t−1.
We also have
∀t ∈ T , λitptcit + λ
i
tptϕ
i
t = λ
i
tptω
i
t + λ
i
tκtϕ
i
t−1.
Let
∆t−1 =
t−1∑
s=0
βsi ui(c
i
s)−
t−1∑
s=0
βsi ui(c
i
s).
We have
∆t−1 >
t−1∑
s=0
βsi u
′
i(c
i
s)(c
i
s − cis) =
t−1∑
s=0
λ
i
tps(c
i
s − cis)
> −λit−1pt−1ϕit−1.
For any t large enough, we have ∆t−1 > −ε. Hence, for any ε > 0
∞∑
s=0
βtui(c
i
s) >
∞∑
s=0
βsui(c
i
s)− ε.
Finally, it is easy to check that ∀t ∈ T∑
i∈I
cit =
∑
i∈I
ωit + ξt;
pt
(∑
i∈I
ϕit + ξt
)
= κt
∑
i∈I
ϕit−1;∑
i∈I
ϕit > 0.
This concludes the proof of claim 1.5.10.
The proof of theorem follows from claim 1.5.8, 1.5.9 and 1.5.10.
1.6 Concluding remarks
One feature that makes General Equilibrium model with collateral constraints ap-
pealing is that, similar constraints can be observed in actual markets. As such, they
provide a natural and intuitive method of imposing a Transversality Condition and
reducing the threat of default. The main idea is to use a natural limit on debts that
for example excludes default at equilibrium as in our case, and in addition restricts
agents choices in such a way that Ponzi Schemes cannot arise.
We provided an equilibrium existence result for an exchange economy with col-
lateral constraints. This result provides the foundations for similar models that use
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collateral requirements in Macroeconomic theory (see Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997;
Cordoba and Ripoll, 2004). The bubble example we provided shows that collateral
constraints can give rise to bubbles. A particularity of our example is that the as-
set containing the bubble is not fiat money, but is a physical asset paying positive
dividends.
The connection we make between Arrow-Debreu markets and sequential markets
is helpful for models that need to rely on the techniques and concepts of Arrow-
Debreu theory.
As a natural extension to our model one might consider an economy in which
the long-lived asset is replaced by a production factor. In this line of research
Becker et al. (2012) have shown that no bubbles can occur in a Ramsey model with
heterogeneous discounting, elastic labour and borrowing constraint. Their results
rely on the fact that, in Ramsey models with heterogeneous discounting the most
patient agent will end up with all the capital as time approaches infinity.
The question then remains whether one would get bubbles in an economy where
agents have individual production functions as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), since
under the Inada conditions agent would always hold some positive amount of the
production factor.
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CHAPTER 2
Debt sustainability with one-sided exclusion
2.1 Introduction
There exists a vast literature on consumer default that focuses mainly on consump-
tion and asset price fluctuations. In theses type of literature the punishment for
defaulting can consist in a seizure of a collateral, a complete exclusion from financial
markets or partial exclusion from financial markets. The severity of the punishment
may also vary in the length of the exclusion. Borrowing and lending takes place
by trading a financial asset which is in zero net supply. Kehoe and Levine (1993)
show that in a stochastic endowment economy there exists equilibria for sufficiently
patient agents in which borrowing occurs despite an option to default. The model
they consider is an Arrow-Debreu economy in which punishment for default consist
in an complete (two-sided) exclusion from financial markets. Their definition of
equilibrium includes a participation constraint that guarantees that no agent who
engages in trade has an incentive to default.
The findings of Kehoe and Levine (1993) are in line with the findings of Kocher-
lakota (1996), who shows that for sufficient patient agent a “Folk Theorem” similar
to Kimball (1988) can be achieved leading to an equilibrium identical to the one
under full commitment in which agents have no incentive to default.
In a more recent paper Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009) consider a general equilib-
rium economy in which agents are excluded permanently from savings after default.
They find that equilibria with trading can exist for sufficient low interest rate that
guarantee agents willingness to repay their debts.
Azariadis and Kaas (2013) consider a full exclusion from the credit market and
show that in in these type of stochastic exchange economies the length of the pun-
ishment for default affects the efficiency of equilibria. They show that the longer
54
the punishment, the more likely it is that there exists an equilibrium in which there
is trade in the financial asset without default.
A model in which default occurs at equilibrium can be found in Chatterjee et al.
(2007). The authors match key economic aggregates of U.S. data by considering a
general equilibrium model with default. The punishment consist in a seizure of the
households’ assets up to a limit, an exclusion from savings in the defaulting period
and a temporary exclusion from borrowing.
In a similar fashion Braido (2008) constructs a model with default at equilib-
rium. The punishment for default consists in his model in a tightening of borrowing
constraints. The novelty of his paper is that agents are not excluded from financial
trade, but by defaulting agents will gradually tightening there borrowing constraints.
A separate part of the literature focuses on sovereign debt. In this type of
literature the punishment consists mostly of a loss in reputation and an exclusion
from future borrowing. The reason for this is that when negotiating with countries,
creditors cannot demand a collateral and it is also difficult to exclude a defaulting
country from saving. In some of the literature on sovereign debt, default is also
followed by an external penalty that can be seen as a retaliation from the creditor
countries, which could consists in an imposition of extra tariffs on international
trade or cancellation of trade agreements. In a similar type of model Eaton and
Gersovitz (1981) show that with an extra penalty on borrowing without collateral
and partial exclusion from financial markets, borrowing can be sustained, in contrast
to Bulow and Rogoff (1989) where borrowing can never be sustained on on the basis
of reputation alone. A crucial condition for the no trade result by Bulow and
Rogoff (1989) is that countries can continue to participate in financial markets as
creditors. Cole and Kehoe (1995) show that in a model in which no side can commit
to honouring ones obligations, borrowing can be sustained, since a default can lead to
a full exclusion from the financial market. The literature on sovereign debt is tightly
related to the one on private debt, since countries are modelled as representative
consumer. The issue of unilateral commitment is also highlighted by Hellwig and
Lorenzoni (2009). Moreover, since in Bulow and Rogoff (1989) agents can always
save at a global interest rate, an equilibrium with low interest rates cannot arise.
Our model is in the spirit of Cole and Kehoe (1995) and Hellwig and Loren-
zoni (2009) with respect to the punishment we impose on default. We consider a
deterministic General Equilibrium model in which agent start with an endowment
of a commodity that can either be used for consumption or can be invested in a
productive activity that yields a positive payoff in the next period. The commodity
itself cannot be directly stored. Compared to a stochastic endowment economy, the
future aggregate endowment of the commodity depends entirely on the production
choices of the agents. To simplify our analysis we study an economy with a finite
set of consumers that have a common discount factor and can invest in the same
55
productive activity.
We first consider an economy in which investment is unbounded. By a non-
arbitrage argument follows then instantly that if we allow for borrowing and lending
the return on savings must be equal to the ones of the productive activity. In an
economy with full commitment this implies that we have for each equilibrium with-
out borrowing an infinite amount of equilibria with borrowing. Once we introduce
the option to default, all borrowing equilibria disappear, since the lending party can
guarantee itself at least the same amount of future consumption through investing
and thus has no incentive to lend. Analogously, the borrowing party can guarantee
itself the same amount of consumption smoothing through investing and does not
suffer disutility from being excluded from financial markets. As a result there cannot
exist an equilibrium with borrowing.
In the second part we study the case in which the maximum amount that can be
invested is bounded from above. In this version of the model agents that start with
a relative high endowment of the commodity might want to lend to other agents in
order to carry over more consumption into future periods. This implies that if we
consider an economy with full commitment there can exist equilibria where agents
lend and borrow to each other, and in which the consumption plans can only be
achieved with borrowing. We show that with a partial exclusion constraint agents
have always an incentive to default and the autarky equilibrium is the only outcome
for these type of economies.
Apart form the non stochastic environment, the model differs from most of the
literature with respect to the punishment we impose on default, since we use a par-
tial exclusion constraint as in Bulow and Rogoff (1989) and Hellwig and Lorenzoni
(2009).
The fact that we are in a non stochastic environment simplifies the analysis
significantly, but allows us to focus our interest on efficient resource sharing. Our no
trade result implies that uncertainty is a crucial condition for an equilibrium with
trade and without default.
2.2 The model
2.2.1 Agents and commodities
There is a single non durable good at every period t ∈ T = {0, 1, 2, . . . }. There is
a finite set I = {1, 2, . . . , I} of agents. Agents can use the good for consumption or
production. Each agent chooses a consumption sequence ci = (cit)t∈T where c
i
t ∈ R+.
The utility function is assumed to be time-additively separable, i.e.
U i
(
ci
)
=
∞∑
t=0
βtui
(
cit
)
(2.2.1)
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where ui : R+ → [0,+∞) is the instantaneous utility function at period t and β ∈
(0, 1) is the common discount factor. All agents discount future utility at the same
rate. We impose the following assumption on the utility functions:
(A.1) ∀i, ui is strictly increasing, strictly concave, continuous, ui (0) = 0, differen-
tiable with Inada condition
lim
cit→0
∂U i (ci)
∂cit
= +∞; ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T
The continuation utility in any period s is denoted as
U is
(
ci
)
=
∞∑
t=s
βt−sui
(
cit
)
Agents are equally productive but the productivity varies across time. Let A =
(At)t∈T be the sequence of productivity factors across time where At+1 is the pro-
ductivity in period t + 1. By investing an amount xit+1 > 0 of the good in period
t an agent will receive an output At+1x
i
t+1 in units of the good in period t + 1.
The sequence of investment decisions for agent i will be denoted by xi =
(
xit+1
)
t∈T ,
where xit ∈ X ⊆ R+. X is a convex subset of R+. In the course of this analysis
we will consider a setup in which investment choices are only bounded from below,
that is X = R+and one in which there exists an upper bound on investment, i.e. X
is closed and convex. In the case where an upper bound exists we will assume it is
given by 1 such that X = [0, 1] ⊂ R+.
2.2.2 Financial markets
There exists a short-lived security available for trade at each period t paying one
unit of the consumption good at period t + 1. This security can be short sold and
is provided in zero net supply, i.e.
∀t ∈ T
∑
bit+1 = 0 (2.2.2)
Let q = (qt+1)t∈T be the asset price sequence where qt+1 ∈ R+represents the
asset price at period t. Let bit+1 denote the net financial position for this security
at the end of period t, i.e. the beginning of period t + 1. An agent that short sells
this security in period t, that is, if bit+1 < 0, will receive −qt+1bit+1 units of the good
in period t and promises to repay −bit+1 units of the good in period t+ 1. An agent
that buys the security in period t, i.e. bit+1 > 0, will pay qt+1b
i
t+1 units of the good
at period t and will receive bit+1 units in period t+ 1. The security holding sequence
for agent i is denoted by bi =
(
bit+1
)
t∈T .
The amount of short-lived security an agent can short sale is observable and is
subject to an upper bound, i.e. bit+1 is subject to a lower bound. The bound is
57
endogenous and follows from the institutional environment in the economy. The
institution cannot force agents to repay the debt fully. If agent i has been short in
period t, she/he should deliver the promise bit+1 in period t + 1. However agent i
may decide to default and choose to deliver a quantity dit+1 = 0. Lenders keep track
of the borrowers asset position and the provision of credit never exceeds At+1x
i
t+1.
That is, each agent i faces the following borrowing constraint
∀t ∈ T bit+1 > −At+1xit+1
This constraint ensures that every borrower can repay in full amount its debt at any
point in time.
An agent that defaults will be punished. In this model the punishment consists
in a partial exclusion from the financial market. Partial exclusion implies that after
a default an agent cannot borrow at any future period but only save. Specifically,
if an agent i defaults in period s, then the borrowing constraint is given by
∀t > s bit+1 > 0
We will impose the following assumptions on xi0 and b
i
0:
(A.2) All agents start with a positive net position in the assets, i.e. A0x
i
0 + b
i
0 >
0, ∀i ∈ I.
(A.3) All agents start without debt, i.e. bi0 = 0, ∀i ∈ I.
Assumption (A.2) implies that agents can afford some positive consumption in the
first period without borrowing. Assumption (A.3) is self explanatory.
2.2.3 Budget constraints
Let A be the space of sequences a = (at)t∈T with
at = (ct, xt+1, bt+1) ∈ R+ ×X × R
Agent i’s choice ai = (ci, xi, bi) ∈ A must satisfy the following constraints:
• budget constraint
∀t ∈ T cit + xit+1 + qt+1bit+1 6 Atxit + bit (2.2.3)
• borrowing constraint
∀t ∈ T bit+1 > −At+1xit+1 (2.2.4)
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In case that there exists a period s ∈ T in which the agent defaulted, the borrowing
(2.2.4) constraint is replaced by a partial exclusion constraint
∀t > s ∈ T bit+1 > 0 (2.2.5)
The partial exclusion constraint implies that an agent is not allowed to short sell
the financial security and thus effectively borrow.
2.2.4 The equilibrium concept
Denote by Q the set of sequences of prices q satisfying
∀t ∈ T qt ∈ R+
Given a sequence of prices q ∈ Q let Bi (q) denote the set of plans a ∈ A satisfying
constraints (2.2.3) and (2.2.4).
Definition 2.2.1. A competitive equilibrium for the economy with full commitment
Efc =
(
U i, β, xi0, b
i
0
)
i∈I
is a price sequence q ∈ Q and a family of allocations (ai)i∈I , with ai ∈ A such that
(A) for every agent i, the plan ai is optimal among the budget feasible plans, i.e.
ai maximises (2.2.1) and ai ∈ Bi (q)
(B) the financial market clears at every period, i.e.
∀t ∈ T
∑
i∈I
bit+1 = 0
Lemma 2.2.1. qt+1 > 0, ∀t ∈ T .
Proof. Assume there exists a period t in which qt+1 = 0. In this case b
i
t+1 < ∞ is
not optimal for any agent i. This can be seen by considering an alternative strategy
bˆit+1 = b
i
t+1 + ,  > 0. The new strategy is feasible since qt+1 = 0, and by applying
this strategy the agent could increase consumption in period t + 1 by . Since this
holds for all agents i, it follows
∑
i∈I b
i
t+1 > 0, which contradicts the market clearing
condition (2.2.2) .
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For an equilibrium price sequence q, with qt+1 > 0, ∀t, any agent i ∈ I solves the
following optimisation problem
max
ci,bi
U i
(
ci
)
=
∞∑
t=0
βtiu
i
(
cit
)
s.t. ∀t∈ T cit + xit+1 + qt+1bit+1 6 Atxit + bit
∀t ∈ T bit+1 > −At+1xit+1
Let V i0 (q) be the maximum value an agent i can achieve for the associated equilib-
rium price sequence q. The maximum continuation utility for an agent i from period
t onwards will be denoted as V it (q).
When allowing for default any agent i that chooses to default in a period s,
fails to deliver bis and delivers instead d
i
s = 0. The agent is forbidden to short sell
the financial security and has to choose a continuation consumption sequence. Let
ci,s, bi,s be the alternative consumption and asset holding choices for agent i after
default in period s. The continuation utility is given by U i,ds (c
i,s). The maximisation
problem after default for any an agent i is given by
max
ci,s,bi,s
U i,ds
(
ci,s
)
=
∞∑
t=s
βt−sui
(
ci,st
)
s.t. t > s cit + xit+1 + qt+1bit+1 6 Atxit + bit; bis = 0
∀t > s bit+1 > 0
Let V i,ds (q) be the maximum continuation utility an agent i can achieve when de-
faulting in period s associated with a price vector q, where q is an equilibrium price
vector for the economy with full commitment.
Definition 2.2.2. A competitive equilibrium for the economy without full commit-
ment
Enc =
(
U i, β, xi0, b
i
0
)
i∈I
is a price sequence q ∈ Q and a family of allocations (ai)i∈I , with ai ∈ A such that
(A) for every agent i, the plan ai is optimal among the budget feasible plans, i.e.
ai maximises (2.2.1) and ai ∈ Bi (q)
(B) the financial market clears at every period, i.e.
∀t ∈ T
∑
i∈I
bit+1 = 0
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(C) no agent has an incentive to default at any point in time
V it (q) >V i,dt (q) ; ∀t ∈ T ; ∀i ∈ I
Throughout the paper we will define the Arrow-Debreu price at time 0 for one
unit of consumption at time t as
p0 = 1, pt+1 = ptqt+1, ∀t > 0
We can think of it as the spot price at time 0 for one unit of consumption at time
t+ 1. By a non-arbitrage argument we can find the spot price at time s for one unit
of consumption at time t+ 1 as
pst+1 =
pt+1
ps
where the non-arbitrage condition for spot prices is given by
pt+1 = psp
s
t+1 =p1p
1
2 . . . p
t
t+1
=q1 . . . qt+1
2.2.5 Characterisation of the equilibrium when investment
is unbounded from above
In this case X = R+. The optimisation problem of any agent i can be characterised
by the following Lagrangian
L (ci, xi, bi) = ∞∑
t=0
βtui
(
cit
)
+
∞∑
t=0
λit
(
Atx
i
t + b
i
t − qt+1bit+1 − xit+1 − cit
)
+
∞∑
t=0
µit+1x
i
t+1 +
∞∑
t=0
ζ it+1
(
At+1x
i
t+1 + b
i
t+1
)
(λit)
∞
t=0 is the sequence of Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget constraint.(
µit+1
)∞
t=0
is the sequence of Lagrange multipliers associated with the non-negativity
constraint of xit+1.
(
ζ it+1
)∞
t=0
is the sequence of Lagrange multipliers associated with
the borrowing constraint. Given the Inada condition and assumption (A.2) it follows
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immediately cit > 0,∀t,∀i. The FOC are given by
∂L (ci, xi, bi)
∂cit
=βt
∂ui (cit)
∂cit
− λit = 0
∂L (ci, xi, bi)
∂xit+1
=− λit + λit+1At+1 + µit+1 + At+1ζ it+1 = 0 (2.2.6)
∂L (ci, xi, bi)
∂bit+1
=− λitqt+1 + λit+1 + ζ it+1 = 0 (2.2.7)
∂L (ci, xi, bi)
∂λit+1
=Atx
i
t + bt − xit+1 − qt+1bit+1 − cit > 0 (2.2.8)
λit > 0; λit
[
∂L (ci, xi, bi)
∂λit+1
]
= 0
∂L (ci, xi, bi)
∂ζ it+1
=At+1x
i
t+1 + b
i
t+1 > 0; (2.2.9)
ζ it+1 > 0; ζ it+1
[
∂L (ci, xi, bi)
∂ζ it+1
]
= 0
∂L (ci, xi, bi)
∂µit+1
=xit+1 > 0; (2.2.10)
µit+1 > 0; µit+1
[
∂L (ci, xi, bi)
∂µit+1
]
= 0
Since the utility function is strictly increasing with respect to consumption, it follows
immediately that the budget constraint is binding and λit > 0,∀t,∀i.
From the FOC (2.2.7), we have
qt+1 >
λit+1
λit
, ∀t > 0,∀i
qt+1 =
λit+1
λit
if ζ it = 0
q1 . . . qt+1 = pt+1 >
λi1
λi0
λi2
λi1
. . .
λit+1
λit
=
λit+1
λi0
, ∀t > 0, ∀i
To derive the last line, the non-arbitrage condition for spot prices was used.
In the following part of this chapter it will be shown that an economy without full
commitment Enc does not have any equilibrium in which trade occurs. All the results
derived from now on apply to economy Enc. Although, some of the results derived
below may hold even for an economy with full commitment, we will not mention it
since the full commitment case is well know and is only used for comparison reasons
at a later stage.
Lemma 2.2.2. Let
(
(ai)i∈I , q
)
be an equilibrium. Then
1− qt+1At+1 > 0, ∀t > 0
Proof. From the market clearing condition (2.2.2) follows that there must exist in
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every period at least one agent, with bit+1 > 0. Since cit+1 > 0 it follows that there
exists in every period at least one agent for which Atx
i
t + b
i
t > 0. We fix a period
t + 1 and denote by j the agent with At+1x
j
t+1 + b
j
t+1 > 0. This implies ζ
j
t+1 = 0.
From the FOC (2.2.6) follows then
qt+1 =
λjt+1
λjt
6 1
At+1
And this concludes the proof.
Lemma 2.2.2 implies that an agent i that borrows bit+1 = −1 units of consumption
and invests it in the productive activity will not receive more than what she/he has to
repay next period. In an economy with unbounded investment this is equivalent to a
non-arbitrage condition, which does not permit an agent to increase its consumption
in the next period to an infinite amount. To see this, suppose bit+1 < 0 and let
xit+1 = −qt+1bit+1 > 0. The borrowing constraint (2.2.4) is then given by
bit+1 >At+1qt+1bit+1
1 6At+1qt+1, since bit+1 < 0
For 1−At+1qt+1 < 0, the borrowing constraint is fulfilled for any bit+1 < 0, and since
the condition holds with strict inequality we have for bit+1 → −∞, At+1xit+1 + bit+1 =
−At+1qt+1bit+1 + bit+1 →∞. Given the budget constraint (2.2.3) we could have then
cit+1 →∞. This example shows that if Lemma (2.2.2) does not hold, we would have
no equilibrium since all agents would prefer to borrow and thus the market clearing
condition for the financial asset (2.2.2) would not be fulfilled.
The next Lemma derives a similar non-arbitrage condition for the case where
agents saves.
Lemma 2.2.3. Let
(
(ai)i∈I , q
)
be an equilibrium. Then:
Atx
i
t + b
i
t >0, ∀t > 1, ∀i
Moreover, we have
1− qt+1At+1 =0, ∀t > 0
and
pt+1 =
λit+1
λi0
, ∀i
=
1∏t+1
τ=1Aτ
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Proof. We first proof
At+1x
i
t+1 + b
i
t+1 = 0 ⇒Atxit + bit > 0, At+2xit+2 + bit+2 > 0
Indeed, we have in this case bit+1 = −At+1xit+1. Inserting this equality in the budget
constraint at period t we get
Atx
i
t + b
i
t =c
i
t + x
i
t+1 + qt+1
[−At+1xit+1]
=cit + x
i
t+1 [1− qt+1At+1] > cit > 0
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 2.2.2 and from the fact that xit+1 > 0.
Now, assume At+2x
i
t+2 + b
i
t+2 = 0, from the result we just obtained above, it
should follow At+1x
i
t+1 + b
i
t+1 > 0, but this contradicts our initial assumption. So it
follows At+2x
i
t+2 + b
i
t+2 > 0 or equivalently b
i
t+2 > −At+2xit+2.
Inserting this inequality in the budget constraint at period t+ 1 implies
0 = At+1x
i
t+1 + b
i
t+1 =c
i
t+1 + x
i
t+2 + qt+2b
i
t+2
At+1x
i
t+1 + b
i
t+1 >c
i
t+1 + x
i
t+2 [1− qt+2At+2] > ct+1 > 0
which is a contradiction. Therefore At+1x
i
t+1 + b
i
t+1 > 0,∀t > 0,∀i.
As a consequence if follows from the FOC ζ it+1 = 0,∀t > 0,∀i. Thus λ
i
t+1
λit
=
qt+1, ∀t > 0,∀i. By summing across the budget constraints we get
At+1
I∑
i=1
xit+1 =
I∑
i=1
cii,t +
I∑
i=1
xit+1 >
I∑
i=1
cii,t > 0
Thus in every period there must exist at least one agent that invest such that
At+1
∑I
i=1 x
i
t+1 > 0. Let this agent be denoted by jˆ. From the non-negativity
constraint for xit+1 follows then µ
ˆ
t+1 = 0. Inserting this result in FOC (2.2.6) we get
λˆt+1
λˆt
=
1
At+1
It follows then directly from the definition of pt+1, that
pt+1 =
λit+1
λi0
,∀i
=
1∏t+1
τ=1Aτ
This concludes the proof.
From Lemma 2.2.3 follows Atx
i
t + b
i
t > 0,∀t > 1, ∀i and At+1 = 1qt+1 , ∀t ∈ T .
The case At+1 >
1
qt+1
has been already discussed. For At+1 <
1
qt+1
it would follow
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that the return on saving is higher than the return on investing in the productive
activity. Given that Atx
i
t + b
i
t > 0, an agent would invest nothing in the productive
activity, if this second non-arbitrage condition does not hold. In such a case we
would have bit > 0,∀i and the financial market clearing condition (2.2.2) would not
be fulfilled.
Lemma 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 imply that the two assets have the same return at equi-
librium and thus the financial assets is redundant. Intuitively, should there be trade
in the financial asset, i.e. ∃i, ∃t : bit+1 < 0, then once we allow for the option to
default, agents should stop trading in the financial asset, because the borrower has
always an incentive to default. This is demonstrated by the next proposition.
Proposition 2.2.1. If
(
(ai)i∈I , q
)
is an equilibrium, then bit = 0,∀t > 1,∀i. This
implies the only feasible equilibrium in this economy is a no trade equilibrium.
Proof. Consider an allocation
(
(ai)i∈I , q
)
t∈T in which there exist an agent j and a
period s−1 such that bjs < 0. We claim that given the option of default there exists an
alternative allocation for agent j, a˜j =
(
c˜jt , x˜
j
t+1, b˜
j
t+1
)
t∈T
that is feasible and yields
a higher utility, U j (c˜j) > U j (cj). Indeed, consider this alternative consumption,
borrowing and investment path for agent j that is given by
c˜jt = c
j
t ; ∀t < s
c˜jt = c
j
t − bjt > cjt ; t = s
c˜jt = c
t
j; ∀t > s
b˜jt = b
j
t ; ∀t 6 s
b˜jt = 0; ∀t > s
x˜jt = x
j
t ; ∀t 6 s
x˜jt = x
j
t +
1
At
bt; ∀t > s
For all periods t < s, the allocation is unchanged, thus it must be shown that the
allocation is budget feasible for t > s. In period s, given the default decision the
agent will deliver d = 0, the budget constraint is given by
c˜js + x˜
j
s+1 + qs+1b˜
j
s+1 6Asx˜js + d
cjs − bjs + xjs+1 +
1
As+1
bs+1 6Asxjs
cjs + x
j
s+1 +
1
As+1
bs+1 6Asxjs + bjs
We recall that the constraint in the old allocation was given by
cjs + x
j
s+1 + qs+1b
j
s+1 6Asxjs + bjs
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From Lemma 2.2.3 follows 1
As+1
= qs+1 and that the inequality was fulfilled in the old
equilibrium it holds in the new one, too. To determine whether the new allocation
is feasible for t > s we write the budget constraint for t > s as
c˜jt + x˜
j
t+1 + qt+1b˜
j
t+1 6Atx˜jt + b˜jt
cjt + x
j
t+1 +
1
At+1
bjt+1 6At
(
xjt +
1
At
bjt
)
cjt + x
j
t+1 + qt+1b
j
t+1 6Atxjt + bjt
Again, given that this inequality was satisfied under the old allocation it is satisfied
also under the new. Thus the consumption stream is feasible. To check that c˜j is a
consumption stream which yields a higher utility, we note that ∀t ∈ T \{s}, c˜jt = cjt
and for t = s, c˜jt > c
j
t . Since the utility function is strictly increasing in the
consumption arguments it follows U j (c˜j) > U j (cj). From this follows that there
exists a period s in which V js (q) < V
j,d
s (q) and the proof is concluded.
The case with unbounded investment is not surprising and very intuitive. The
economic argument for the no trade result is based on the fact that the financial asset
is redundant in an economy with full commitment. This implies we have multiple
equilibria. In other words, given any equilibrium where there exists an agent i that
borrows in a period t, we can find an alternative equilibrium without borrowing, in
which all consumption sequences of the agents are unchanged. So once we introduce
the option to default, an agent can make use of this option without having to sacrifice
on future consumption streams, which is what the trading strategy in Proposition
2.2.1 demonstrates.
However, the next section shows that in the case where investments are bounded
from above the the financial assets is not redundant anymore and the proof of the
no trade result is more elaborated.
2.2.6 Characterisation of the equilibrium when investment
is bounded from above
In this case X = [0, 1]. Consider the following problem P i (q) which corresponds to
agent’s i optimisation problem
max
ci,xi,bi
∞∑
t=0
βtui
(
cit
)
s.t.∀t > 0, cit + xit+1 + qt+1bit+1 6 Atxit + bit
∀t > 0, cit > 0, xit+1 ∈ [0, 1] , bit+1 > −At+1xit+1
xi0 > 0, b0 are given
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An allocation will be called P i(q)-feasible, if it fulfils the budget constraint, the
borrowing constraint and the lower and upper bound on investment. An allocation
is called P i(q)-optimal if it is P i(q)-feasible and if there does not exist an allocation
that is P i(q)-feasible and yields higher utility.
The Lagrangian associated with P i (q) is given by
L (ci, xi, bi) = ∞∑
t=0
βtui
(
cit
)
+
∞∑
t=0
λit
(
Atx
i
t + b
i
t − qt+1bit+1 − xit+1 − cit
)
+
∞∑
t=0
µit+1x
i
t+1 +
∞∑
t=0
νit+1
(
1− xit+1
)
+
∞∑
t=0
ζ it+1
(
At+1x
i
t+1 + b
i
t+1
)
(λit)
∞
t=0 is the sequence of Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget constraint.(
µit+1
)∞
t=0
is the sequence of Lagrange multipliers associated with the non-negativity
constraints of xit+1.
(
νit+1
)∞
t=0
is the sequence of Lagrange multipliers associated
with the upper bound on xit+1 and
(
ζ it+1
)∞
t=0
is the sequence of Lagrange multipliers
associated with the borrowing constraint. The FOC are given by
∂L (ci, xi, bi)
∂cit
=βt
∂ui (cit)
∂cit
− λit = 0
∂L (ci, xi, bi)
∂xit+1
=− λit + λit+1At+1 + µit+1 − νit+1 + At+1ζ it+1 = 0 (2.2.11)
∂L (ci, xi, bi)
∂bit+1
=− λitqt+1 + λt+1 + ζ it+1 = 0 (2.2.12)
∂L (ci, xi, bi)
∂λit+1
=Atx
i
t + bt − xit+1 − qt+1bit+1 − cit > 0;
λit > 0; λit
[
∂L (ci, xi, bi)
∂λit+1
]
= 0
∂L (ci, xi, bi)
∂ζ it+1
=At+1x
i
t+1 + b
i
t+1 > 0;
ζ it+1 > 0; ζ it+1
[
∂L (ci, xi, bi)
∂ζ it+1
]
= 0
∂L (ci, xi, bi)
∂µit+1
=xit+1 > 0; µit+1 > 0; µit+1
[
∂L (ci, xi, bi)
∂µit+1
]
= 0 (2.2.13)
∂L (ci, xi, bi)
∂νit+1
=1− xit+1 > 0; νit+1 > 0; νit+1
[
∂L (ci, xi, bi)
∂νit+1
]
= 0 (2.2.14)
Lemma 2.2.4. Let
(
(ai)i∈I , q
)
be an equilibrium. It follows At+1x
i
t+1 + b
i
t+1 > 0⇒
Atx
i
t + b
i
t > 0.
Proof. For At+1x
i
t+1+b
i
t+1 > 0 it follows ζ
i
t+1 = 0 and from FOC (2.2.12) qt+1 =
λit+1
λit
.
At this stage we will consider different cases.
Case 1 :
xit+1 = 0,⇒ bit+1 > 0. In this case the budget constraint in period t can be
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written as
cit + qt+1b
i
t+1 6Atxit + bit
Since cit > 0 and qt+1b
i
t+1 > 0 it follows At+1x
i
t+1 + b
i
t+1 > 0.
Case 2 :
0 < xit+1 < 1,⇒ bit+1 > −At+1xit+1. In this case it follows from FOC (2.2.13)
and (2.2.14), µit+1, ν
i
t+1 = 0. From FOC (2.2.11) follows
λit+1
λit
= 1
At+1
= qt+1. The
condition At+1x
i
t+1 + b
i
t+1 > 0 can then be written
xit+1 +
1
At+1
bit+1 >0; since At+1 > 0
xit+1 + qt+1b
i
t+1 >0
The budget constraint in period t can then be written as
0 < cit + x
i
t+1 + qt+1b
i
t+1 6Atxit+1 + bit+1
where the first inequality follows from the fact that cit > 0 and x
i
t+1 + qt+1b
i
t+1 > 0.
Case 3 :
xit+1 = 1 ⇒ bit+1 > −At+1xit+1. In this case we have again xit+1 + 1At+1 bit+1 > 0.
From FOC (2.2.13) and (2.2.14) follows µit+1 = 0, ν
i
t+1 > 0. We can then use FOC
(2.2.11) to write 1
At+1
=
λit+1
λit+ν
i
t+1
6 λ
i
t+1
λit
= qt+1. So it follows
xit+1 +
λit+1
λit + ν
i
t+1
bit+1 6xit+1 +
λit+1
λit
bit+1
0 < xit+1 +
1
At+1
bt+1 6xit+1 + qt+1bit+1
The budget constraint in period t can then be written as
0 < cit + x
i
t+1 + qt+1b
i
t+1 6Atxit + bit
and we can conclude Atx
i
t + b
i
t > 0.
Considering all the cases we can conclude that At+1x
i
t+1 +b
i
t+1 > 0⇒ Atxit+bit >
0.
Corollary 2.2.1. For any i ∈ I and s ∈ T such that Asxis + bis = 0, follows
Atx
i
t + b
i
t = 0,∀t > s.
Proof. We will use a proof by induction. Assume there exists an agent i and a period
s in which Asx
i
s + b
i
s = 0, then if As+1x
i
s+1 + b
i
s+1 > 0 we have a contradiction to
Lemma (2.2.4), so it follows Asx
i
s + b
i
s = 0⇒ As+1xis+1 + bis+1 = 0.
Assume now that for a period τ > s we have Aτx
i
τ + b
i
τ = 0, then if Aτ+1x
i
τ+1 +
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biτ+1 > 0 we have again a contradiction to Lemma (2.2.4), and so by the induction
principle it follows Asx
i
s + b
i
s = 0⇒ Atxit + bit,∀t > s.
Lemma 2.2.4 implies that an agent that is unconstrained in borrowing in period
t, must have been unconstrained in all previous periods. Given that in every period
t there must exist at least one agent that is unconstrained in borrowing, it follows
that there exists at least one agent that will always be unconstrained. Corollary
2.2.1 implies that if the borrowing constraint for one agent binds in period t, it will
bind in all future periods. We can now define the set of agents whose borrowing
constraint will never bind as I1 ⊆ I. As stated above, there exists at least one agent,
that will never be borrowing constrained, so we have I1 6= ∅. Let I2 = I{1 = I\I1.
The set I2 is the set of agent for whom the borrowing constraint will bind at some
point in time. Note that, it is possible that I1 = I and I2 = ∅.
For i ∈ I1 we can show that λ
i
t+1
λi0
= pt+1.
Lemma 2.2.5. For all i ∈ I1 follows λ
i
t+1
λ0i
= pt+1.
Proof. From the definition of pt+1 we have
pt+1 =
t+1∏
s=1
qs
For each agent i ∈ I1 we have ζ it+1 = 0, ∀t. By using the FOC we get
qt+1 =
λit+1
λit
, ∀t,∀i ∈ I1
Inserting this result in the definition of pt+1 gives us the desired result
pt+1 =
λit+1
λi0
, ∀t, ∀i ∈ I1
The next Lemma will show that the present value of savings and returns from
the productive activity must go to zero as time approaches infinity.
Lemma 2.2.6. Let for an arbitrary agent i, ai be P i (q)-feasible. If there exists
M > 0, T s.t. for all t ≥ T , we have pt (Atxit + bit) > M , then ai is NOT P i (q)
optimal.
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Proof. Let 0 <  < M . Define
c˜it =c
i
t, b˜
i
t+1 = b
i
t+1, ∀t 6 T − 1
c˜iT =c
i
T +

pT
, b˜iT+1 = b
i
T+1 −

pT+1
c˜it =c
i
t, b˜
i
t+1 = b
i
t+1 −

pt+1
, ∀t > T + 1
x˜it+1 =x
i
t+1, ∀t ∈ T
The allocation ai is P i (q) feasible. Indeed, for t 6 T − 1:
c˜it + x˜
i
t+1 + qt+1b˜
i
t+1 =c
i
t + x
i
t+1 + qt+1b
i
t+1
=Atx
i
t + b
i
t
=Atx˜
i
t + b˜
i
t
For t = T :
c˜iT + x˜
i
T+1 + qT+1b˜
i
T+1 =
(
ciT +

pT
)
+ xiT+1 + qT+1
(
biT+1 −

pT+1
)
=
(
ciT +

pT
)
+ xiT+1 + qT+1b
i
T+1 −

pT
=ciT + x
i
T+1 + qT+1b
i
T+1
=Atx
i
T + b
i
T = AT x˜
i
T + b˜
i
T
For t > T :
c˜it + x˜
i
t+1 + qt+1b˜
i
t+1 =c
i
t + x
i
t+1 + qt+1
(
bit+1 −

pT+1
)
=cit + x
i
t+1 + qt+1b
i
t+1 −

pt
=Atx
i
t + b
i
t −

pt
> M − 
pt
> 0
Corollary 2.2.2. If ai is P i (q) optimal, then lim inft→∞ pt (Atxit + bit) = 0.
Proof. From Lemma 2.2.6 we have
∀i ∈ I, ∀M > 0, ∀T, ∃t > T, s.t. pt
(
Atx
i
t+1 + b
i
t+1
)
6M
This implies:
∀i ∈ I, ∀T, inf
t>T
pt
(
Atx
i
t + b
i
t
)
6M
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and hence
lim inf
t→∞
pt
(
Atx
i
t + b
i
t
)
= lim
T→∞
inf
t>T
pt
(
Atx
i
t + b
i
t
)
6M
Let M → 0. We get lim inft→∞ (Atxit + bit) 6 0. Since Atxit + bit > 0, we have
lim inft→∞ pt (Atxit + b
i
t) = 0.
Lemma 2.2.6 and Corollary 2.2.2 are similar to the condition that in a finite
period model, agents will consume everything in the last period and invest and
save nothing. The difference is that since the model consists of infinite periods,
we can not use an endpoint condition, but we must use a limit condition, i.e. a
Transversality Condition (TVC).
The next Proposition demonstrates that this Transversality Condition together
with the FOC yields the only optimal solutions of the problem P i (q).
Proposition 2.2.2 (TVC as necessary and sufficient condition for optimality). The
allocation ai is P i (q)-optimal, if and only if, it satisfies the FOC and TVC:
(TVC) lim inf
t→∞
pt
(
Atx
i
t + b
i
t
)
= 0
Proof. Let ai satisfy the FOC. After tedious computations (see Appendix 1.) we
obtain
T∑
t=0
βt
[
ui
(
cit
)− ui (cˆit)] >− λT+1 (AT+1xiT+1 + biT+1)
where aˆi =
(
cˆit, xˆ
i
t+1, bˆ
i
t+1
)
t∈T
is P i (q)-feasible.
Since −λitqt+1 +λit+1 + ζ it+1 = 0 we have λitqt+1 > λt+1, for all t > 0. This implies
λiT qT+1 >λiT+1
λiT−1qT qT+1 >λiT+1
... >...
λi0q1q2 . . . qT+1 >λiT+1
or λi0pT+1 >λiT+1
Hence
T∑
t=0
βt
[
ui
(
cit
)− ui (cˆit)] >− λi0pT+1 (AT+1xiT+1 + biT+1)
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If lim inft→∞ pt (Atxit + b
i
t) = 0, then
lim
T→∞
T∑
t=0
βt
[
ui (cti)− ui
(
cˆit
)]
> lim sup
T→∞
{−λi0pT+1 (AT+1xiT+1 + biT+1)}
=− λi0 lim inf
T→∞
pT+1
(
AT+1x
i
T+1 + b
i
T+1
)
= 0
Conversely if ai is P i (q)-optimal then it satisfies the FOC and from Corollary
2.2.2 the TVC holds.
It has been shown that the the present value of return from the productive
activity and savings tends to 0 as we approach infinity. For the purpose of this
paper it is interesting to analyse what happens to present value of savings. Note
that, it is interesting to consider the present value of savings because we did not
rule out that limt→∞At = ∞. So even with bounded investments we could have
limt→∞ pt (Atxit + b
i
t) = 0, limt→∞ ptAtx
i
t 6= 0 and limt→∞ ptbit 6= 0.
We start by showing that lim inft→∞ ptbit 6 0, ∀i.
Corollary 2.2.3. Let ai be P i (q)-feasible. If there exists M > 0, T s.t. for all
t > T , we have ptbit >M , then ai is NOT optimal.
Hence, if ai is P i (q)-optimal, then lim inft→∞ ptbit 6 0.
Proof. It is easy since ptb
i
t >M implies pt (Atxit + bit) >M . From Lemma 2.2.6 the
allocation is not optimal.
The proof of Corollary 2.2.3 is straightforward since we have Atx
i
t > 0, ∀t, ∀i.
At this point we do not know if lim inft→∞ ptbit = lim supt→∞ ptb
i
t, since it could be
that the borrowing sequence converges to two different limit values. We continue by
showing that at equilibrium, lim inft→∞ λit (Atx
i
t + b
i
t) = 0.
Lemma 2.2.7. Let ai be P i (q)-feasible. If there exists M > 0, T s.t. for all t > T ,
we have λit (Atx
i
t + b
i
t) >M , then ai is NOT P i (q)-optimal.
Proof. Let 0 <  < M . Define
c˜it =c
i
t, b˜
i
t+1 = b
i
t+1, ∀t < T − 1
c˜iT =c
i
T +

λiT
, b˜iT+1 = b
i
T+1 −

λiT+1
c˜it =c
i
t, b˜
i
t+1 −

λiT+1
, ∀t > T + 1
x˜it+1 =x
i
t+1 ∀t > 0.
The allocationai is P i (q)-feasible. First observe that for t > T , we have ζ it = 0,
since Atx
i
t + b
i
t >M > 0.
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We have, for t 6 T − 1:
c˜it + x˜
i
t+1 + qt+1b˜
i
t+1 =c
i
t + x
i
t+1 + qt+1b
i
t+1
=Atx
i
t + b
i
t
=Atx˜
i
t + b˜
i
t
For t = T :
c˜iT + x˜
i
T+1 + qT+1b˜
i
T+1 =
(
ciT +

λiT
)
+ xiT+1 + qT+1
(
biT+1 −

λiT+1
)
=
(
ciT +

λiT
)
+ xiT+1 + qT+1bT+1 −

λiT
=ciT + x
i
T+1 + qT+1b
i
T+1
=ATx
i
T + b
i
T = AT x˜
i
T + b˜
i
T
For t > T :
c˜it + x˜
i
t+1 + qt+1b˜
i
t+1 =c
i
t + x
i
t+1 + qt+1
(
bit+1 −

λit+1
)
=cit + x
i
t+1 + qt+1b
i
t+1 −

λit
=Atx
i
t + b
i
t −

λit
> M − 
λit
> 0.
Since c˜it = c
i
t, ∀t 6= T and c˜iT > ciT , the proof is over.
Corollary 2.2.4. If ai is P i (q)-optimal, then lim inft→∞ λit (Atxit + bit) = 0.
Proof. From Lemma 2.2.7 we have
∀M > 0, ∀i, ∀T, ∃t > T, s.t. λit
(
Atx
i
t + b
i
t
)
6M
This implies:
∀T, inf
t>T
λit
(
Atx
i
t+1 + b
i
t
)
6M
and hence
lim inf
t→∞
λit
(
Atx
i
t + b
i
t
)
= lim
T→∞
inf
t>T
λit
(
Atx
i
t + b
i
t
)
6M
Let M → 0. We get lim inft→∞ λit (Atxit + bit) 6 0. Since Atxit + bit > 0, we have
lim inft→∞ λit (Atx
i
t + b
i
t) = 0.
Lemma 2.2.7 and Corollary 2.2.4 imply that the marginal utility of an extra unit
of the consumption good at time t is equal to 0 as t approaches infinity. Since,
we do not know if the sequence (λit (Atx
i
t + b
i
t))t∈T approaches a unique limit, the
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statements are so far only true for the lower bound, i.e. the infimum. The next
Proposition states an alternative Transversality Condition which together with the
optimality conditions must always be fulfilled if the the allocation ai is optimal.
Proposition 2.2.3 (TVC as necessary and sufficient condition for optimality). The
allocation ai is P i (q)-optimal if, and only if, it satisfies the FOC and the TVC:
(TV C) lim inf
t→∞
λit
(
Atx
i
t + b
i
t
)
= 0
Proof. Let
(
cit, x
i
t+1, b
i
t+1
)
satisfy the FOC. After tedious computations (see Ap-
pendix 2.5.1) we obtain
T∑
t=0
βt
[
ui
(
cit
)− cˆit] >− λiT+1 (AT+1xiT+1 + biT+1)
where aˆi =
(
cˆit, xˆ
i
t+1, bˆ
i
t+1
)
t∈T
is P i (q)-feasible.
Hence
lim
T→∞
T∑
t=0
βt
[
ui
(
cit
)− ui (cˆit)] > lim sup
T→∞
{−λiT+1 (AT+1xiT+1 + biT+1)}
=− lim inf
T→∞
λiT+1
(
AT+1x
i
T+1 + b
i
T+1
)
= 0
Conversely, if ai is P i (q)-optimal then it satisfies the FOC and from Corollary
2.2.4 the TVC holds.
Note that, so far we can have an allocation ai which is P i (q)-optimal even when
lim supt→∞ λ
i
t (Atx
i
t + b
i
t) > 0. The next Corollary shows that for every optimal
allocation the marginal utility of one extra unit of savings, has a lower bound equals
to 0 as time approaches infinty.
Corollary 2.2.5. Let ai be P i (q)-feasible. If there exists M > 0, T s.t. for all
t > T , we have λitbit >M , then ai is NOT P i (q)-optimal.
Hence, if ai is P i (q)-optimal, then lim inft→∞ λitbit 6 0.
Proof. It is easy since λitb
i
t > M implies λit (Atxit + bit) > M . From Lemma 2.2.6
follows
(
cit, x
i
t+1, b
i
t+1
)
t∈T is not P i (q)-optimal.
So far we derived a Transversality Condition for initial optimisation problem of
the agent in which she/he is allowed to borrow up to −At+1xt+1 in every period
t. We will now consider an alternative problem in which the agent is only allowed
to save. This is interesting in so far that an agent that defaults, will solve this
alternative problem from the defaulting period onwards.
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We consider Problem Qi (q):
max
ci,xi,bi
∞∑
t=0
βtui
(
cit
)
s.t.∀t > 0, cit + xit+1 + qt+1bit+1 6 Atxit + bit
∀t > 0, cit > 0, xit+1 ∈ [0, 1] , bit+1 > 0
xi0 > 0, b0 are given
An allocation is Qi(q)-feasible if it fulfils the budget constraint, the non-negativity
constraint on borrowing, the non-negativity constraint on investment and upper
bound on investment. An allocation is Qi(q)-optimal if there does not exist among
all Qi(q)-feasible allocations an allocation that yields a higher utility. As for problem
P i (q) we can derive similar limit conditions for the problem Qi (q).
Lemma 2.2.8. Let ai be Qi (q)-feasible and bit+1 > 0, ∀t > 0. If there exists M > 0,
T s.t. for all t > T , we have ptbit >M , then ai is NOT Qi (q)-optimal.
Hence, if ai is Qi (q)-optimal, then lim inft→∞ ptbit = 0.
Proof. Define
b˜it+1 =b
i
t+1, ∀t 6 T − 1
c˜it+1 =c
i
t+1, ∀t 6 T − 1
x˜it =x
i
t, ∀t
b˜iT+1 =b
i
T+1 −
ε
pT+1
with 0 < ε < M
c˜iT =c
i
T +
ε
pT
c˜it =c
i
t, t > T + 1
b˜it+1 =b
i
t+1 −
ε
pt+1
, ∀t > T + 1
We have b˜it > 0, ∀t.
We claim that aˆi =
(
c˜it, x˜
i
t+1, b˜
i
t+1
)
t∈T
is Qi (q)-feasible. We have:
For t 6 T − 1,
c˜it + x˜
i
t+1 + qt+1b˜
i
t+1 =c
i
t + x
i
t+1 + qt+1b
i
t+1
=Atx
i
t + b
i
t
=Atx˜
i
t + b˜
i
t
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For t = T ,
c˜iT + x˜
i
T+1 + qT+1b˜
i
T+1 =
(
ciT +
ε
pT
)
+ xiT+1 + qT+1
(
biT+1 −
ε
pT+1
)
=ciT +
ε
pT
+ xiT+1 + qT+1b
i
T+1 −
ε
pT
=ciT + x
i
T+1 + qT+1b
i
T+1
=ATx
i
T + b
i
T
=AT x˜
i
T + b˜
i
T
For t > T − 1,
c˜it + x˜
i
t+1 + qt+1b˜
i
t+1 =c
i
t + x
i
t+1 + qt+1
(
bit+1 −
ε
pt+1
)
=cit + x
i
t+1 + qt+1b
i
t+1 −
ε
pt
=Atx
i
t +
(
bit −
ε
pt
)
=Atx˜
i
t + b˜
i
t
Since we have c˜it = ct, ∀t 6= T and c˜iT > cit, the proof is over.
This shows that in the limit the infimum of the present value of savings tends
to 0 as time approaches infinity, for problem Qi (q). Before we compare the two
problems we will consider a simple case in which agent i will always default. This
simple case consists in a borrowing sequence in which there exits a period τ in which
the present value pτb
i
τ < lim inft→∞ ptb
i
t 6 lim supt→∞ ptbit. Economically, speaking
this is the case of a plan in which there exists a period τ after which an agents starts
repaying its debt.
We start by showing that if there exists a period τ such that pτb
i
τ < lim inft→∞ ptb
i
t,
then then we have a case where the present value of the debts starts decreasing after
the period τ , i.e. the present value of the savings starts increasing for bit+1 < 0. In
other words the agents starts repaying its debts.
Lemma 2.2.9. Let ai be P i (q)-optimal. Assume
pτb
i
τ < lim inf
t→∞
ptb
i
t
Then
∃T, s.t. ∀t > T,pτbiτ < ptbit
Proof. If not, ∀T , ∃t > T , ptbit 6 pτbiτ . This implies inft>T ptbit 6 pτbiτ . Let T →∞.
We get lim inft→∞ ptbit 6 pτbiτ : contradiction.
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Lemma 2.2.10. Let ai be P i (q)-optimal. Assume prbir < lim inft→∞ ptbit. Then
there exists s > r, t > s, s.t. ptbit > psbis, ∀t > s.
Moreover, lim inft→∞ ptbit > psb
i
s.
Proof. From Lemma 2.2.9, there exists T such that ∀t > T , ptbit > prbir. We can
choose T > r. Let s satisfy psb
i
s = min {ptbit : r 6 t 6 T}. Then, for t > T , we have
ptb
i
t > pτb
i
τ > psbis. For s 6 t 6 T , we have ptbit > psbis.
It is trivial that lim inft→∞ ptbit > psb
i
s since pτb
i
τ > psbis.
Under this circumstances, we can show that an agent will default, since essen-
tially at some point in time the agent is only repaying its debt. The following
Proposition demonstrates that by defaulting the agent can increase its utility.
Proposition 2.2.4. Let ai be P i (q)-optimal. Assume prbir < lim inft→∞ ptbit. Then
agent i will default.
Proof. First remember that lim inft→∞ ptbit 6 0. Thus bir < 0. From Lemma 2.2.10
there exists s > r, s.t. ptbit > psbis, ∀t > s and lim inft→∞ ptbit > psbis. Define for any
t > s
b˜it =b
i
t −
psb
i
s
pt
x˜it+1 =x
i
t+1
c˜it =c
i
t
We have b˜is = 0 and b˜
i
t > 0, ∀t > s.
Consider the program Qis (q):
max
(cˆit,xˆit+1,bˆit+1)t>s
∞∑
t=s
βtui
(
cˆit
)
∀t > s, cˆit + xˆit+1 + qt+1bˆit+1 6 Atxˆit + bˆit
∀t > s, cˆit > 0, 1 > xˆit+1 > 0, bˆit+1 > 0, xˆit+1 = xit+1
bˆis = 0
The plan ai is Qis (q)-feasible. Indeed:
For t = s
c˜is + x˜
i
s+1 + qs+1b˜
i
s+1 =c
i
s + x
i
s+1 + qs+1
(
bis+1 −
psb
i
s
ps+1
)
=cis + x
i
s+1 + qs+1b
i
s+1 −
psb
i
s
ps
=Asx
i
s + b
i
s − bis
=Asx
i
s
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For t > s
c˜it + x˜
i
t+1 + qt+1b˜
i
t+1 =c
i
t + x
i
t+1 + qt+1
(
bit+1 −
psb
i
s
pt+1
)
=cit + x
i
t+1 + qt+1b
i
t+1 −
psb
i
s
pt
=Atx
i
t + b
i
t −
ps
pt
=Atx˜
i
t + b˜
i
t
However, this plan is not Qis (q)-optimal since lim inft→∞ ptb˜it = lim inft→∞ ptbit −
psbs > 0 (see Lemma 2.2.8). Therefore there exists another plan aˆ
i
s =
(
cˆit, xˆ
i
t+1, bˆ
i
t+1
)
t>s
which is Qis (q)-optimal. In particular,
∞∑
t=s
βtui
(
cˆit
)
>
∞∑
t=s
βtui
(
c˜it
)
=
∞∑
t=s
βtui
(
cit
)
This implies that agent i will default at date s.
We can generalise the result above to any equilibrium allocation in which agents
borrow and lim inft→∞ ptbit = 0, as shown in the next Proposition.
Proposition 2.2.5. (i) Let
(
(ai)i∈I , q
)
be an equilibrium. Assume there exists an
agent i such that (bit)t∈T has a subsequence which is non positive, different from zero
and satisfies lim inft→∞ ptbit = 0. In this case agent i will default.
(ii) Therefore, an equilibrium
(
cit, x
i
t+1, b
i
t+1, qt
)
t∈T which satisfies lim inft→∞ ptb
i
t =
0 for any i is without incentive to default if, and only if, it is no-trade, i.e. bit =
0,∀t > 0, ∀i.
Proof. (i) If the non positive sequence is different is different from zero then prb
i
r <
0 = lim inft→∞ ptbit for some r. Apply Proposition 2.2.4.
(ii) Let
(
(ai)i∈I , q
)
be an equilibrium without incentive to default. It follows
from (i) that bit = 0 if b
i
t is non positive. This property holds for any i. Since∑
i b
i
t = 0 if b
i
t = 0 is non negative.
Note that, in the economy with full commitment it is possible to have an equi-
librium in which agents borrow and repay their debts fully, or let the present value
of their debts decrease gradually until lim inft→∞ ptbit = 0. But by Proposition 2.2.5,
this equilibrium cannot exist once we introduce the option to default, since there
exists at least one agent who will default.
Let Mt =
(∏t
s=1As
)
(
∑
i x
i
0). We add the following assumption:
(A.4) ∀i, ∑∞t=0 βtui (Mt) <∞
Mt is the maximum amount of the consumption good than can be achieved by the
economy in each period t. In other words, we imagine that each agent i consumes
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0 units in every period, and the whole amount of the consumption good is invested
in every period. We assume that even if it were possible to consume this amount in
each period, no agent could achieve an infinite amount of utility.
With this additional assumption we are able to show that limt→∞ pt+1
[
At+1x
i
t+1 + bt+1
]
=
0. This is done in the following two Lemmas.
Lemma 2.2.11. Assume assumptions (A.1), (A.2), (A.3), (A.4) hold. Let
(
(ai)i∈I , q
)
be an equilibrium. Then ∀i, ∑∞t=0 λitcit <∞.
Proof. We have:
∞∑
t=0
βtui (Mt) >
∞∑
t=0
βtui
(
cit
)
=
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
ui
(
cit
)− ui (0)]
>
∞∑
t=0
βt
∂ui (cit)
∂cit
cit
=
∞∑
t=0
λitc
i
t
Lemma 2.2.12. Assume assumptions (A.1), (A.2) hold. Let
(
(ai)i∈I , q
)
be an
equilibrium. Then
∀i, lim
t→∞
pt+1
[
At+1x
i
t+1 + b
i
t+1
]
= 0
Proof. We have for all i ∈ I1, for all t:
λitc
i
t + λ
i
tx
i
t+1 + λ
i
tqt+1b
i
t+1 =λ
i
tAt
[
xit + b
i
t
]
Given that qt+1 =
1
At+1
=
λit+1
λit
,∀i ∈ I1, adding the constraints from t = 0 to t = T
and taking into account the FOC, we get
T∑
t=0
λitc
i
t + λ
i
T+1
[
AT+1x
i
T+1 + b
i
T+1
]
=λi0
(
A0x
i
0 + b
i
0
)
Since
∑∞
t=0 λ
i
tc
i
t <∞ (Proposition 2.2.5), the limit, when T →∞, of λiT+1
[
AT+1x
i
T+1 + b
i
T+1
]
exists. From Corollary 2.2.4, we obtain
lim
t→∞
λiT+1
[
AT+1x
i
T+1 + b
i
T+1
]
=0
From Lemma 2.2.5 this equality is equivalent to
∀i ∈ I1, lim
t→∞
λ0pT+1
[
AT+1x
i
T+1 + b
i
T+1
]
= 0⇔ lim
t→∞
pT+1
[
AT+1x
i
T+1 + b
i
T+1
]
= 0
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For i ∈ I2 we get the same condition since for all i ∈ I2, there exists a period s
such that
Atx
i
t + b
i
t = 0, ∀t > s
So it follows for all i ∈ I
lim
t→∞
λt+1
[
At+1x
i
t+1 + b
i
t+1
]
=0
We now come to our main result:
Theorem 2.2.1. Assume assumptions (A.1), (A.2), (A.3), (A.4) hold. Let
(
(ai)i∈I , q
)
be an equilibrium. It is without incentive to default if and only if, it is no-trade.
Proof. From Lemma 2.2.12 we have
lim
t→∞
(
λitx
i
t+1 + λ
i
tqt+1b
i
t+1
)
=0, ∀i
or
lim
t→∞
(
ptx
i
t+1 + pt+1b
i
t+1
)
=0, ∀i
Summing over i we get:
lim
t→∞
pt
(∑
i∈I
xit
)
= 0⇒ lim inf
t→∞
ptx
i
t+1 = 0, ∀i.
Consider an arbitrary agent j ∈ I. Let the subsequence {tk}∞k=1 satisfy lim supt→∞ ptxjt =
limk→∞ ptkx
j
tk
. Since
∀i, ptkxitk 6
Mt∏tk
s=1 As
6
∑
i∈I
xi0
we can assume, by taking eventually a subsequence, that ∀i 6= j, ptkxitk → li, li >
−∞, li < +∞, i.e. the subsequence converges to a finite limit. Hence
∑
i∈I limk→∞ ptkx
i
tk
=
0. In particular, lim supt→∞ ptx
j
t+1 = 0. Since lim inft→∞ ptx
j
t+1 = 0, we actually
have limt→∞ ptx
j
t+1 = 0. Since this will hold for any arbitrary agent j it follows that
limt→∞ ptxit+1 = 0, ∀i. This implies limt→∞ pt+1bit+1 = 0, ∀i. We apply Proposition
2.2.5, statement (ii) to conclude the proof.
From the discussion above follows that the only feasible equilibrium is the au-
tarky equilibrium. The intuition for the no trade result of this part is the following.
We have show that the present value of debt must converge to zero for each optimal
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trading sequence. An agent that accumulates some debt in a finite period has the
option to default, repay the debt or roll it over such that its present value converges
to zero. By a non arbitrage argument we must conclude that for the creditor it
makes no difference whether the debt is repaid or rolled over, i.e. the discounted
sum of interest payments should have the same present value as repaying the debt
in full now or any finite repayment schedule. The creditor is strictly worse of in
terms of present value for the case the borrower defaults. This implies that for the
borrower the present value of defaulting is higher than repaying or rolling over the
debt. This present value can be invested in the productive activity and thus improve
the future utility of the defaulting agents.
2.3 An example with full commitment
In this section we present an example with full commitment which highlights the
benefits of trade when investment is bounded. In this example there are two agents
with the same discount factor βit = 3/4, ∀t ∈ T , ∀i ∈ {1, 2} and the same utility
function given
U i
(
ci
)
=
∞∑
t=0
βt ln cit; ∀i ∈ {1, 2}
The other fundamentals are given by At+1 = 2,∀t ∈ T , x10 = 16/6, x20 = 8/6 and
b10 = 0, b
2
0 = 0. The equilibrium allocation with full commitment is given by
c1t =
7
6
; c2t =
5
6
; ∀t ∈ T
x1t+1 = 1; x
2
t+1 = 1; ∀t ∈ T
b1t+1 =
2
3
; b2t+1 = −
2
3
; ∀t ∈ T
qt =
3
4
; ∀t ∈ T
The Lagrange multipliers are given by
λ1t = β
t
(
6
7
)
; λ2t = β
t
(
6
5
)
; ∀t ∈ T
ζ1t+1 = 0; ζ
2
t+1 = 0; ∀t ∈ T
µ1t+1 = 0; µ
2
t+1 = 0; ∀t ∈ T
ν1t+1 = β
t
(
3
7
)
; ν2t+1 = β
t
(
3
5
)
; ∀t ∈ T
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In this equilibrium with full commitment the individual utilities are
U1
(
c1
)
=
ln
(
7
6
)
1
4
≈ 0.62
U2
(
c2
)
=
ln
(
5
6
)
1
4
≈ −0.73
To compare this solution with the autarky solution, we state the autarky optimisa-
tion problem. In autarky we have bit = 0,∀t ∈ T ,∀i ∈ {1, 2}. The Lagrangian for
an individual i are then given by
L (ci, xi) = ∞∑
t=0
βtui
(
cit
)
+
∞∑
t=0
λit
(
Atx
i
t − xit+1 − cit
)
+
∞∑
t=0
µit+1x
i
t+1 +
∞∑
t=0
νit+1
(
1− xit+1
)
The FOC are given by
∂L (ci, xi)
∂cit
=
βt
cit
− λit = 0
∂L (ci, xi)
∂xit+1
=− λit + λit+1At+1 + µit+1 − νit+1 = 0
∂L (ci, xi)
∂λit
=Atx
i
t − xit+1 − cit = 0;
λit > 0; λit > 0; λit
[
∂L (ci, xi)
λit
]
= 0
∂L (ci, xi)
∂µit+1
=xit+1 > 0; µit+1 > 0; µit+1
[
∂L (ci, xi)
∂µit+1
]
= 0
∂L (ci, xi)
∂νit+1
=1− xit+1 > 0; νit+1 > 0; νit+1
[
∂L (ci, xi)
νit+1
]
> 0
Under the given fundamentals the equilibrium is
c10 =
10
6
; c20 =
10
21
c11 = 1; c
2
1 =
5
7
c1t = 1; c
2
t = 1; ∀t > 2
x11 = 1; x
2
1 =
12
14
xit+1 = 1; x
2
t+1 = 1; ∀t > 1
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The Lagrange multipliers are given by
λ10 =
6
10
; λ20 =
21
10
λ11 =
3
4
; λ21 =
21
20
λ1t
(
3
4
)t
; λ2t =
(
3
4
)t
; ∀t > 2
µ1t+1 = 0; µ
2
t+1 = 0; ∀t ∈ T
ν11 =
9
10
; ν21 = 0
ν12 =
3
8
; ν22 =
3
40
ν1t+1 =
(
3
4
)t
1
2
; ν2t+1 =
(
3
4
)t
1
2
; ∀t > 2
The utilities in the autarky equilibrium are given by
U1
(
c1
)
= ln
(
10
6
)
≈ 0.51
U2
(
c2
)
= ln
(
10
21
)
+ ln
(
5
7
)
≈ −1.08
By comparing the utilities under autarky and full commitment we see that bor-
rowing and lending benefits both agents and the new allocation is Pareto improving.
Our no trade results has then important welfare implications for models in which
investment is bounded.
2.4 Concluding remarks
We have proven a no trade result in the spirit of Bulow and Rogoff (1989) for
a General Equilibrium economy, where the future endowment of the consumption
good depends on the investment decisions of the agents and does not follow a random
process.
Our main finding is that even in an economy with bounded investment in which
agents benefit from trade, a partial exclusion constraint is a too weak punishment
to guarantee repayment incentives.
The main limitation of our model is the fact that we are considering a model in
which agents have the same productivity. A natural extension would be to consider
different productivity factors or stochastic productivity factors. The fact that we
are in a non stochastic environment diminishes the benefits and thus weakens the
punishment we impose, when excluding defaulting agents from future borrowing.
Given the no-trade result, the question arises what motivates borrowing between
countries or agents when there is only one-sided exclusion from capital markets. A
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frequent explanation offered by the literature is the introduction of a reputation loss
in case of default. One can think of this being an exogenous cost or a direct reduction
of utility associated with the decision to default. Trade could also be motivated by
the presence of uncertainty. The idea is that, in the future there could arise a state
where an agent faces an extremely low endowment stream. In such a case it might
be possible that saving alone is not enough to insure against such a bad state. For
future work, the model could be extended along both lines, and important insights
can be gained by observing where the above proof for the no-trade result fails if
trade takes place at equilibrium.
Finally we would like to highlight an area where our results might be of interest.
As discussed before we expect that uncertainty can improve the equilibrium in the
sense agents have more incentives to trade and less incentives to default. This could
be of a major interest when considering loans in underdeveloped countries, where
the lack of property rights leads to the impossibility of collateral backed loans.
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2.5 Appendix Chapter 2
2.5.1 Discussion of TVC in chapter 2
Consider and allocation
(
cˆit, xˆ
i
t+1, bˆ
i
t+1
)∞
t=0
that is P i (q)-feasible and satisfies the
FOC. Multiplying each budget constraint (2.2.3) for period t by λit and summing up
to a period T we get
T∑
t=0
λˆitcˆ
i
t =
T∑
t=0
λˆit
(
Atxˆ
i
t + bˆ
i
t
)
−
T∑
t=0
λˆitxˆ
i
t+1 −
T∑
t=0
λˆitqt+1bˆ
i
t+1
= λˆi0
(
A0xˆ
i
0 + bˆ
i
0
)
+
T−1∑
t=0
λˆit+1
(
At+1xˆ
i
t+1 + bˆ
i
t+1
)
−
T∑
t=0
λˆitxˆ
i
t+1 −
T∑
t=0
λˆitqt+1bˆ
i
t+1
By replacing λˆitqt+1 in the last term with FOC (2.2.12) we can write
T∑
t=0
λˆitcˆ
i
t = λˆ
i
0
(
A0xˆ
i
0 + bˆ
i
0
)
+
T−1∑
t=0
λˆit+1
(
At+1xˆ
i
t+1 + bˆ
i
t+1
)
−
T∑
t=0
λˆitxˆ
i
t+1 −
T∑
t=0
(
λˆit+1 + ζˆ
i
t+1
)
bˆit+1
= λˆi0
(
A0xˆ
i
0 + bˆ
i
0
)
+
T−1∑
t=0
λˆit+1A
i
t+1xˆ
i
t+1 −
T∑
t=0
λˆitxˆ
i
t+1 −
T∑
t=0
ζˆ it+1bˆ
i
t+1 − λˆT+1bˆiT+1
By replacing λˆit in the third term with FOC (2.2.11) we can write
T∑
t=0
λˆitcˆ
i
t = λˆ
i
0
(
A0xˆ
i
0 + bˆ
i
0
)
+
T−1∑
t=0
λˆit+1At+1xˆ
i
t+1−
T∑
t=0
(
λˆit+1At+1 + µˆt+1 − νˆit+1 + ζˆ it+1At+1
)
xˆit+1 −
T∑
t=0
ζˆ it+1bˆ
i
t+1 − λˆiT+1bˆiT+1
T∑
t=0
λˆitcˆ
i
t = λˆ
i
0
(
A0xˆ
i
0 + bˆ
i
0
)
−
T∑
t=0
µˆit+1xˆ
i
t+1 +
T∑
t=0
νˆit+1xˆ
i
t+1−
T∑
t=0
ζˆ it+1
(
At+1xˆ
i
t+1 + bˆ
i
t+1
)
− λˆiT+1
(
AT+1xˆ
i
T+1 + bˆ
i
T+1
)
By adding and subtracting
∑T
t=0 νˆ
i
t+1 to the above equation and using FOC
ζˆ it+1
(
At+1xˆ
i
t+1 + bˆ
i
t+1
)
= 0 and the FOC (2.2.13), (2.2.14) we can write
T∑
t=0
λˆitcˆ
i
t = λˆ
i
0
(
A0xˆ
i
0 + bˆ
i
0
)
+
T∑
t=0
νˆit+1 − λˆiT+1
(
AT+1xˆ
i
T+1 + bˆ
i
T+1
)
(2.5.1)
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Consider now a second sequence
(
cit, x
i
t+1, b
i
t+1
)
that satisfies the FOC. We can write
T∑
t=0
(
λitc
i
t − λˆitcˆit
)
= λi0
(
A0x
i
0 + b
i
0
)− λˆi0 (A0xˆi0 + bˆi0)+ T∑
t=0
νit+1 −
T∑
t=0
νˆit+1−
(2.5.2)
λiT+1
(
AT+1x
i
t+1 + b
i
T+1
)
+ λˆiT+1
(
AiT+1xˆ
i
T+1 + bˆ
i
T+1
)
(2.5.3)
By combining FOC (2.2.11), FOC (2.2.12) and FOC (2.2.13) it is possible to write
νit+1x
i
t+1 =
(−λit + λitqt+1At+1)xt+1
νit+1 = λ
i
t (qt+1At+1 − 1)
Equation (2.5.1) hat can be written as
T∑
t=0
λˆitcˆ
i
t = λˆ
i
0
(
A0xˆ
i
0 + bˆ
i
0
)
+
T∑
t=0
λˆit (qt+1At+1 − 1)− (2.5.4)
λˆiT+1
(
AT+1xˆ
i
T+1 + bˆ
i
T+1
)
(2.5.5)
By applying FOC (2.2.12) recursively it is possible to write
λt+1 = λ
i
tqt+1 − ζ it+1
= λit−1qtqt+1 − ζ itqt+1 − ζ it
= λit−2qt−1qtqt+1 − ζ it−1qtqt+1 − ζtqt+1 − ζt+1
...
= λ0
t+1∏
s=0
qs −
t+1∑
s=0
(
ζ it+1−s
s∏
r=0
qr
)
where q0 = 1. Note that, λ
i
t > 0, ∀t, so it follows
λi0
t+1∏
s=0
qs >
t+1∑
s=0
(
ζ it+1−s
s∏
r=0
qr
)
(2.5.6)
Equation (2.5.5) can be written as
T∑
t=0
λˆitcˆ
i
t =λˆ
i
0
(
A0xˆ
i
0 + bˆ
i
0
)
+
T∑
t=0
[(
λˆi0
t∏
s=0
qs −
t∑
s=0
(
ζ it−s
s∏
r=0
qr
))
(qt+1At+1 − 1)
]
−
λˆiT+1
(
AT+1xˆ
i
T+1 + bˆ
i
T+1
)
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By using the FOC λit = β
t
i
∂ui(ct)
∂cit
and the concavity of ui (cit) it is possible to write
T∑
t=0
βtiu
i
(
cˆit
)
>
T∑
t=0
[(
λˆi0
t∏
s=0
qs −
t∑
s=0
(
ζ it−s
s∏
r=0
qr
))
(qt+1At+1 − 1)
]
−
λˆiT+1
(
AT+1xˆ
i
T+1 + bˆ
i
T+1
)
(2.5.7)
Consider now a second allocation that maximises the total utility up to a period
T , i.e. we can think of it as if βti = 0, ∀t > T . We must have λT+1 = 0 and
bˆiT+1 = −AT+1xˆit+1. In other words, since we are maximising the utility up to a
period T , we can use the end point condition for a finite time optimisation problem
that states that in the final period T the agent borrows up to its limit, since she/he
will repay the debt in the periods that are not counted in the utility. Given that the
allocation aˆi solves a finite time maximisation problem the FOC are still necessary
conditions and must hold. Consider now the allocation ai. Given inequality (2.5.6)
we can choose a sequence such that
λi0 = λˆ
i
0
bT+1 > bˆiT+1
By inserting equation (2.5.7) into (2.5.6), using the concavity of ui, inequality (2.5.6)
and Corollary (2.2.1) follows then
T∑
t=0
βti
[
ui
(
cit
)− ui (cˆit)] > −λiT+1 (AT+1xT+1 + bT+1)
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CHAPTER 3
Testing the CAPM for an artificially constructed economy
3.1 Introduction
According to Fama and French (2004) the Capital Asset Pricing Model of Sharpe
(1964) and Lintner (1965) is still widely used and of interest. The simple and
intuitive results of the model are as appealing to practitioners as they are to academic
scholars. But the model is also widely criticised because of its strong assumptions
and poor empirical record.
From a General Equilibrium point of view, the model is not satisfying since
it holds only under strong assumptions on the utility functions, see Berk (1997),
and/or strong conditions on the the distribution of returns, see Ross (1978). From
an empirical point of view, the Sharp-Lintner version of the CAPM is rejected by
most tests. For an excellent exposition of the tests, see Fama and French (2004).
An interesting critique of the CAPM tests is presented by Roll (1977). Roll
argues that testing the Sharp-Lintner version of the CAPM poses several difficulties
because the market portfolio is not known. The major argument is that most test
reject the CAPM because the portfolio used to approximate the market portfolio,
the so called market proxy, is not close to the true market portfolio resulting in a
misspecification of the CAPM. The importance of the market proxy when testing
the CAPM rests in the fact that a market portfolio has to be identified in relation to
which the CAPM is constructed. Given that it is not agreed upon what constitutes
an asset or not (consider for example human capital), and given that not all data
can be readily available, any portfolio which is chosen is essentially a market proxy.
Fama and French (2004, p.41) consider the problem of choosing a suitable market
proxy one of the major reasons why the CAPM has been rejected in major CAPM
tests. In this chapter we use a complete artificial economy to compare the estimation
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results based on the true market portfolio with the ones based on a market proxy.
The economy is completely artificial in the sense that we model and fix every aspect
of it and as such, we know exactly whether the CAPM holds or not and we know
exactly the distribution of returns and what the market portfolio is. For our esti-
mation process we generate a sequence of observed returns and use these sequence
to test the CAPM in this model. In this sense the approach we adopt is similar to
a Monte Carlo simulation. Our paper shows that for a particular class of economies
a market proxy does give reliable test results. But in this class of economies it is
very unlikely for the CAPM to be rejected even when it does not hold. We argue
that even if one were to know what the market portfolio is, estimating the CAPM
would require a very high amount of observations until the asymptotic properties of
the estimators are relevant. The artificial economy we propose will be presented in
two different versions. The first has agents with quadratic utilities and markets are
complete. In this case the CAPM will always hold. The second economy consists of
agents with logarithmic utilities and complete markets. In this economy the CAPM
does not hold in general. After calculating the equilibrium prices we will generate a
sequence of observed returns based on the probabilities specified in the model. We
then conduct an Ordinary Least Square estimation on the observed returns similar
to Jensen (1968). In a second test we omit a collection of assets from the portfolio
that is used in the estimation in order to test the CAPM with a market proxy. Given
that the CAPM does hold when agents have quadratic utility we use this type of
economy to test whether using a market proxy leads to a rejection of the CAPM.
The economy with logarithmic utility in which the CAPM does not hold, is used to
test what impact a market proxy has in case the CAPM does not hold.
Our major finding is that using a market proxy gives us a good test and estima-
tion results. Good in the sense that, the estimation results are not far from the ones
based on the true market portfolio. A second finding is that even using a sequence
of 5000 observations it is still unlikely to reject the CAPM for the economy where
it is known not to hold.
The main limitation of our paper is that we cannot calibrate our model on real
data and as such we cannot answer the question whether the CAPM holds or not.
The relevance of our results lies in the fact that we have full control of the data
generated in the economy and as such we do not face the usual problems that
models based on real data face, e.x. autocorrelation, structural breaks and so on.
Thus the estimation results depend only on the specification of the market proxy
and we can use simple statistical methods in our analysis.
The paper is organised as follows. In the first part we describe the model. In
the second part we describe the estimation process and the results. The last part
contains concluding remarks.
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3.2 The model
There are two periods in this economy, indexed by t ∈ T = {0, 1}. There exists
one consumption good at time t = 0. The consumption good is not storable and
thus can only be consumed in the period where it is available. In the second period
t = 1, there is a new endowment of this consumption good. The new endowment
of the consumption good is produced from assets. There are M states of the world
indexed by m ∈ M = {1, 2, . . . ,M}. Every asset yields a specific amount of the
consumption good in every future state of the world. There are N = M different
assets indexed by n ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . , N}. Assets differ in their payoffs. These
payoffs can be represented by vectors with M = N entries. The whole structure of
assets payoffs can be represented by a M ×N or N ×N payoff matrix given by
Π =

pi1,1 . . . pi1,N
...
. . .
...
piM,1 . . . piM,N

where pim,n denotes the payoff of asset n ∈ N in state m ∈ M. It will be assumed
that the matrix Π is of full rank. This implies that we have a complete market
structure.
Assets can be split in any amount and can be short sold. An agent can exchange
shares in assets for units of the consumption good in period t = 0.
An alternative way of thinking about this economy, is one in which the con-
sumption good consists of fruits and the assets are trees. An agent exchanges fruits
at t = 0 for a claim on the future production of a tree, which in our economy is
represented by an asset. Give random influences the trees’ fruit production may
vary in the second period.
One of the assets is denoted as the risk free asset. For example, let asset N be
the risk free asset, such that it pays the fixed amount p¯i for each state m ∈M. The
payoff matrix can then be written as
Π =

pi1,1 pi1,2 . . . p¯i
pi2,2 pi2,2 . . . p¯i
...
...
. . .
...
piM,1 piM,2 . . . p¯i

The initial endowments of the consumption good and of the assets in the whole
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economy are specified by an endowment vector with (N + 1) entries given by
E =

ε0
ε1
...
εN
 ; E ∈ RM+1
where ε0 indicates the total endowment of the consumption good in period t = 0 and
εn indicates the total initial endowment of asset n ∈ N . The endowments satisfy
the following assumptions
(A.1) The consumption good and all assets are given in positive aggregate endow-
ment, i.e.
ε0 > 0
εn > 0; ∀n ∈ N
(A.2) The individual endowments of consumption good and assets are non-negative,
i.e.
ei,0 > 0; ∀i ∈ I
ei,n > 0; ∀i ∈ I, ∀n ∈ N
(A.3) Each agent holds at least some positive endowment of the consumption good
or of some asset, i.e.
ei,0 +
N∑
n=1
ei,n > 0; ∀i ∈ I
Assumption (A.1) is self-explanatory and implies that none of the assets is a
financial asset given in zero net supply. Assumption (A.2) is convenient since to-
gether with Assumption (A.3) it guarantees that an agent with logarithmic utility
can achieve an allocation for which the utility function is defined.
The price of the consumption good is given by q0, the prices of the assets are
given by qn. The price vector can be written as
Q =

q0
q1
...
qN
 ; Q ∈ RM+1
The states of the world occur with given probabilities specified by a probability
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vector
P =

p1
p2
...
pM
 ; P ∈ RM
where pm indicates the probability with which state m occurs in period t = 1.
The probability vector satisfies the standard conditions pm > 0, ∀m ∈ M and∑M
m=1 pm = 1. Depending on which state is realised and on the choices the agent
has made, a consumption stream is realised.
There are I agents in the economy indexed by i ∈ I = {1, 2, . . . , I}. An agent
chooses a level of consumption in period t = 0, and then chooses a vector of possible
consumptions of which only one element will be realised. The consumption vector
can be written as
Ci =

ci,0
ci,1
...
ci.M
 ; Ci ∈ RM+1
where ci,0 indicates the consumption in period t = 0 and ci,m indicates the con-
sumption if the state of the world m is realized in period t = 1. Agents choose their
consumption by choosing how much they want to consume in period t = 0 and what
assets they want to hold at the given prices. The choices of asset holdings for an
agent i are given by
Si =

si,1
si,2
...
si.N
 ; Si ∈ RM
where si,n denotes agent i’s holding of asset n in period t = 1.
Given the information that is available the consumption levels can be computed
by a map ΓO : R+ × RN × RN×M → RN+1+ such that ΓO (ci,0, Si,Π) = Ci. The map
ΓO is given by the set of equations
ci,0 = ci,0 (is a choice variable)
ci,m =
N∑
n=1
si,npim,n; ∀m ∈M (3.2.1)
Equation (3.2.1) highlights the fact that agents do not choose consumption in period
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t = 1 directly, but choose the assets that they want to hold and then consume the
payoffs received from these assets.
Let the total amount of the consumption good in period t = 0 be given by
g0 = ε0
Let the total amount of the consumption good in period t = 1 and for each state
m ∈M be given by
gm =
N∑
n=1
εnpim,n
We denote by g¯ the maximum amount of the consumption good available in each
period and state, i.e.
g¯ = max {g0, . . . , gM}
The utility function of agent i is of the form
EUi (Ci) =ui (ci,0) +
∑
m∈M
pmui (ci,m) (3.2.2)
We will impose the following Assumption on the utility functions
(A.4) For all i ∈ I
∂ui (c)
∂c
|06c6g¯ > 0
During the course of our analysis we will consider a version of the model in which
agent have a quadratic utility function of the form
EUi (Ci) = γi +
(
δici,0 − κic2i,0
)
+
M∑
m=1
pm
(
δici,m − κic2i,m
)
where γi, δi and κi are individual parameters of the utility function. Assumption
(A.4) is then needed to ensure that none of the agents reaches or surpasses her/his
bliss point.
We will also consider a version of the model in which agents have logarithmic
utility functions given by
EUi (Ci) =χi + ln (ci,0 + θi) +
M∑
m=1
pm ln (ci,m + θi)
where χi and θi are individual parameters of the utility function.
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The initial endowments of an agent i are given by the vector
Ei =

ei,0
ei,1
...
ei,N
 ; Ei ∈ RM+1
where ei,0 is agent i’s initial endowment of the consumption good and ei,n is agent
i’s endowment of asset n ∈ N . Obviously the sum of the endowments of the agents
must sum up to the total endowments, that is
I∑
i=1
ei,0 = ε0
I∑
i=1
ei,n = εn; ∀n ∈ N
The budget restriction of an agent i is then given by
q0ei,0 +
N∑
n=1
qnei,n − q0ci,0 −
N∑
n=1
qnsi,n > 0 (3.2.3)
Given that no agent will reach her/his bliss point, the budget restriction will always
bind at equilibrium. This follows from Assumption (A.4) which implies that more
consumption yields always a positive amount of utility and thus it can never be op-
timal to leave consumption idle. The market clearing condition for the consumption
good in period t = 0 is given by
I∑
i=1
ci,0 =
I∑
i=1
ei,0 = ε0 (3.2.4)
The market clearing condition for the asset markets in period t = 1 can be written
as
I∑
i=1
si,n =
I∑
i=1
ei,n = εn; ∀n ∈ N (3.2.5)
Let FO =
{
Π, P, (EUi)i∈I , (Ei)i∈I
}
denote the fundamentals of this economy.
An allocation in this economy is defined by AO =
{
(ci,0)i∈I , (Si)i∈I , Q
}
, i.e. an
allocation is defined by the collection of consumption choices at t = 0 of each agent
i, the collection of security choice vectors of each agent i and the price vector.
Definition 3.2.1 (Competitive Equilibrium). A competitive equilibrium for the
economy with fundamentals FO is defined by the allocation A∗O that fulfils the
following two conditions
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(a) every agent maximises its utility function EUi with respect to the budget
constraint, i.e. each agent i ∈ I maximises (3.2.2) with respect to (3.2.3)
(b) markets clear, i.e. equation (3.2.4) and (3.2.5) are fulfilled for all n ∈ N
Proposition 3.2.1. There does not exist an equilibrium with q0 6 0, i.e. at equi-
librium q0 > 0
Proof. The proof follows from the fact that the the derivative ∂EUi(Ci)
∂ci,0
> 0,∀i. For
q0 6 0 any agent i can afford ci,0 = ε0. Since the utility function is strictly increasing
with respect to ci,0 ∈ [0, g¯] any agent would prefer to consume ci,0 > ε0 and given
that q0 6 0, any amount ci,0 > 0 is affordable. This implies that for ε0 < +∞ the
market clearing conditions can never be fulfilled.
From this proposition follows that q0 can be normalised to 1 and thus all prices can
be measured in units of the consumption good.
3.2.1 Normalisation to an orthonormal basis
In the model proposed in this chapter, the market is complete. Mathematically, this
means that the price vectors span the state-space and thus it is possible to rewrite
the model to one containing only Arrow securities. This is done by switching to
an orthonormal basis. This is very useful when simulating the economy since, the
equilibrium solution in the Arrow security models has a very simple form and can
be easily converted to a solution for the original economy. In the following it will
be shown how the solution for the Arrow securities economy is derived.
Consider the payoff matrix Π. The matrix has to be of full rank, otherwise the
assets are not linear independent and thus at least one asset is redundant. Let ~pin
denote the payoff vector of asset n. ~pin is the n-th column of matrix Π. Each payoff
vector can be treated as a basis vector in an N -dimensional Euclidean space RN .
This basis can be converted into an orthonormal basis that is equivalent to a payoff
matrix given by
ΠA =

1 0 . . . 0
0 1
. . . 0
...
. . . . . .
...
0 0 . . . 1

Each column in the matrix ΠA is a basis vector in the orthonormal basis and will
be denoted by ~piA,n. The matrix ΠA is the identity matrix. To convert to the
orthonormal basis the inverse of Π must be calculated such that
Π · Π−1 = ΠA
95
Let the inverse be given by
Π−1 =

x1,1 x1,2 . . . x1,N
x2,1 x2,2
. . . x2,N
...
. . . . . .
...
xN,1 xN,2 . . . xN,N

To find the elements of this inverse we can apply the Gauss-Jordan method. Ge-
ometrically, this implies deriving a linear combination of the original basis vectors
such that for each column vector j ∈ {1, . . . , N} of the matrix Π−1 the following
equation is fulfilled
x1,j~pi1 + x2,j~pi2 + . . .+ xN,j~piN = ~piA,j
where ~piA,j is the j-th column vector of the identity matrix. Economically, this
implies that the original assets are combined into new assets such that each asset
pays out exactly 1 unit of consumption in only one state of world. In other words,
the original assets are combined into Arrow Securities. Once the inverse of the payoff
matrix is obtained, the endowments of Arrow Securities in the economy have to be
derived. Since 1 Arrow Security pays exactly 1 unit of the consumption good in
only 1 state of the world, the endowment of an Arrow Security that pays 1 unit
of consumption in state m is given by the total amount of the consumption good
available in state m in the original economy. Let the endowment vector of Arrow
Securities be given
EA =

εA,1
εA,2
...
εA,M
 ; EA ∈ RM
Each element m ∈M is given by
εA,m =
N∑
n=1
εnpim,n
The individual endowment vector of Arrow Securities of an agent i is given by
EA,i =

ei,0
eA,i,1
...
eA,i,m
 ; EA,i ∈ RM+1
where ei,0 is the original endowment of the consumption good in period t = 0, which
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is not affected by the conversion of the basis. Each element m ∈M of the individual
endowment vector of Arrow Securities is given by
eA,i,m =
N∑
n=1
ei,npim,n (3.2.6)
To convert the optimal security choices from the original economy we let Ai be the
choice of Arrow Securities holdings of an agent i. A vector Ai is given by
Ai =

ai,1
ai,2
...
ai,M
 ; Ai ∈ RM
Let CA,i be the consumption vector in the Arrow Securities economy for agent i. For
each agent i, CA,i is given by
CA,i =

ci,0
ai,1
...
ai,M
 ; RM+1
Given the choice vector Si of the original economy, each element of Ai can be cal-
culated by a map ΓA : R+ × RN × RN×M → RN+1+ such that ΓA (ci,0, Si,Π) = CA,i.
The map ΓA is given by
ci,0 = ci,0
ai,m =
N∑
n=1
si,npim,n (3.2.1
′)
This implies that the Arrow Securities choices are the same as the consumption
choices for the solution of the original economy, i.e.
ai,m =ci,m; ∀m ∈M
Note, at this stage we have not shown that the equilibrium in the Arrow Securities
economy is the same as the equilibrium in the original economy. So far, we converted
the original maximisation problem into a problem that consists of choosing the
optimal consumption allocation directly.
It remains to convert the price vector from the original economy to the one of the
Arrow Securities economy. Given that an Arrow Security can be seen as a portfolio
of original assets that pays 1 unit of consumption in only 1 state of the world,
calculating the price of the Arrow Security corresponds to calculating the price of
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this portfolio for given prices of the original securities. The portfolio weights for
each Arrow Security are given by the column vectors of Π−1. So for a given price
vector Q the corresponding price vector of the Arrow Securities economy QA can be
found by calculating ∀m ∈M
qA,m =
N∑
n=1
qnxn,m
It is also possible to go from a given price vector of Arrow Securities to a price vector
in the original economy. In this case the price of an Arrow Security corresponds to
the price of 1 unit of consumption in state m. Thus the price of an asset in the
original economy is the value of its consumption and is given by
qn =
M∑
m=1
qA,mpim,n (3.2.7)
In other words, given the price vector of Arrow Securities, the original asset can be
seen as a portfolio of Arrow Securities with portfolio weights given by the column
vectors of Π.
The market clearing conditions in the Arrow Securities economy are given by
I∑
i=1
ci,0 =
I∑
i=1
ei,0 (3.2.4)
i∑
i=1
ci,m =
I∑
i=1
ai,m; ∀m ∈M
Let FA =
{
ΠA, P, (EUi)i∈I , (EA,i)i∈I
}
denote the fundamentals of the economy
with Arrow Securities and AA =
{
(ci,0)i∈I , (Ai)i∈I , QA
}
an allocation in this econ-
omy.
Proposition 3.2.2. For each economy with fundamentals given by FO and an
equilibrium allocation given by A∗O there exist an equivalent allocation A∗A which is
an equilibrium in the economy with fundamentals FA, such that the consumption
streams are equivalent, i.e. Ci = CA,i for all i ∈ I. And where the individual
consumption streams Ci, CA,i follow from ΓO (ci,0, Si,Π) = Ci and ΓA (ci,0, Si,Π) =
CA,i.
Proof. Let the set of feasible consumption allocations in the original economy for an
agent i be given by Bi,O. The set of feasible consumption allocations in the Arrow
Securities economy for an agent i will be given by Bi,A. The proof will proceed as
follows. We will show that for each i, Bi,O = Bi,A. Since the utility functions did not
change it follows that arg maxCi∈Bi,O EUi = arg maxCA,i∈Bi,A EUi and thus Ci = CA,i.
It remains then to show that the market clearing conditions are identical, too.
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To determine the budget set for the consumption vector let Π˜O be defined as
Π˜O =

1 0 . . . 0
0 pi1,1
. . . pi1,N
...
...
. . .
...
0 pim,n . . . piM,N

In this matrix the consumption good at time t = 0 is treated as an asset that pays
1 unit of consumption at time t = 0 and 0 in period t = 1 for each state m ∈ M.
Let S˜i,O be given by
S˜i,O =

ci,0
si,1
...
si,N
 ; S˜i,O ∈ RM+1
Given this notation the budget constraint (3.2.3) for the original economy can be
written in matrix notation as
Q>Ei −Q>S˜i,O > 0
The mapping ΓO can then be written as
ΓO
(
S˜i,O, Π˜O
)
=Π˜OS˜i = Ci (3.2.8)
Thus the budget restriction can be written as
Q>Ei −Q>Π˜−1O Ci > 0
The budget restriction for the Arrow Securities economy is given by
q0ei,0 +
N∑
n=1
qA,neA,i,n − q0ci,0 −
N∑
n=1
qA,nai,n > 0
In matrix notation this can be written as
Q>AEA,i −Q>ACA,i > 0
Equations (3.2.6) and (3.2.7) can be written as matrix equations of the form
EA,i = Π˜OEi (3.2.9)
Q> = Q>AΠ˜O → Q>A = Q>Π˜−1O
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Inserting this equations into the budget constraint for the Arrow Securities economy
yields
Q>Π˜−1O Π˜OEi −Q>Π˜−1O CA,i > 0
Q>Ei −Q>Π˜−1O CA,i > 0
So, by defining the budget sets as
Bi,O =
{
Ci ∈ RM+1 : Q>Ei −Q>Π˜−1O Ci > 0
}
Bi,A =
{
CA,i ∈ RM+1 : Q>Ei −Q>Π˜−1O CA,i > 0
}
it is obvious that the two set are identical. Since the utility functions in both
economies are the same it follows that
argmaxCi∈Bi,O EUi = argmaxCA,i∈Bi,A EUi
Ci =CA,i
It remains to show that the market-clearing conditions do not change, such that
a market clears in one economy if and only if it clears in the other economy. The
market clearing conditions (3.2.5) in the original economy can be rewritten in matrix
notation as
S˜1 + . . .+ S˜I − E1 − . . .− EI = ~0
where ~0 is the zero vector. Analogously, in the Arrow Securities economy, the market
clearing conditions can be written as
CA,1 + . . .+ CA,i − EA,1 − . . .− EA,I = ~0
Given that it has been shown that CA,i = Ci it is possible to use equation (3.2.8)
and (3.2.9) to write
Π˜OS˜1 + . . .+ Π˜OS˜I − Π˜OE1 − . . .− Π˜OEI = ~0
By multiplying this equation by Π˜−1O it is possible to write
Π˜−1O Π˜OS˜1 + . . .+ Π˜
−1
O Π˜OS˜I − Π˜−1O Π˜OE1 − . . .− Π˜−1O Π˜OEi = Π˜−1O ~0
S˜1 + . . .+ S˜I − E1 − . . .− EI = ~0
So it follows that
S˜1 + . . .+ S˜I − E1 − . . .− EI = CA,1 + . . .+ CA,i − EA,1 − . . .− EA,I = ~0
100
and the proof is concluded.
3.2.2 The maximisation problem in the orthonormal basis
for the quadratic utility model
In this section we will derive the equilibrium for the model with quadratic utilities
given by
EUi (Ci) = γi +
(
δici,0 − κic2i,0
)
+
M∑
m=1
pm
(
δici,m − κic2i,m
)
; i ∈ I
For any agent i the Lagrangian including FOC is given by
Li (CA,i, λi) =γi + δici,0 − κic2i,0 +
M∑
m=1
pm
(
δici,m − κic2i,m
)
+
λi
(
ei,0 +
M∑
m=1
qA,,meA,i,m − ci,0 −
M∑
m=1
qA,mci,m
)
∂L (CA,i, λ)
∂ci,0
=δi − 2κici,0 − λi = 0 (3.2.10)
∂L (CA,i, λi)
∂ci,M
=pm (δi − 2κici,m)− qA,mλi = 0; ∀m ∈M (3.2.11)
∂L (CA,i, λi)
∂λi
=ei,0 +
M∑
m=1
qA,,meA,i,m − ci,0 −
M∑
m=1
qA,mci,m = 0 (3.2.12)
λi > 0; λi
∂L (CA,i, λi)
∂λi
= 0
Combing (3.2.10) with (3.2.11) yields the following system of equations
ci,m =
qA,m
pm
ci,0 +
(
1− qA,m
pm
)
δi
2κi
; ∀m ∈M (3.2.13)
Inserting each of these M functions into (3.2.12) leads to the demand function for
the consumption good at t = 0
ci,0 =
ei,0 +
∑M
m=1 qA,meA,i,m −
∑M
m=1
[(
qA,m − q
2
A,m
pm
)
δi
2κi
]
1 +
∑M
m=1
q2A,m
pm
(3.2.14)
Given the demand function for the consumption good at t = 0, the demand functions
for the Arrow Securities can be derived by inserting (3.2.14) into the system of
equations (3.2.13).
To solve for the Arrow Security prices we consider the market clearing condition
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for the consumption good at t = 0∑
i∈I
ci,0 =
∑
i∈I
ei,0 = ε0
The market clearing conditions for the Arrow Securities are given by the following
set of equations
∑
i∈I
ci,m =
∑
i∈I
eA,i,m = εA,m =
qA,m
pm
ε0 +
(
1− qA,m
pm
)∑
i∈I
δi
2κi
; ∀m ∈M
The prices can be found by solving each of these equations for qA,m
qA,m =pm
(
εA,m −
∑
i∈I
δi
2κi
)
(
ε0 −
∑
i∈I
δi
2κi
) ; ∀m ∈M (3.2.15)
Given the simplicity of equation (3.2.15) it is possible to simulate an equilibrium
of a large economy by computing first the Arrow Security prices, then inserting
the results in (3.2.14) and computing the demand for ci,0. Finally, we insert prices
and ci,0 into the system of equations (3.2.13) to compute the demand for Arrow
Securities. Once the solution for the Arrow Security economy is obtained we can
convert this solution to the original economy and verify that in this case the CAPM
always holds.
3.2.3 The maximisation problem in the orthonormal basis
for the logarithmic utility model
The equilibrium allocation with logarithmic utilities is computed in a similar way
as the one with quadratic utilities. We choose a logarithmic utility function for the
case where the CAPM does not hold, because the solution in the Arrow securities
economy for this utility function is simple and convenient for the simulation. The
utility functions are of the form
EUi (Ci) = χi + ln (ci,0 + θi) +
M∑
m=1
pm ln (ci,m + θi)
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The Lagrangian including FOC for any agent i’s maximisation problem is given by
Li (Ci, λi) =χi + ln (ci,0 + θi) +
M∑
m=1
pm ln (ci,m + θi) +
λi
(
ei,0 +
M∑
m=1
qA,,meA,i,m − ci,0 −
M∑
m=1
qA,mci,m
)
∂Li (Ci, λi)
∂ci,0
=
1
ci,0 + θi
− λi = 0 (3.2.16)
∂Li (Ci, λi)
∂ci,m
=
pm
ci,m + θi
− qmλi = 0; ∀m ∈M (3.2.17)
∂Li (Ci, λi)
∂λi
=ei,0 +
M∑
m=1
qA,,meA,i,m − ci,0 −
M∑
m=1
qA,mci,m = 0 (3.2.18)
λi > 0; λi
∂L (CA,i, λi)
∂λi
= 0
Combining (3.2.16) with (3.2.17) yields the following system of equations
ci,m =
pm
qA,m
ci,0 +
(
pm
qA,m
− 1
)
θi; ∀m ∈M (3.2.19)
Inserting each of this M functions into (3.2.18) leads to the demand function for the
consumption good at t = 0
ci,0 =
ei,0 +
∑M
m=1 qA,meA,i,m + θi
(∑M
m=1 qA,m − 1
)
2
(3.2.20)
The demand functions of Arrow Securities can then be derived by inserting (3.2.20)
into the system of equations (3.2.19).
By using the market clearing condition for the consumption good at t = 0, the
market clearing conditions for the Arrow Securities can be written as
∑
i∈I
ci,m =
∑
i∈I
eA,i,m = εA,m =
pm
qA,m
ε0 +
(
pm
qA,m
− 1
)∑
i∈I
θi; ∀m ∈M
Solving for the prices yields
qA,m =pm
(
ε0 +
∑
i∈I θi
)(
εA,m +
∑
i∈I θi
) ; ∀m ∈M (3.2.21)
To simulate this economy, we will first derive the prices. The solution is then
inserted into (3.2.20) and the demand for ci,0 is derived. Last, we insert our result
into (3.2.19) and derive the demand for Arrow Securities.
Once the equilibrium in the Arrow Securities economy is derived we can convert
our result to the original economy. In the log utility model the CAPM does not
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always hold, in contrast to the case in the quadratic utility economy.
3.3 The Estimation process
Our estimation process consists in simulating an artificial economy as specified
above. We will calculate the equilibrium prices and then generate a sequence of
observed returns based on the probabilities specified in the fundamentals of the
economy. With the sequence of observed returns we will conduct and OLS estima-
tion of the CAPM, by using the true market portfolio and a proxy for the market
portfolio. This process will be performed for economies with logarithmic utility
where the CAPM holds and for economies with quadratic utilities.
The next three subsections describe the simulation process, the econometric
model and present the results of the estimation process.
3.3.1 The Simulation
We fix the number of asset and states of the world M = N . Given that the solution
of the equilibrium price vector depends only on the aggregate endowments, we will
consider only I = 2 agents. The payoff matrix Π, the probability vector P and the
endowments E1, E2 and e1,0, e2,0 are generated randomly.
To increase the spread between the return of the market portfolio and the return
of the risk free asset we will add the following matrix to the randomly generated
payoff matrix Π
T =

0 0 . . . 0
τ τ . . . 0
2τ 2τ . . . 0
...
...
...
...
(M − 1)τ (M − 1)τ ... 0

where τ is a positive scalar and matrix T is of dimension M ×N . Note that since
matrix T is of rank 1 the new payoff matrix ΠT , given by
ΠT = Π + T
is of full rank, if Π is of full rank. The economy including matrix T can be interpreted
as an economy in which state m = 1 is the worst state and state m = M is the best.
It does not necessary mean that each asset pays the most in state M , but in general
it will be true.
To avoid unrealistic returns we will also scale the endowment of the consumption
good and the risk-free asset. Note that, since returns are measured in units of the
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consumption good, the initial endowment of the consumption good will determine
whether the returns on the assets are negative or positive.
Without loss of generality, we will consider only economies with non-negative
payoffs in which there exists a risk free asset and in which the payoff matrix has full
rank, i.e.
pim,n > 0; ∀n ∈ N , ∀m ∈M
pim,N = p¯i > 0; ∀m ∈M
det Π 6= 0
The generated probability vector satisfies the standard assumption and the gener-
ated endowments satisfy assumption (A.1)-(A.3).
To construct the market portfolio we consider the equilibrium prices and con-
struct the portfolio weights according to the following formula
ωn =
qnεn∑N−1
n=1 qnεn
; 1 6 n 6 N − 1
The weights for the proxy of the market portfolio are constructed by ignoring the
first k assets. The weights of the market proxy are calculated according to
ω˜n =
ωn∑N−1
n=2 ωn
; k + 1 6 n 6 N − 1
Given the equilibrium prices we can construct the equilibrium returns as show
in the following matrix
R =

pi1,1
q1
− 1 pi1,2
q2
− 1 . . . p¯i
qN
− 1
pi2,1
q1
− 1 pi2,2
q2
− 1 . . . p¯i
qN
− 1
...
. . . . . .
...
piM,1
q1
− 1 piM,2
q2
− 1 . . . p¯i
qN
− 1

With the equilibrium returns we can construct the CAPM as shown in the Appendix.
We will then proceed by generating a sequence of observed returns and estimating
the CAPM with an OLS estimation. The economy is not a dynamic economy, in
the sense that we will use the result of the two period model for constructing the
sequence of observed returns, i.e. we will simulate the economy only once and extract
the equilibrium prices. Judd et al. (2003) show that in an economy with shocks the
optimal portfolio hold by agents is time and shock independent. In our case we
can see that the optimal solution depends only on the aggregate endowments, thus
considering a dynamic economy would not change the results significantly unless we
change the aggregate endowments.
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3.3.2 The econometric model
The Sharp-Lintner Model predicts that given that, the market portfolio is mean-
variance efficient and given that the capital market line is tangent to the minimum
variance frontier, for each asset n ∈ N the following equation holds
rn =rf + βn (rMP − rf ) (3.3.1)
βn =
σMP,n
σMP,MP
where rf is the risk free return, which corresponds to the return of asset N in our
economy. rn and rMP are the expected return of asset n and of the market portfolio,
respectively. Merton (1972) demonstrates the derivation of equation (3.3.1) through
a variance minimisation problem. βn is economically speaking the degree to which
asset n is correlated with the market portfolio and how risky it is compared to the
market.
For our estimation we rewrite (3.3.1) as
rn − rf =βn (rMP − rf ) (3.3.2)
as demonstrated by Jensen (1968), where (rn − rf ) is the risk-premium of asset n
over the risk free asset and (rMP − rf ) is the risk-premium of the market portfolio
over the risk free asset.
We will denote by J the length of the sequence of observed returns that will
be generated according to the probability distribution specified in the model. To
construct our data a pseudo random number generator is used to generate a sequence
of {mj}Jj=1 states of the world such that mj ∈M, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , J}. We use then our
equilibrium prices to generate for each asset n ∈ N a sequence of observed returns
{rn,j}Jj=1. With the observed returns we can construct our data set consisting of
N − 1 dependent variable vectors Yn = (yn,1, yn,2, . . . , yn,J) and one independent
variable vector X = (x1, x2, . . . , xJ). The elements of these vectors are given by
yn,j =rn,j − rf ; ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , J}
xn,j =rMP,j − rf ; ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , J}
We then proceed in the estimation of (3.3.2) by using an OLS estimation. The
econometric equation is given by
yn,j =αn + βnxj + un,j
where αn is Jensen’s Alpha for asset n. αn has the economic interpretation of excess
return of asset n. When the CAPM holds the return of an asset depends on the
risk this asset has compared to the market portfolio. In other words the βn. An
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αn > 0 implies that the asset pays a higher return compared to the amount of risk
it carries. In our case a positive αn implies that the CAPM does not hold for this
asset.
For the estimation where we use a market portfolio proxy we replace our depen-
dent variable by
x˜j =rpr,j − rf ; ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , J}
where rpr,j is the return of the market portfolio proxy when state j is observed. To
derive the econometric model for the market proxy we define by N1 ⊂ N all assets
that are included in the market proxy. The econometric equation is then given by
yn,j =α
′
n,j + β
′
n,jx˜j + u
′
j; ∀n ∈ N1
After deriving our estimates we test for the significance of our estimates. To test
the significance of the estimated parameters we use a 2 tailed student t-test at a 5%
significance level. For the model where we use the correct market portfolio we will
test for each an the following null-hypothesis
H0 : αˆn = 0; H1 : αˆn 6= 0
For the βˆn-estimators we test the following null-hypothesis
H0 : βˆn = βn; H1 : βˆn 6= βn
where we use the simulation results to estimate the true value for βn.
3.4 Simulation results
In this section we report the result of our simulation calibrations. To avoid examples
with extremely high or low returns we will adjust the payoffs, scale the endowments
of the consumption good and of the risk free asset, and adjust the parameters of
the utility function. The test results are very sensitive to the size of the returns and
the size of Jensen’s α. The examples below try to match realistic values, although
we encountered problems in keeping the spread between the return of the market
portfolio and the risk free return above 2% in the case where agents have quadratic
utilities.
Since we are considering large economies, we will summarise the main properties
of our economy by by showing key values. We will denote by rMP the expected
return of the market portfolio at equilibrium. The mean of the observed returns will
be denoted as r¯MP . In a similar way we will denote the equilibrium expected return
of the market proxy as rPR and the mean of the observed returns of the market
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proxy will be given by r¯PR. Recall that, the true values of Jensen’s α is given by
αn = rn − rN − βn (rMP − rN) ; ∀n ∈ N
We define by A the vector containing the absolute α-values, i.e.
A =

|α1|
|α2|
...
|αN |

We will denote by αmax the maximum element of vector A and by αmin the minimum
element of A. Given the large amount of assets considered, rounding errors will
occur. For the quadratic utility economy αmax and αmin capture the size of this
rounding errors. For the logarithmic utility economy αmax and αmin are different
from 0, because the CAPM does not hold. In this case the size of αmax and αmin
highlight how close the true value is to zero, including rounding errors. Of crucial
interest will be the amount of assets for which the null hypothesis is rejected. We
denote by Hr0,α the number of assets for which we reject the null for the estimators
αˆn and by H
r
0.β the number of assets for which the null is rejected for the estimators
βˆn. The relative amount of rejection for each set of estimators will be denoted by
H˜r0,α and H˜
r
0,β. When we use the market portfolio in our independent variable, this
values are given by
H˜r0,α =
Hr0,α
N − 1
H˜r0,β =
Hr0,β
N − 1
When we use the market proxy the values are given by
H˜r0,α =
Hr0,α
N − 1− k
H˜r0,β =
Hr0,β
N − 1− k
where k is the amount of assets that are excluded in the market proxy.
3.4.1 Results for the quadratic utility
The first example we consider follows below.
Table 3.2 reports the results of our estimation in which we use the market port-
folio as the independent variable. Table 3.3 reports the results of the estimation in
which the market proxy was used as the independent variable.
From the definition of the significance level follows that there is a probability that
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no. of assets N = M 250
no. of observations J 365
no. of assets omitted in the market proxy k 50
size of the market proxy relative to market portfolio J−1−k
J−1 0.7992
rN 0.059672
Table 3.1: Example 1
rMP 0.078685
r¯MP 0.064937
αmin −1.3184 exp(−15)
αmax 6.245 exp(−16)
Hr0,α,
(
H˜r0,α
)
6, (0.024096)
Hr0,β,
(
H˜r0,β
)
10, (0.0401606)
Table 3.2: Results example 1: market portfolio
rPR 0.078684
r¯PR 0.064935
αmin −1.0379 exp(−7)
αmax 1.5734 exp(−7)
Hr0,α,
(
H˜r0,α
)
7, (0.035176)
Hr0,β,
(
H˜r0,β
)
7, (0.035176)
Table 3.3: Results example 1: market proxy
we will reject the null hypothesis even when it is true. Given that under quadratic
utility the CAPM holds, the rejection rate of our 5% t-test should be around 5%.
This should hold for the tests performed on the αˆn-estimators and on the tests
performed on the βˆn-estimators. In our example we can see that the true α values are
almost zero, except for rounding errors in the range of (−1.4e−15,+6.5e−16). In the
estimation where we used the market portfolio, Hr0,α in table 3.2 reports the amount
of assets for which the null hypothesis was rejected on the set of estimators {αˆn}249n=1.
Out of 249 assets that are contained in the market portfolio the null hypothesis on
the respective estimator αˆn was rejected for 6 assets, which corresponds to around
2.41% of the assets. For the set of estimators
{
βˆn
}249
n=1
the amount of assets for
which we reject the null hypothesis is given by Hr0,β in table 3.2. We see that the
null hypothesis was rejected for 10 assets which corresponds to around 4% of the
assets.
When using the market proxy the amount of assets for which the tests are per-
formed is given by 199. The sets of estimators are given by {αˆn}249n=51 and
{
βˆn
}249
n=51
.
Hr0,α in table 3.3 shows the amount of assets for which we reject the null hypothesis
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on the set of estimators {αˆn}249n=51. For this set of estimators the null hypothesis is
rejected for 7 assets out of 199, which corresponds to around 3.5% of the assets.
Hr0,β show the amount of assets for which we reject the null hypothesis on the set
of estimators
{
βˆn
}249
n=51
. Out of 199 assets we reject the null hypothesis for 7 assets
which is around 3.5% of the assets.
Given that in both cases the rejection rates are close to the 5% significance level,
it is very unlikely that we would have rejected the CAPM for this data set. Even for
the case where we used the market proxy the rejection rates are not high enough to
allow us to reject the CAPM. Based on this test results we would draw the correct
conclusion which is not to reject the CAPM.
3.4.2 Results for the logarithmic utility
We consider now an example with logarithmic utility. The example is specified in
table 3.4.
no. of assets N = M 250
no. of observations J 365
no. of assets omitted in the market proxy k 50
size of the market proxy relative to market portfolio M−1−k
M−1 0.7992
rN 0.002368
Table 3.4: Example 2
Table 3.5 and table 3.6 summarise the results for the market portfolio and the
market proxy, respectively.
rMP 0.090639
r¯MP 0.082722
αmin −0.0057955
αmax 0.005024
Hr0,α,
(
H˜r0,α
)
10, (0.0401606)
Hr0,β,
(
H˜r0,β
)
21, (0.0843373)
Table 3.5: Results example 2: market portfolio
When considering an economy with logarithmic utility the CAPM does not hold
in general. We can see from table 3.5 that the true α values are not equal to zero.
Comparing them with the errors from table 3.2 we conclude that these are not
rounding errors. In this case the rejection rates should be considerably higher than
5%.
The test results on the βˆn-estimators are more difficult to interpret and to predict.
Although the CAPM does not hold in this case, it is not excluded that the risk-
premium of the market portfolio rMP − rN can have some explanation power for the
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rPR 0.090944
r¯PR 0.08245
αmin −0.0053572
αmax 0.0051011
Hr0,α,
(
H˜r0,α
)
7, (0.035176)
Hr0,β,
(
H˜r0,β
)
19, (0.0954774)
Table 3.6: Results example 2: market proxy
individual risk premium of the assets. For this reason we do not know what the true
value is.
When using the market portfolio as independent variable the sets of estimators
are given by {αˆn}249n=1 and
{
βˆn
}249
n=1
. Hr0,α in table 3.5 reports the amount of assert
for which we reject the null hypothesis out of the 249 αˆn-estimators. In this case
the null hypothesis is rejected for 10 assets out of 249, which corresponds to around
4% of the assets. For the 249 βˆn-estimators the amount of assets for which the null
is rejected is reported by Hr0,β in table 3.5. We see that the null is rejected for 21
assets out of 249, which is around 8.4% of the assets.
When using the market proxy as independent variable the amount of assets for
which we reject the null on the set of estimators {αˆn}249n=51 is given by Hr0,α in table
3.6. Out of 199 assets the null is rejected for 7 assets, which corresponds to around
3.5% of the assets. The amount of assets for which we reject the null hypothesis on
the set of estimators
{
βˆn
}249
n=51
is given by Hr0,β in table 3.6. Out of 199 assets the
null hypothesis is rejected for 19, i.e. around 9.5% of the assets.
The example above shows that the market proxy does still give estimates that
are close to the ones based on the market portfolio. But although the CAPM does
not hold, the rejection rates for the tests performed on the αˆn-estimators are lower
than 5%. Based on the test results on the αˆn-estimators it is unlikely that we would
reject the CAPM even if in this case the CAPM does not hold.
To clarify why we are not able to reject the CAPM based solely on the test of
the αˆ estimators, we need to study the asymptotic properties of our model. This is
done in the next section.
3.5 Asymptotic behaviour of the logarithmic model
We use a similar economy as in example 1 and example 2, but increase the number
of observations J for each asset to show that we can get a significant rejection rate
for high values. The question is whether these amount of observations are feasible
in reality. Table 3.7 specifies our third example.
The results for the market portfolio and the market proxy are reported in table
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no. of assets N = M 250
no. of observations J 2002
no. of assets omitted in the market proxy k 50
size of the market proxy relative to market portfolio M−1−k
M−1 0.7992
rN −0.022718
Table 3.7: Example 3
3.8 and table 3.9, respectively.
rMP 0.063564
r¯MP 0.074579
αmin −0.0048623
αmax 0.0038018
Hr0,α,
(
H˜r0,α
)
18, (0.0722892)
Hr0,β,
(
H˜r0,β
)
11, (0.0441767)
Table 3.8: Results example 3: market portfolio
rPR 0.063468
r¯PR 0.074778
αmin −0.0048515
αmax 0.0038301
Hr0,α,
(
H˜r0,α
)
14, (0.0703518)
Hr0,β,
(
H˜r0,β
)
10, (0.0502513)
Table 3.9: Results example 3: market proxy
By comparing Hr0,α from table 3.8 with H
r
0,α from table 3.9 we see that the test
results on the αˆn-estimators are still close. When using the market portfolio as
the independent variable the null hypothesis on the αˆn-estimators is rejected for 18
assets, i.e. around 7% of the assets. When using the market proxy we reject the
null for 14 assets out of 199, which is around 7% of the assets, too. In this example
we included 2002 observations for each asset. If these where daily observations this
would correspond to almost 5 years and 6 months of observations. The rejection
rates are still close to the 5% significance level, but they are both above the 5%
significance level. In this case we would reject the CAPM, which would be the
correct decision. But considering the amount of observations we have included, we
find that the rejection rate is surprisingly low.
In the next example we increase the number observations to an amount that
allows us to reject the CAPM, convincingly.
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no. of assets N = M 250
no. of observations J 50002
no. of assets omitted in the market proxy k 50
size of the market proxy relative to market portfolio M−1−k
M−1 0.7992
rN −0.028398
Table 3.10: Example 4
The results for the market portfolio and the market proxy are shown in table
3.11 and table 3.12, respectively.
rMP 0.05557
r¯MP 0.05608
αmin −0.004123
αmax 0.00407
Hr0,α,
(
H˜r0,α
)
51, (0.204819)
Hr0,β,
(
H˜r0,β
)
7, (0.028112)
Table 3.11: Results example 4: market portfolio
rPR 0.055789
r¯PR 0.056309
αmin −0.0033618
αmax 0.0039242
Hr0,α,
(
H˜r0,α
)
35, (0.175879)
Hr0,β,
(
H˜r0,β
)
7, (0.035176)
Table 3.12: Results example 4: market proxy
Note that, if these where daily observations we would have included around 136
years of observations for each asset. The rejections rates for the test on the α values
are in this cases far from the 5% significance level, but the results of the market
proxy are still close to the results of the market portfolio. Hr0,α in table 3.11 shows
that we reject the null on the αˆn-estimators for 51 assets out of 199, when the market
portfolio is the independent variable. This is a rejection rate of around 20%. When
the market proxy is the independent variable, Hr0,α shows that we reject the null
hypothesis for 35 assets out of 199. This is a rejection rate of around 17%. In both
cases we would draw the correct conclusion and reject the CAPM.
In all the examples we have shown, the tests performed on the estimators where
the market proxy has been used as the independent variable would lead as to the
same conclusion as the tests performed on the estimators where the true market
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portfolio has been used. From our analysis we conclude that in our economies, the
market portfolio does give reliable results.
Surprisingly we find it hard to reject the CAPM when it does not hold. This
raises the question whether it is feasible to test the CAPM based on real data.
Considering that the most convincing result would correspond to more than 136
years of daily observations, it can be expected that by this time a structural break
would have occurred.
It has also to be noted that the rejection rates on the βˆn-estimators are never far
from the 5% significance level. This suggests that even when the CAPM does not
hold, there exists a linear relation between the risk-premium of the market portfolio
and the risk-premium of the individual assets. But since we have no theoretical
model at hand, we can not comment further on this result.
3.6 Reducing the accuracy of the market proxy
In this section we will reduces the accuracy of the market portfolio by omitting
more than half of the assets contained in the market portfolio. The example for the
quadratic utility function follows below.
no. of assets N = M 250
no. of observations J 365
no. of assets omitted in the market proxy k 125
size of the market proxy relative to market portfolio M−1−k
M−1 0.4980
rN 0.060731
Table 3.13: Example 5
The estimation results for the market portfolio and the market proxy follow in
table 3.14 and 3.15.
rMP 0.079668
r¯MP 0.075548
αmin −1.1102 exp(−015)
αmax 9.2981 exp(−016)
Hr0,α,
(
H˜r0,α
)
12, (0.0481928)
Hr0,β,
(
H˜r0,β
)
13, (0.0522088)
Table 3.14: Results example 5: market portfolio
We can see that the α values increase in absolute terms and also the rejection
rates increase slightly. The rejection rates with the true market portfolio are around
5%, the rejection rates with the market proxy are slightly higher. But given that
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rPR 0.079665
r¯PR 0.075577
αmin −2.2796 exp(−007)
αmax 3.4092 exp(−007)
Hr0,α,
(
H˜r0,α
)
8, (0.064516)
Hr0,β,
(
H˜r0,β
)
10, (0.0806452)
Table 3.15: Results example 5: market proxy
we ignored more than half of the assets that are contained in the market portfolio
the rejection rates are still surprisingly low.
We will now show a similar example for the case where the CAPM does not hold.
no. of assets N = M 250
no. of observations J 365
no. of assets omitted in the market proxy k 125
size of the market proxy relative to market portfolio M−1−k
M−1 0.4980
rN 0.0013782
Table 3.16: Example 6
The next two tables show the estimation results based on the market portfolio
and the ones based on the market proxy.
rMP 0.0013782
r¯MP −0.0077242
αmin −0.0045849
αmax 0.004662
Hr0,α,
(
H˜r0,α
)
5, (0.02008)
Hr0,β,
(
H˜r0,β
)
10, (0.0401606)
Table 3.17: Results example 6: market portfolio
rPR 0.0014152
r¯PR −0.0076808
αmin −0.00424
αmax 0.0039229
Hr0,α,
(
H˜r0,α
)
4, (0.032258)
Hr0,β,
(
H˜r0,β
)
6, (0.048387)
Table 3.18: Results example 6: market proxy
This last examples confirms the results that we have so far collected. Even when
the CAPM does not hold a misspecification of the market proxy has a minimal
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effect on the results. In this case the α values do not even increase significantly.
The rejection rates increase only slightly. Given the low rejection rates we would
reach the wrong conclusion in this case and not reject the CAPM.
3.7 Concluding remarks
We have shown that in general the market proxy provides accurate estimates of the
model. Roll’s critique remains still valid, but our model raises the question whether
noise in the data would not have a greater impact on the test results. This can be
also be seen in our second argument, where we have shown that a high amount of
observations is required to get significant rejection rates. Our examples suggest that
there could exist external factors that drive the rejection rates in real world tests of
the CAPM.
The limitations, of our analysis are in so far that we did not impose a particular
structure on the assets that are not included in the market proxy. It can be expected
that, if the assets we exclude from the market proxy have a very strong negative
correlation with the remaining assets contained in the market proxy, our results
might change. A second limitation is that we added some autocorrelation in our
payoffs, this has been done to achieve a realistic spread between risk free return and
return of the market portfolio. The problem of doing so is that the asset are in a
way very similar and thus the impact of excluding one asset might be lower.
A third limitation is that with this type of models it is difficult to calibrate
the returns to similar values observed in actual data. On the other hand, the values
used here might be closer to the true values, since they contain less noise than actual
data.
Despite the limitations mentioned here, we would like to mention a possible
extension of our framework, that due to its scope is not included in this chapter.
The results presented here show that other factors than the market proxy may have
a big impact on the results of the CAPM tests. One of these factors might be
structural breaks. When structural breaks occur, the statistician is using data that
is based on two (or more) different data generating processes. Thus, it is very likely
that the test results lead to a rejection because part of the data does simply not
reflect the model that is assumed to be true. In our framework it is possible to
introduce structural breaks and compare the results with the current ones to asses
whether structural breaks or the misspecification of the market portfolio have a
bigger impact. This can be of interest for future CAPM tests insofar as it puts the
problem of the market proxy in relation with the problem of structural breaks and
can give us a better understanding of the magnitude of both problems.
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3.8 Appendix Chapter 3
3.8.1 Computing the CAPM
We compute the equilibrium of the quadratic utility economy as described in Section
2.3 and for the logarithmic utility economy as described in section 2.4. For an
economy with fundamentals FO and an equilibrium allocation A∗O the return matrix
is given by
R =

r1,1 r1,2 . . . r1,N
r2,1 r2,2
. . . r2,N
...
. . . . . .
...
rM,1 rM,2 . . . rM,N
 =

pi1,1
q1
− 1 pi1,2
q2
− 1 . . . p¯i
qN
− 1
pi2,1
q1
− 1 pi2,2
q2
− 1 . . . p¯i
qN
− 1
...
. . . . . .
...
piM,1
q1
− 1 piM,2
q2
− 1 . . . p¯i
qN
− 1

The average return vector for each asset n ∈ N is given by
r¯ =

r¯1
r¯2
...
r¯N
 =

(
∑M
m=1 pmpim,1)
q1
− 1
(
∑M
m=1 pmpim,2)
q2
− 1
...
p¯i
qN
− 1

The variance covariance matrix can be computed as
Σ =

σ1,1 σ1,2 . . . σ1,N
σ2,1 σ2,2
. . . σ2,N
...
. . . . . .
...
σN,1 σN,2 . . . σN,N

where σn,n = σ
2
n is the variance of returns of asset n which is equivalent to the
covariance of return of asset n with itself. The formula for the covariances is given
by
σk,l =
M∑
m=1
pm (rm,k − r¯k) (rm,l − r¯l) ; ∀k, l ∈ N
By using the aggregate endowment vector E we can compute the portfolio share of
the market portfolio weights
ωn =
qnεn∑N−1
n=1 qnεn
; 1 6 n 6 N − 1
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The vector of market portfolio weights will be denoted by
~ω =

q1ε1∑N−1
n=1 qnεn
q2ε2∑N−1
n=1 qnεn
...
qN−1εN−1∑N−1
n=1 qN−1εN−1

The return and variance of the market portfolio are given by
rMP =
N−1∑
n=1
ωnr¯n
σMP,MP =
N−1∑
k=1
N−1∑
l=1
ωkωlσk,l
The covariance between the market portfolio and an asset n is given by
σMP,n =
N−1∑
k=1
ωkσn,k
We can now construct the SML equation
rn =rf + βn (rMP − rf ) (3.3.1)
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